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I. Introduction
In commemoration of the tenth anniversary of 9/11, syndicated,
conservative columnist George F. Will wrote a perspicacious piece
entitled Sept. 1I's Self-Inflicted Wounds. Mr. Will's editorial compares
American responses to the tenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor with
those of 9/11. Although Pearl Harbor heralded America's entry into
an inescapable war that would ultimately cost the lives of more than
400,000 citizens,' the nation, recounted Mr. Will, met that solemn
ten-year anniversary with little fanfare. As he wrote, "On Dec. 8,
1951, the day after the 10th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the New
York Times' front page made a one-paragraph mention of
commemorations the day before, when the paper's page had not
mentioned the anniversary." 2 Mr. Will further asserted:
The most interesting question is not how America in 2011 is
unlike America in 2001 but how it is unlike what it was in 1951.
The intensity of today's focus on the 10th anniversary of Sept. 11
testifies to more than the multiplication of media ravenous for
content, and to more than today's unhistorical and self-
dramatizing tendency to think that eruptions of evil are violations
of a natural entitlement to happiness. It also represents the search
for refuge from a decade defined by unsatisfactory responses to
Sept. 11.3
Although not addressed by Mr. Will, the decision to try
suspected terrorists associated with 9/11 by military commissions
has arguably been the most unsatisfactory response to the war on
terror to date. In a combative memoir published five years after
9/11, John Yoo, "the key architect for the Bush administration's
legal response to the terrorist threat," 4 writes that "[m]ilitary
commissions have been the Bush administration's most conspicuous
policy failure in the war against al Qaeda." 5 Indeed, the numbers
1. See, e.g., ANNE LELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32492, AMERICAN WAR
AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2 (2010) (calculating that
405,399 U.S. military personnel died during service in World War II).
2. George F. Will, Sept. 1I's Self-Inflicted Wounds, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2011, at
A15.
3. Id.
4. Michiko Kakutani, What Torture Is and Isn't: A Hard-Liner's Argument, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at El.
5. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 208 (2006).
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alone support that supposition. Since President Bush decreed that
suspected 9/11 terrorists would be tried by military commissions on
November 13, 2001, until he left office on January 20, 2008, military
comnuissions convicted three individuals - two of whom are no
longer in custody. 6
The Obama Administration's bifurcated approach to Article III
courts and military commissions has been similarly ineffectual.
Following dissemination of the Guantinamo Review Task Force
report mandated by Executive Order (E.O.) 13,492 in the spring of
2010,7 four detainees have pled guilty under the revised Military
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2009 since commissions were restarted
in the spring of 2010.8
The paucity of convictions can be attributed primarily to the
lack of an existing legal precedent. Although American use of
military commissions predates the founding of the United States, 9
the last employment of military commissions was Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's (FDR) decision to try eight Nazi saboteurs in 1942.10
That model - heavily relied upon by the Bush Administration - has
routinely been criticized as "a precedent not worth repeating.""l
6. See infra Part II.A.4.
7. Although the joint interagency task force completed its report in January
2010, the Washington Post reported the Administration chose not to send it to select
committees on Capitol Hill until late-May 2009 due to the attempted bombing of
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day, 2009. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Most
Guantanamo Detainees Low-Level Fighters, Task Force Report Says, WASH. POST, May
29, 2010, at A03 (noting that "there was little public or congressional appetite for
further discussion of its plan to close the military detention center").
8. See infra Part II.B.3.
9. For an historical overview of the use of military commissions in American
history, see Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS & PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2005) [hereinafter FISHER, TRIBUNALS]. See also
MAJ Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, THE ARMY LAW 41
(Mar. 2002).
10. For an excellent overview of Ex Parte Quirin, see Louis FISHER, NAZI
SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 161 (2d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter FISHER, SABOTEURS]; PIERCE O'DONNELL, IN TIME OF WAR: HITLER'S
TERRORIST ATTACK ON AMERICA (2005); MICHAEL DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID
ON AMERICA (2004).
11. Louis Fisher, Military Commissions: Problems of Authority and Practice, 24 B.U.
INT'L L. J. 15, 16 (2006) ("A close look at Quirin reveals a process and a decision with
so many deficiencies that it should be remembered as a precedent not worth
repeating."). See also JAMES A. THURBER, RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 331 (4th ed. 2009) ("Two years after the Court released
the full opinion in Quirin, the Roosevelt Administration decided that the procedure
it followed in 1942 was so flawed that it was not a model worth repeating."). See
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Consequently, as one practitioner explains, the lack of reliable
precedent from which to draw has "resulted in a disturbing
uncertainty surrounding the state of applicable law and has created
extensive delays, with striking implications for individual cases." 12
Congress has been forced to overhaul the system twice, from the
military commissions originally conceived in President Bush's
November 13, 2001, order, to the post-Hamdan 2006 MCA, to the
2009 MCA. With each overhaul has come the need for new
instructions and rules, often accompanied by several revisions.13
Delays have been inescapable as military prosecutors have been
forced to withdraw and refile charges.14
If, as suggested by the English author, Samuel Johnson, "great
works are performed not by strength, but by perseverance,"1 5 the
current iteration of military commissions should serve as the
Department of Defense's (DoD's) proverbial Battle of Gettysburg16
also infra note 127 and accompanying text.
12. Devon Chaffee, Military Commissions Revived: Persisting Problems of
Perception, 9 U.N.H. L. REv. 237, 241 (2011).
13. Between March 21, 2002 and March 27, 2006 - the eve of oral arguments in
United States v. Hamdan before the Supreme Court - the Department of Defense issued
two Military Conumission Orders (MCOs) (each with a single revision) and ten
separate Military Commission Instructions (MCIs) (some, such as MCI4 include four
separate revisions). See HUMAN RIGHTs FIRST, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER, A GUIDE
TO THE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS iv (2006). See also Hearing to Receive Legal
Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 30 (2009) (statement of Deborah N. Pearlstein, Princeton University)
("Indeed, from the time the commissions were announced in 2001 until ... Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, commission rules were revised or amended no fewer than 15 times.")
[hereinafter Legal Issues Hearing]. The most recent revision came on December 8, 2011,
with the promulgation of new rules of court. See Military Commissions Trial
Judiciary R. of Court (2011), http://www.mc.mil/LEGAL RESOURCES/Military
ComrnissionsDocuments/CurrentDocuments.aspx (containing instructions for
lawyers practicing before military commissions).
14. The case of Ibrahim Ahmed Mohmoud al Qosi, the first detainee to be tried
under the 2009 MCA, is illustrative. The Sudanese citizen arrived at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, in January 2002 and the Government first charged him in February 2004.
His case dragged on until the parties reached a plea agreement in February 2011,
meaning the Government charged al Qosi under all three variations of the military
commissions system. See United States v. Ibrahim al Qosi, P-002, Defense Response
to Government Motion for Appropriate Relief (120 Day Continuance), May 22,
2009, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx ("During
this period of detention, he obviously has had no trial. Yet, he has been charged
under three phases of the Guantdnamo debacle, without resolution of his case.").
15. Quotes on Perseverance, The Samuel Johnson Sound Bite Page, http://www.
samueljohnson.com/persever.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
16. Fought at the beginning of July 1863, the Battle of Gettysburg "has
5
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in the war on terror. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Officious
encroachment by Congress into areas of critical executive branch
authority17 and questionable decisions 8 by the Court of Military
Commissions Review (CMCR)19 risk turning the newly constituted
military commissions into a latter-day Operation Barbarossa. 20 This
is deeply unfortunate, for patriotic Americans have worked
diligently and can now claim, after two false starts, a military
commissions system that is fair and transparent.
This article contends that military commissions have a
legitimate role to play in bringing suspected terrorists to justice.
Such a role, however, must be part of a broader strategy that
includes criminal prosecution in federal courts. Moreover,
Congress's recent attempts to shape American counterterrorism
policy through the National Defense Authorization Act constitute a
deleterious challenge to executive branch authority. 21
With respect to the charge of material support for terrorism
conventionally been regarded as the turning point of the Civil War, the victory that
won the war for the Union, the great divide." JAMES A. RAWLEY, TURNING POINTS OF
THE CIVIL WAR 147 (1989).
17. See infra Part II.B.1.
18. See, e.g. Kevin Jon Heller, The CMCR Invents the "War Crime" of Material
Support for Terrorism, OPINIo JuRis (June 24, 2011, 11:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2011/06/24/the-cmcr-invents-the-war-crime-of-material-support-for-terrorism/
(criticiz-ing the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review's decision in United States
v. Hamdan that material support for terrorism constitutes a war crime) [hereinafter
Heller, Opinio Juris Blog]. See also infra Part III.C.
19. Congress authorized the Court of Military Commission Review in the 2006
MCA. See Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950f, 23 Stat. at
2600 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, & 28 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 2006 MCA]. In cases in which the final decision of a military
commission (as approved by the convening authority) includes a finding of guilty,
appeal to the CMCR is automatic. Id. at § 950c(A). The 2006 MCA limited the
court's jurisdiction solely "to matters of law." Id. at § 950f(D). The 2009 MCA
significantly expanded the court's scope of review. In addition to reviewing
"matters of law" the court will consider factual sufficiency and appropriateness of
the sentence. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 118-84, § 950f(D),
123 Stat. 2574-2614 (2009 ) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, & 28
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 2009 MCA].
20. Proving George Santayana's famous aphorism that "those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it," Hitler discarded the lessons of
Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia in 1841 and launched his own invasion of
the Soviet Union in 1941. Code-named Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's self-inflicted
wound would ultimately prove Nazi Germany's demise. See PAUL JOHNSON,
MODERN TIMES THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE EIGHTIES 397 (revised ed.
2001); PETER ANTILL & PETER DENNIS, STALINGRAD 1942 27 (2007).
21. See infra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
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(MST) as a crime triable by military commission, Congress has
impermissibly created, rather than merely defined,22 a violation of
existing international law. In affirming the convictions of Salim
Ahmed Hamdan 23 and Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, 24 the
CMCR has sanctioned Congress's overreaching in two decidedly
American-centric decisions that mistakenly conflate a domestic
crime with a violation of international law. In its very first two
decisions, the CMCR has not only threatened hard-won convictions,
but has also renewed questions concerning the system's legitimacy.
Part II of this article places the charge of MST in the broader
context of the theoretical underpinnings of military commissions in
the war on terror. It argues that the charge of providing MST is a
logically consistent consequence of the Bush Doctrine25 - which was
substantively enshrined in both the Authorization for Use of
22. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.")
[hereinafter the Define and Punish Clause].
23. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (C.M.C.R. 2011).
24. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (C.M.C.R. 2011).
25. Various commentators delineate multiple foreign policy principles
articulated by the Bush Doctrine. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine:
In American Foreign Policy, A New Motto: Don't Ask. Tell, CNN.CoM (Feb. 26, 2001,
12:09 PM),http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/03/05/doctrine.
html (describing the Bush Doctrine as "a return to the unabashed unilateralism of
the '80s").
Nevertheless, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is widely accepted that
the Bush Doctrine stands primarily for the proposition that the United States will
make no distinction between those harboring terrorists and the terrorists
themselves. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Chides Some Members of Coalition for
Inaction in War Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/world/nation-challenged-president-bush-
chides-some-members-coalition-for-inaction-war.html ("A senior Administration
official said Mr. Bush's speech would be a fleshing out of what the White House
calls the Bush Doctrine - the assertion that nations that harbor terrorists are as
guilty as the terrorists themselves"). See also NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2006) (stating
that the United States "make[s] no distinction between terrorists and those who
knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.").
For an interesting argument that the Bush Doctrine became customary international
law through "instant custom" in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,
see Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 156 n.3
(2003) (citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, stressing that those
responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of these acts will be held accountable).
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Military Force (AUMF) 26 and the President's November 13, 2001,
military order authorizing commissions.27 Indeed, both the Bush
doctrine and the charge of MST seek to impose liability on a third
party, provided that party possesses a "permissive"28 scienter
element and performs some act - no matter how innocuous - of
providing assistance to a terrorist organization. Liability is imposed
regardless of whether the assistance actually furthered or intended
to further a terrorist act.29 As Professor David Cole, counsel for the
petitioners in Holder v. HLP, and one of the most forceful critics of
the material support provision, argues, "we have made guilt by
association the linchpin of the war's strategy." 30 That "guilt by
26. The AUMF is the joint resolution passed by the U.S. Congress authorizing
the use of armed forces against those responsible for the attacks on 9/11.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter AUMF].
To be sure, the AUMF and the President's military order were not the only tools
aimed at substantively codifying the Bush Doctrine and providing the foundation
for the charge of providing material support for terrorism. Sandwiched between
the AUMF (September 14, 2001) and the military order (November 13, 2001) was
Executive Order 13,224, promulgated by President Bush on September 23, 2001.
The E.O. can be viewed as a precursor to the charge of providing material support
for terrorism. See Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 4, 3 C.F.R. 786, (2001), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (2002) (concluding that financial donations by U.S. persons to a
designated list of terrorist organizations "would seriously impair [the President's]
ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order" and prohibiting
all such donations).
27. Military Order, November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
28. With respect to the material support provision, there is no need to prove an
individual intended to further terrorist activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006);
Robert Chesney, The Supreme Court, Material Support, and the Lasting Impact of Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 13, 14 (2011).
29. Both the 2006 MCA and the 2009 MCA define providing material support
for terrorism by the following:
Any person subject to this chapter who provides material support or
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for,
or in carrying out, an act of terrorism (as set forth in paragraph (24) of this
section), or who intentionally provides material support or resources to an
international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the
United States, knowing that such organization has engaged or engages in
terrorism (as so set forth), shall be punished as a military commission
under this chapter may direct.
2006 MCA, supra note 19 § 950v(b)(25)(a); 2009 MCA, supra note 19, at § 950t(25).
30. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). See also Aiding Terrorists: An Examination of the
Material Support Statute: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 25
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association" liability has its analytical roots in both the AUMF and
the President's military order. The charge of MST is the
correspondent blossoming of those roots.
The article posits that the AUMF, President Bush's November
13, 2001, military order authorizing commissions, and the charge of
providing material support are interrelated; thus Part II begins with
a detailed examination of the AUMF. It then proceeds to the
military order. Whereas the former formally codified the
intellectual foundation of the Bush Doctrine, the latter created a
venue by which the charge of material support could then put the
doctrine into practice. The article next seeks to delineate the
minimal due process rights mandated at a military commission as
well as the application or non-application of those rights by the
Bush administration. This section concludes with a quantifiable
assessment of military commissions during the Bush administration.
By providing this historical context, it will be clear that the
supposition that MST constitutes a war crime is not sui generis but
represents a rational continuation of the codification of the
intellectual foundations underwriting the Bush administration's
response to the war on terror.
The article next considers military commissions under the
Obama administration. This discussion reveals that the paradigms
of law enforcement and military commissions as counterterrorism
tools have become competitive rather than complementary.31 Such
competitiveness is manifested most prominently in the 2011 and
2012 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), 32 but also in
(2004) [hereinafter Aiding Terrorists Hearing] (statement by Professor David Cole).
Contra United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 176 (2008) (holding that
prohibitions against the conduct of providing material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization did not unconstitutionally impose guilt by
association).
31. For an interesting argument that a decade after 9/11 there is no longer any
substantive difference between Article III courts and military commissions see
Collin P. Wedel, Note, War Courts: Terror's Distorting Effects on Federal Courts, 3 LEG.
& PoL'Y BRIEF 12 (2011) ("In a trend that should alarm both tribunal proponents
and detractors alike, these once-antagonistic systems are becoming twins. While
efforts to improve the military tribunal system to match constitutional and
international legal norms have enjoyed a fair level of success, long-entrenched
Article III standards are deteriorating at a pace that mirrors the pace of the
tribunal's improvements.").
32. The Ike Skeleton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
H.R. 6523, 111th Cong. §1032, enacted as Pub. L. No. 111-383 (Jan. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter 2011 NDAA]; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
9
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Congress's decision not to eliminate the charge of MST in the 2009
MCA.
Part III considers the military commissions' most recent self-
inflicted wound - the misplaced notion that providing MST
constitutes a violation of existing international law. Although both
Hamdan and al Bahlul have each appealed the decisions of the
CMCR to the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
military commissions continue to level this charge. In fact,
providing MST has become a standard charge on practically every
charge sheet emerging from the commissions. According to the
commissions' revised, public webpage, of the six pending cases, all
but two defendants are charged with providing MST.33 Indeed, as
the sole defense counsel in United States v. Ali Hamza al-Bahlul
testified to Congress, "if they removed this crime from the statute
there would be very few detainees left to prosecute." 34 Time will
tell whether the strategy of charging MST at military commissions
proves farsighted or perhaps the final, mortal blow in a decade of
self-inflicted wounds to military commissions.
II. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
Military Commissions in the Global War on Terror
A. The Bush Administration: A New Paradigm
1. The 2001 AUMF: A Blank Check?
The AUMF legally codified the intellectual foundations of the
Bush Doctrine and continues to be "the bedrock" of the Obama
Administration's legal authority to detain35 and target 36 individuals
Pub. L. No. 112-8, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) [hereinafter 2012 NDAA].
33. As of this writing, the commissions currently list one case as "charges
pending/active" and five cases as "charges pending/inactive." See Military
Commissions, MILITARY COMMISSIONS CASES, http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military
Commissions.aspx (last visited May, 10, 2012).
34. Andy Worthington, Lawyers Appeal Guantdnamo Trial Convictions, THE
FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUNDATION (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.fff.org/
comment/com1002a.asp (quoting Lt. Col. David J.R. Frakt).
35. See, e.g., Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Couns. of the Dep't of Def., Dean's
Lecture at Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the
Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2011), (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/
national-security-and-defense/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-
lawyering-obama-administration/p 2 74 4 8 [hereinafter Johnson, Yale Speech] )("In
the detention context, we in the Obama Administration have interpreted this
10 [Vol. 36:1
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in the conflict against al Qaeda. It is therefore worthwhile to
examine the resolution in detail. This section begins by considering
the paradigmatic shift in response to acts of terrorism heralded by
the AUMF. The section next considers the AUMF in detail with
particular focus on the resolution's applicability, and spatial and
temporal scope.
The debate that rages today - whether the 9/11 terrorist acts
constitute criminal acts to be tried in Article III courts or violations
of the laws of war to be tried by military commissions - was ignited
shortly after United Airlines Flight 175 slammed into the south
tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03:11 on September 11, 2001.
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. Government handled acts of terrorism
primarily through the criminal justice system.38 The attacks of 9/11,
authority to include: those persons who were part of, or substantially supported,
Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners.").
36. With respect to targeting, the Obama Administration similarly relies upon
the AUMF "as informed by the laws of war," to include the principles of distinction
and proportionality. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov /s/1/releases/remarks/ 139119.htm [hereinafter Koh, ASIL
Speech] (noting that the Obama "[a]dministration has carefully reviewed the rules
governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted
consistently with law of war principles. . . .").
While some states have objected to the use of advanced weapons systems, such as
unmanned aerial vehicles, by the United States in lethal targeting operations, the
Obama Administration maintains that "lethal force against known, individual
members of the enemy is a long-standing and long-legal practice" and "there is no
prohibition under the law of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons
systems in armed conflict, so long as they are employed in conformity with the law
of war." See Johnson, Yale Speech, supra note 35; Koh, ASIL Speech. The Obama
Administration further rejects the contention that targeted killings of al Qaeda
members constitutes "assassination." See, e.g., Koh, ASIL Speech ("But under
domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems - consistent with applicable laws
of war - for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when
acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does
not constitute 'assassination."' ).
37. The 9/11 Commission Report offers a comprehensive chronology of the
events of 9/11. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 311 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
38. Id. at 73 ("Legal processes were the primary method for responding to these
early manifestations of a new type of terrorism."). See also WILLIAM SHAWCROSS,
JUSTICE AND THE ENEMY: NUREMBERG, 9/11, AND THE TRIAL OF KHALID SHEIKH
MOHAMMED 56 (1st ed. 2010) ("Until 9/11 the United States had reacted relatively
cautiously and sporadically to terrorist attacks abroad; it had taken a primarily law-
enforcement approach, however shocking these assaults had been."); John M.
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however, ushered in a paradigmatic shift, enshrining the United
States military as the lead response to terrorist acts.
As the journalist Bob Woodward recounts in his 2002 book,
Bush at War, even before the grievous news that hijackers had
crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon at 9:37:46 and
civilians on a fourth jet, United Airlines Flight 93, brought down
that aircraft intended for the U.S. Capitol in a field near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, at 10:02:23, the President had determined the attacks
were acts of war.39 Woodward vividly recounts the moment Chief
of Staff Andrew Card informed the President that the second tower
of the World Trade Center had been hit:
A photo of that moment is etched for history. The President's
hands are folded formally in his lap, his head turned to hear
Card's words. His face has a distant sober look. Almost frozen,
edging on bewilderment. Bush remembers exactly what he was
thinking: "They had declared war on us, and I made up my mind
at that moment that we were going to war." 40
That evening, in an address from the oval office, President Bush
proclaimed what has since entered the lexicon as the Bush Doctrine,
a sweeping proclamation that "[w]e will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who
harbor them."41 As Woodward explains, the declaration was "an
incredibly broad commitment to go after terrorists and those who
sponsor and protect terrorists, rather than just a proposal for a
targeted retaliatory strike. The decision was made without
consulting Cheney, Powell, or Rumsfeld." 42
Allen, Expanding Law Enforcement Discretion: How the Supreme Courts Post-September
11th Decisions Reflect Necessary Prudence, 41 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 587, 592 (2008)
("Before the September 11th tragedies energized a national movement to protect
the nation from terrorism, law enforcement dealt with acts of terrorism similarly to
other crimes."); Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and
the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21 (2005) ("Prior to 9/11, the
Defense Department played a limited role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts."); Note,
Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1219
(2002) ("Over the course of several years, most of the [1993 World Trade Center]
bombing suspects were tried, convicted, and sentenced in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.").
39. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 15 (2002).
40. Id. See also GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 127 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Before & After; Defining a Leader First by His Words,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A4.
42. WOODWARD, supra note 39, at 30. Secretary of State Colin Powell in
particular had concerns with the broad scope of the declaration. ("Powell asserted
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In an address to Congress and the American people nine days
later, the President reiterated the assertion that the nation was at
war.43 The President further promised the "war on terror" 44 would
be "unlike any other we have ever seen."45 Finally, President Bush
reasserted the still undefined Bush Doctrine, warning that no
distinction would be made between the actual terrorists who
conducted the attacks and "any nation that continues to harbor or
that everyone in the international coalition was ready to go after al Qaeda, but that
extending the war to other terrorist groups or countries could cause some of them
to drop out."). Id. at 81.
43. A NATION CHALLENGED; President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint
Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2001, at Al ("On September the 11th,
enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.") [hereinafter
President Bush's Address to Congress].
44. The term "war on terror" has generated extensive criticism both within and
outside the Bush Administration, and is no longer used by the Obama
Administration. In a speech before the National Press Club in July 2005, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, decried the term's
limited focus on the military to the exclusion of other instruments of national power.
See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, New Name for 'War on Terror' Reflects Wider
U.S. Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A7 (" [i]f you call it a war, then you think
of people in uniform as being the solution."). President Bush's National Security
Advisor, Stephen Hadley echoed this view in an interview with the New York Times in
2005, claiming that the conflict "was more than just a military war on terror." Richard
W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: Phrase Is 'War on Terror', N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 4,
2005 at A12. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attempted to replace the phrase
in 2005 with the ambitious "Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism" or GSAVE
but was quickly overruled by the President. Id. ("In a speech here, Mr. Bush used the
phrase "war on terror" no less than five times. Not once did he refer to the "global
struggle against violent extremism," the wording consciously adopted by Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other officials . . . .").
Outside the Bush Administration, criticism has focused primarily on the
mischaracterization of the nature of the enemy. Terrorism expert and Yale Law
School Professor Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims that the slogan "'[w]ar on
terror' is, on its face, a preposterous expression," as terrorism is not the enemy but
merely a technique. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACKS: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 13 (2006). Retired Lieutenant Colonel John A.
Nagl, a coauthor of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) has
said the phrase "was enormously unfortunate because . it pulled together
disparate organizations and insurgencies." See Scott Wilkinson & AL Kamen,
'Global War on Terror' Is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at A04. The
Obama Administration no longer uses the phrase "Global War on Terror" but uses
the more sterile "Overseas Contingency Operation." Id.
45. President Bush's Address to Congress, supra note 43, at Al ("Americans should
not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.
It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations, secret even in
success.").
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support terrorism."46
With little debate and only token resistance, Congress passed
S.J. Res. 23 (Authorization for Use of Military Force) on September
14, 2001, and the President signed the legislation on September 18,
2001.47 Quite astonishingly, the authorization the President initially
sought from Congress was even more expansive than the
exceedingly broad authorization he signed into law. The original
draft joint resolution would have additionally granted the President
the authority "to deter and pre-empt future acts of terrorism or
aggression against the United States." 48  As a Congressional
Research Services report explains:
This language would have seemingly authorized the President,
without durational limitation, and at his sole discretion, to take
military action against any nation, terrorist group or individuals
in the world without having to seek further authority from the
Congress. It would have granted the President open-ended
authority to act against all terrorism and terrorist or potential
aggressors against the United States anywhere, not just the
authority to act against the terrorist involved in the September 11,
2001 attacks, and those nations, organizations and persons who
had aided or harbored the terrorists. 49
The version of the AUMF signed into law is a short document
46. Id.
47. The Authorization for Military Use of Force (AUMF) passed the Senate on
September 14, 2001 with 98 ayes, 0 nays, and 2 present/not voting. The AUMF
passed the House of Representatives the same day by a vote of 420 ayes, 1 nay, and
10 not voting. See Peter Carlson, The Solitary Vote of Barbara Lee; Congresswoman
Against the Use of Force, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2001, at C1.
Like Jeannette Rankin before her, Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) cast the
lone vote against the AUMF. In explaining her vote on the floor of the House,
Congresswoman Lee said, "However difficult this vote may be, some of us must
urge the use of restraint. There must be some of us who say, let's step back for a
moment and think through the implications of our actions today - let us more fully
understand its consequences." 147 Cong. Rec. H5672 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001)
(statement of Rep. Lee). See also Rep. Barbara Lee, Why I Opposed the Resolution to
Authorize Force, S.F. CHRON., (Sept. 23, 2001), http://www.commondreams.org/
views0l/0923-04.htm ("It was a blank check to the president to attack anyone
involved in the Sept. 11 events - anywhere, in any country, without regard to out
nations' long-term foreign policy, economic and national security interests, and
without time limit.").
48. 147 Cong. Rec. S9949-S9951 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2001).
49. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-140): LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 2 (2001).
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consisting of five "whereas" clauses delineating the purposes for the
resolution and the authorization contained in section 2. Section 2(a)
authorizes the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized,
committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organization or persons.50
While congressional authorizations to use military force have
often been granted to Presidents in place of a more expansive
declaration of war, the 2001 AUMF was sui generis in three
important aspects. First, the 2001 AUMF authorized military force
against "organizations and persons" connected - however remotely
- to the attacks.51 While the AUMF never implicitly states which
organizations are covered, Congress is clearly referring to al Qaeda,
the global militant Islamic organization that ordered and executed
the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, inclusion of the term
"organizations" would sweep up any person who is a member of al
Qaeda (even if that individual had no link to the 9/11 attacks).
While that same person would not be covered by the AUMF in his
individual capacity, as the language only applies to those individuals
who "planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
attacks," he would be covered in his organizational capacity. 52
Second, the spatial scope of the AUMF is similarly far-reaching.
The text assumes that the President can act anywhere he determines
the enemy to be - to include the continental United States - thereby
imposing no geographic limitations on the use of force. 53 Like the
Bush Administration, President Obama's Administration wholly
endorses this view. Indeed, in recent remarks, the President's
50. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001).
51. GRIMMETT, supra note 49, at 4 ("In its past authorizations for use of U.S.
military force, Congress has permitted action against unnamed nations in specific
regions of the world, or against named individual nations but never against
'organizations or persons."').
52. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts' Embrace of
Complexity in Guantdnamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 94, 98 (2011)
("Geographic limits and boundaries simply fail to contain the war against terrorism
within the type of geographic space that delineated the scope of traditional wars.").
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Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the Defense
Department's General Counsel, and the State Department's Legal
Advisor, have all asserted that the authority of the United States to
use, detain, and target al Qaeda members should not be confined to
"hot" battlefields of Afghanistan as we continue to be engaged in an
armed conflict against al Qaeda.54 While many of our closest allies
do not share this view,55 the Obama Administration argues that
confining force to Afghanistan fails to consider the decentralized
nature of al Qaeda over the past decade, 56 and relies upon an
inflexible notion of what constitutes an "imminent" attack.57
Finally, the temporal scope distinguishes the AUMF from
previous authorizations of military force.58 Due to the enigmatic
nature of the war on terror, Congress chose not to limit the
President in terms of when he could act. This contrasts with other
terrorism legislation, notably the USA PATRIOT Act, which
included a sunset clause.59 In light of the Supreme Court's holding
54. See Johnson, Yale Speech, supra note 35; John Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Harvard Law School (Sept.
16, 2011), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/16/john-brennan-speech-on-
obama-administration-antiterrorism-policies-and-practices/ [hereinafter Brennan,
Harvard Speech]. See also Koh, ASIL Speech, supra note 36.
55. See, e.g., Brennan, Harvard Speech, supra note 54 ("Others in the
international community take a different view of the geographic scope of the
conflict, limiting it only to the "hot" battlefields. As such, they argue that, outside
of these two active theatres, the United States can only act in self-defense against al-
Qa'ida .. . if it amounts to an 'imminent' attack.").
56. Id. ("[O]ver the last 10 years al Qaeda has not only become more
decentralized, it has also, for the most part, migrated away from Afghanistan to
other places where it can find safe haven.").
57. Dating back to the 1837 Caroline case, the United States has held that
consistent with customary international law (and after 1945, Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter), a state may employ force in self-defense if in addition to being attacked,
an armed attack is determined to be imminent. Under this construction, "a state is
not required to absorb the 'first hit' before it can resort to the use of force in self-
defense to repel an imminent attack." JEFF A. BOVARNICK ET AL., U.S. ARMY, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GEN.'s LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 40 (GREGORY S.
MUSSELMAN ED., 2011). See also Brennan, Harvard Speech, supra note 54 ("We are
finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible
understanding of 'imminence' may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist
groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves
in the way that evidence imminence in more traditional conflicts.").
58. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 22123, n.332 (noting that
previous authorizations, to include Lebanon, Somalia, and Taiwan, all required
temporal limitations).
59. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No.
16 [Vol. 36:1
2012] Military Commissions and the Charge of Material Support for Terror
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, inherent within the AUMF is the power to
detain any individual who falls within the scope of the statute for
the duration of the relevant conflict. 60
The absence of such limitations raises troubling questions as to
the length of time an individual may be detained in the war on
terror. 61 The traditional law of war rule is detention may last no
longer than active hostilities. 62  The purpose of this rule is
preventive in nature - to ensure enemy combatants do not return to
the battlefield while hostilities are ongoing. 63 Consequently, once
fighting terminates, the rationale for detention dissolves.64
107-56 § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) ("[T]his title and the amendments made by
this title . . . shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.") [hereinafter
PATRIOT Act].
60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) ("[I]t is of no moment that the
AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a
combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in
permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and
unmistakably authorized detention... .").
61. Subsequent to the Court's holding in Hamdi, the legal debate has generally
shifted to the question of the nexus an individual must have to al Qaeda to be
covered by the AUMF. In particular, courts have just begun to grapple with the
quandary presented by the charge of providing material support for terrorism.
62. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW] ("Prisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities."). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts art. 2(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609:
At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of
their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such
conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is
restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protections
of Article 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty.
63. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art.19-art.20, Aug. 12, 1949, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross Commentary (1960)
[hereinafter GPW Commentary].
While NGOs voice skepticism, the Pentagon claims the threat of released detainees
returning to active hostilities has been substantiated. A 2010 Department of
Defense report concluded that one of out five detainees transferred abroad from
Guantanamo Bay has engaged in subsequent acts of terrorism. See Elisabeth
Bumiller, Many Ex-Detainees Said to Be Engaged in Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at
A16.
64. See, e.g., WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1288 (2d ed.
1920) ("It is now recognized that - 'Captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of
vengeance' but 'merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal
character.").
The official commentary to Additional Protocol II maintains, however, that security
17
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Application of this norm to a conflict in which "there is no obvious
point at which the U.S. will be able to declare victory" 65 potentially
subjects detainees - some for merely being a member of a
designated enemy terrorist organization - to lifetime detention.66
requirements may necessitate detention in common article 3 conflicts, as opposed to
common article 2 conflicts, in limited circumstances. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1360 (Yves Sandoz et al., eds., 1987). Paragraph
4493 states in full:
In principle, measures restricting people's liberty, taken for reasons related
to the conflict, should cease at the end of active hostilities, i.e., when
military operations have ceased, except in cases of penal convictions.
Nevertheless, if such measures were maintained with regard to some
persons for security reasons, or if the victorious party were making arrests
in order to restore public order and secure its authority, legal protection
would continue to be necessary for those against whom such actions were
taken.
See also John B. Bellinger & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing
Law, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 201, 229 (2011).
65. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 726 (2004) ("For
that matter, since al Qaeda is not a state, it is not obvious that al Qaeda can formally
surrender. . . And since we apparently lack any means of formal communication
with al Qaeda's leadership . . . there is no clear way to negotiate."). See also Hearing
to Receive Testimony on Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of
Detainees for Violations of the Law of War: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed
Services, 111th Cong. 40 (2009) (statement of Major General (Ret.) John D.
Altenburg, Jr., former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Army) ("[w]hat does
this 21st century non-state actor paradigm mean for the right under the Geneva
Convention to detain people you've captured until the war is over if you can't
really define when the war is over ") [hereinafter 2009 Military Commissions
Hearing before Armed Services].
But cf. ROBIN WRIGHT, ROCK THE CASBAH: RAGE AND REBELLION ACROSS THE ISLAMIC
WORLD 5 (2011) (for an alternative view that the end of the war on terror may be
forthcoming). In a recent book chronicling the Arab spring, Ms. Wright, an intrepid
foreign correspondent and a Middle East watcher of the first rank, argues that in a
"post-jihadist era" al Qaeda has failed to achieve any of its goals and is increasingly
irrelevant. ("A decade later, al Qaeda's goals seemed further away than ever.
Compared with the vast number of democracy activities, cultural innovators, and
new voices in the Islamic world, al Qaeda's extremists looked like pathetic thugs
and losers.").
66. Justice O'Connor acknowledged as much in the Court's plurality opinion in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld:
If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two
generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if
released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position
it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi's
detention could last for the rest of his life.
542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
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Dissatisfaction with this traditional norm has led to calls for
alternatives.67 Perhaps the most auspicious is that expressed by
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, who advocate an
individualized assessment whereby detention authority would
terminate over a detained individual once a determination has been
made that the individual no longer poses a threat. As they explain:
Under this approach, the question is not whether hostilities have
ceased with al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, but
rather whether hostilities have, in essence, ceased with the
individual because he no longer poses a substantial danger of
rejoining the hostilities. A determination of the existence of such
a danger could be based on, among other things, the detainee's
past conduct, level of authority within al Qaeda, statements and
actions during confinement, age and health, and psychological
profile.68
One advantage to this approach is its consistency with
traditional law of war rules. As Bradley and Goldsmith explain,
"many of the traditional rules contemplate release of an enemy
combatant based on an individualized determination that the
combatant does not present a serious threat."69
67. See, e.g., Bellinger & Padmanasabhan, supra note 64, at 240 (considering
three alternatives to the 'cessation of active hostilities' norm). Contra Neil
McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third
Geneva Convention and the "War on Terror," 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 301, 301 (2009)
(arguing that the Third Geneva Conventions is "sufficiently flexible to
accommodate tactics in the War on Terror.").
68. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 2125.
69. Id. For example, Article 132 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reads: "Each
interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons
which necessitated his internment no longer exist."
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Geneva Convention IV), art. 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Civilian Convention].
Article 109 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that parties to the conflict are
obligated to send back the seriously sick or injured prisoners of wars to their own
country. Additionally, the second paragraph of Article 109 permits agreements
"with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-
bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity."
GPW, supra note 62, art. 109.
Article 110 of the Third Geneva Convention requires repatriation of different
categories of prisoners of war, to include "[p]risoners of war whose mental or
physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued
captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a
threat."
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The Obama Administration appears to be moving toward a
model of repatriation based upon individualized assessments.
Upon taking office, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,492,
calling for the closure of Guantdnamo Bay within one year.70 In
support of that goal, the President ordered a comprehensive
interagency review71 of the legal bases for detention of the 242
individuals detained at Guantdnamo. 72 One year after the issuance
of the Executive Order, the Guantanamo Task Force released its
findings. 73 Additionally, on March 7, 2011, the President issued
Executive Order 13,567, resurrecting the process of conducting
periodic reviews of detention decisions. 74  The standard for
continued detention under the periodic review board process is
based upon a finding that "it is necessary to protect against a
significant threat to the security of the United States."75
In addition to Bradley and Goldsmith's innovative alternative, a
second option to the cessation of active hostilities norm would be
linking a conflict with non-state actors to a traditional international
armed conflict. As the former legal advisor for the U.S. Department
of State, John Bellinger III, explains, under such an approach, the
end of the common article 2 conflict between the United States and
Afghanistan 6 would herald the end of the conflict with al Qaeda for
Id. art. 110.
70. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 4897 (2009).
71. The President's E.O. tasked the following six entities with conducting the
first of a series of periodic reviews on all prolonged detentions: the Departments of
Justice, State, Defense, Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Koh, ASIL speech, supra note 36.
72. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 9
(2010).
73. Id. at 9-10 (concluding that of the 240 detainees subject to the Executive
Order, "126 were approved for transfer, 36 were referred for prosecution, 48 were
approved for continued detention under the AUMF, and 30 detainees from Yemen
were approved for 'conditional' detention based on present security conditions in
Yemen.").
74. Exec. Order No. 13, 5673. C.F.R. 13277 (2011).
75. Id. § 2.
76. Arguably, the international armed conflict between the United States and
Afghanistan terminated in June 2002. The loyal jirga, appointed Hamid Karzai as
Interim President of the Afghan Transitional Administration on June 13, 2002. See
Carlotta Gall & James Dao, A Buoyant Karzai is Sworn in as Afghanistan's Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A12. For the view that the international armed conflict
concluded in December 2002, see U.S. v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. Mass.
2008) ("On December 22, 2001, the United States formally recognized and extended
full diplomatic relations to the new government of Hamid Karzai. That recognition
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detention purposes.77 Consequently, this approach takes a narrow
view toward the term "active hostilities" in Article 118 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW), and fails to consider the authority of the United States to
detain individuals in the current common article 3 conflict in
Afghanistan.78
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance to the critical
debate of the temporal limits to detain individuals in the war on
terror. Despite the Government's position in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that
temporal parameters do not apply to a war against terrorists, the
Court steadfastly refused to establish any such limitations, defining
the issue as not ripe.79 In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
did, however suggest that the traditional law of war paradigm may,
at some point, prove inapplicable to the unconventional war on
terror:
[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of
"necessary and appropriate force" to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If
the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of
war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation
we face as of this date.80
Just two years after the Hamdi decision, holding that the AUMF
implicitly authorized the detention of individuals in the war on
terror, the Supreme Court would hold in Hamdan that the AUMF,
broad though it was, could not be read to provide specific
authorization for military commissions.81 It is to the subject of the
President's military order establishing commissions and
signaled the cessation of a state of war with Afghanistan.").
77. Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 64, at 230.
78. See, e.g., YUTAKA ARAi-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs LA\w 23 (2009) (citing the ICRC's November 19, 2002,
Aide-Memoire to the United States setting forth the view that the common article 2
conflict transformed into a common article 3 conflict in June 2002. Per the ICRC, on
that date, the Geneva Conventions ceased to furnish a legal basis for detention
without criminal charges).
79. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) ("Active combat operations
against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.").
80. Id. at 521.
81. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,561 (2006).
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implementing the theoretical foundations of the AUMF that this
article now turns.
2. A Precedent Worth Repeating? Quirin and President Bush's
Military Order
On November 13, 2001, a little more than two months after the
AUMF became law, President Bush signed a military order
authorizing detention of noncitizen terrorists and, if necessary, trial
by military tribunals for violations of the laws of war. 82 While the
individuals carrying out the September 11 attacks violated
numerous domestic criminal laws,8 3 President Bush's military order
clearly established an intent to treat the attacks as acts of war rather
than mere criminal acts.8
To properly understand President Bush's Order, one must first
consider the history of military commissions. In a celebrated
passage beginning The Common Law, Justice Holmes explained, "[i]n
order to know what it is, we must know what it has been."85 The
section begins with a review of the historical authority for military
commissions. The section next analyzes President Bush's Order
with parallels to Proclamation No. 2561 - the military commission
established by FDR to try eight Nazi agents who had covertly
entered the United States to commit acts of terrorism in 1942.
a. Historical Precedents
According to Colonel William Winthrop, "the Blackstone of
Military Law,"8 6 military commissions, a military tribunal neither
mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute, were born of
military necessity.87 The first recorded use of military commissions
occurred in 1847 during the Mexican-American War.88 Serving as
82. Military Order, supra note 27.
83. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-1050, TERRORISM AT
HOME AND ABROAD: APPLICABLE FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL LAWS (2001)
(examining "the constitutional power of Congress and of state legislatures to enact
anti-terrorist legislation and the extent to which they have done so").
84. Military Order, supra note 27, §1(a) ("International terrorists, including
members of al Qaeda, have carried out attacks . . on a scale that has created a state
of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.").
85. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1948).
86. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1957) (plurality opinion).
87. WINTHROP, supra note 64, at 831.
88. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US. 557, 590 (2006) (explaining that although
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Commander of occupied Mexico, General Winfield Scott was greatly
concerned with acts of lawlessness committed by the indigenous
population. As Mexicans could not be tried under the Articles of
War, and having no other tribunal available, General Scott
established a military commission to try offenses against the law of
war.89 Although the Supreme Court later denounced General
Scott's use of military commissions in occupied Mexico,90 military
commissions were nonetheless used extensively during the Civil
War.91
Having surveyed "what sparse legal precedent exists," 92 to
include Colonel Winthrop's seminal treatise, Military Law and
Precedents, the Hamdan Court identified three situations in which
military tribunals have been used: first, to replace civilian courts
when the state had declared martial law; second, to try civilians in
territory occupied by the United States (as in the 1847 precedent);
and finally, as "an incident to the conduct of war" when an enemy
has violated the law of war. 93 One writer has referred to the first
two uses as "territory-based commissions." 94 The Hamdan Court
referred to the third use as a "law of war" commission. President
Bush's Order falls within this third use.
As the history of the commissions convened in Mexico reveal,
the use of military commissions has traditionally been at the
discretion of the President or his military commanders in the field. 95
precursors to military commissions were employed during the Revolutionary War,
the "commission 'as such' was inaugurated in 1847"). See also WINTHROP, Supra
note 64, at 832 ("It was not until 1847, upon the occupation by our forces of the
territory of Mexico . . . that the military commission was, as such, initiated.").
89. WINTHROP, supra note 64, at 832. See also FISHER, TRIBUNALS, supra note 9, at
32-33; H. Wayne Elliot, Military Commissions: An Overview, in ENEMY COMBATANTS,
TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW 124 (David K. Linnan, ed., 2008).
90. Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. 498, 515 (1851) ("And neither the President
nor any military officer can establish a court in a conquered country, and authorize
it to decide upon the rights of the United States, or of individuals in prize cases, nor
to administer the laws of nations.").
91. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124 (1866) (holding that use of military
tribunals for American citizens when civilian courts are operational is
unconstitutional).
92. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595.
93. Id.
94. Chad DeVeaux, Rationalizing the Constitution: The Military Commissions Act
and the Dubious Legacy of Ex Parte Quirin, 42 AKRON L. REV. 13, 46 (2009).
95. WINTHROP, supra note 64, at 831 ("In general, however, it has left it to the
President, and the military commanders representing him, to employ the
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Consequently, military commissions raise separation-of-powers
issues "of the highest order." 96 As one writer has explained, "the
power to create [military commissions] lies at a constitutional
crossroads." 97
Congress would clearly have the authority to establish a
military commission pursuant to its enumerated powers to "declare
war" and "make rules concerning capture on land and water;" 98 to
"define and punish offenses against the Law of Nations," 99 and to
make regulations to regulate the armed forces.100 The power of the
President to convene military commissions flows from his authority
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.' 0 Under Article 21,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, as well as its precursor, Article 15,
the Articles of War, the President "has at least implicit authority to
convene military commissions to try offenses against the law of
war."102
After Congress enacted the Articles of War in 1806, it did not
undertake a revision for more than a century, prompting Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson to pronounce the Articles "notoriously
unsystematic and unscientific."1 03 In 1912, during hearings before
the House Committee on Military Affairs, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army, Brigadier General (BG) E.H. Crowder,
commission, as occasion may require, for the investigation and punishment of
violations of the laws of war .... ).
96. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Located within a single
branch, these courts carry the risk that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and
adjudicated by executive officials without independent review.").
97. Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A
Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two
Courts, 27-50-350 ARMY LAW. 19, 20 (2002).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See also Winthrop, supra note 64, at 831 ("But, in
general, it is those provisions of the Constitution which empower Congress to
'declare war' and 'raise armies'. from which this tribunal derives its original
sanction.").
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
100. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
101. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
102. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 31191, TERRORISM AND THE LAW
OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 17
(2001). See also 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2011).
103. Revision of the Articles of War: Hearing on H.R. 23682 Before the H. Comm. on
Military Affairs, 62d Cong. 3 (1916) (statement of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of
War) (Secretary Stimson's full quote reads, "[t]he existing articles are notoriously
unsystematic and unscientific. Inevitably this condition hampers their easy and
effective enforcement.").
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unveiled an "entirely new" article concerning military commissions.
Although such commissions had "not been formally authorized by
statute," they were, he argued, "an institution of the greatest
importance in a period of war."104 BG Crowder testified that the
new article was critical to ensure that expansion of court-martial
jurisdiction over U.S. military members (to include offenses against
the laws of war) did not preempt military commissions. 05 Enacted
in 1916, BG Crowder's Article 15 would undergo a slight
modification in the 1920 revision to the Articles of War to read:
Art. 15. Jurisdiction Not Exclusive. - The provisions of these
articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be
construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
offenders or offense that by statute or by the law of war may be
triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals. 106
While ensuring courts-martial would not deprive commissions
of concurrent jurisdiction, Congress contemporaneously sought to
limit the procedures by which the President could implement
military commissions in Article 38 of the 1920 Articles of War.107
FDR relied in part on Articles 15 and 38 in appointing a
commission to try eight Nazi saboteurs bent on sabotage.os During
104. Id. at 29 (statement of Brigadier General E. H. Crowder, Judge Advocate
General of the Army) (citing approvingly of the use of military commissions during
the Mexican-American War and the Civil War).
105. Brigadier General Crowder explained:
There will be more instances in the future than in the past when the
jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap [with] that of the war courts, and
the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by
statute the common law of war-jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make
it perfectly plain by the new article that in such cases the jurisdiction of the
war court is concurrent.
Id. See also FISHER, SABOTEURS, supra note 10, at 32.
106. National Defense Act Amendments of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759,
790. See also infra note 115.
107. U.S. WAR OFFICE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR 11-12 (1920). See also infra note 116.
108. See, e.g., H.L. POHLMAN, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 254 (2007). FDR
appointed Major General Frank R. McCoy as president of the commission as well as
three major generals and three brigadier generals to serve on the seven-man
commission. Colonel Cassius M. Dowell and Colonel Kenneth Royall served as
defense counsel. Attorney General Francis Biddle and Major General Myron C.
Cramer, the Judge Advocate of the Army, served as the prosecutors. FISHER,
TRIBUNALS, supra note 9, at 91.
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the military commission, the saboteurs' defense counsel petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the
constitutionality of the commission. 109  Following the Court's
decision that the commission possessed jurisdiction to try the
saboteurs, the commission convicted all eight men and sentenced six
to death.110 The Court did not issue an opinion in Ex Parte Quirin
until October 29, 1942 - almost three months after six of the
saboteurs had been executed."' The Court's opinion focused on the
jurisdiction of the military commission, holding that Article 15 in
and of itself provided congressional authorization to the President
to convene military commissions. 112 This expansive interpretation
received skepticism from the Hamdan Court sixty-four years later.
Justice Stevens wrote in the plurality opinion, "We have no occasion
to revisit Quirin's controversial characterization of Article of War 15
as a congressional authorization for military commissions."113
In 1950 Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), consolidating and revising the Articles of War, the Articles
for the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard.114 The
UCMJ reenacted Article 15 as Article 21 (UCMJ). As of today, the
language of Article 21 of the UCMJ remains substantially identical
to Article 15, Articles of War.115 The UCMJ reenacted Article 38 as
Article 36 (UCMJ).116 Article 36 slightly revises Article 38 and
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id. at 63, 71.
111. Id. at 71.
112. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) ("By the Articles of War, and especially
Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so,
that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
law of war in appropriate cases.").
113. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006).
114. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950).
115. Compare supra note 106 with 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2011) ("The provisions of this
chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. This
section does not apply to a military commission established under chapter 47A of
this title.").
116. Article 36, Uniform Code of Military Justice, states in full:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases
arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other
military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
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obligates the president to utilize the rules of evidence as applied in
criminal cases so far as he considered it "practicable" to do So. 1 17
Article 36, UCMJ, would prove highly consequential to the Bush
Administration's design of trying terrorists by military
commissions. In 2006, the Supreme Court invalidated the
commissions based in part on the President's failure to comply with
Article 36(b), UCMJ, holding, "[b]ecause UCMJ Article 36 has not
been complied with here, the rules specified for Hamdan's
commission trial are illegal."118
b. The Past is Present: Analysis of the President's Military Order
In contradistinction to the AUMF, President Bush's military
order was promulgated without congressional consultation.119 This
is particularly curious given the wholesale support Congress
provided the President with respect to both the AUMF and the USA
PATRIOT Act, as well as the expediency with which the legislative
branch passed both bills.120 The President, moreover, chose to
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to
or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as
practicable, except insofar as applicable to military commissions established under
chapter 47A of this title.
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006).
117. 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006).
118. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 561 (holding that although the President had concluded
that it was impracticable to apply rules governing criminal cases to military
commissions, he failed to make a similar determination that it was impracticable to
apply the rules for courts-martial and nothing in the record demonstrated it would
be impracticable to do so).
119. See, e.g., Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While
Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
2 (2001) [hereinafter Preserving Our Freedoms] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-
VT), Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary) ("Rather than respect the checks and
balances that make up our constitutional framework, the executive branch has
chosen to . . . cut out Congress in determining the appropriate tribunal and
procedures to try terrorists."). Id. at 21 (quoting Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA) as
stating he had received "absolutely no indication" of tribunals being authorized.).
See also Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; White
House Push on Security Steps Bypasses Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al
(quoting Representative Bob Barr (R-GA), a member of the House Judiciary
Committee as stating, "I'm not aware that they're consulting at all.").
120. During his opening statement at hearings conducted in December 2011 by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Chairman Leahy noted:
We passed the [AUMF] in record time and with an extraordinary level of
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bypass advice of military Judge Advocates121 as well as an
interagency team. The President had assembled the team from the
Departments of Defense, State, and Justice to consider options for
prosecuting the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. When it failed to
act with the requisite alacrity the Administration sought, the
President chose to ignore the team.122 Instead, drafting the military
order fell largely to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, a
Bush confidante and former attorney from Texas.123
cooperation between Democrats and Republicans, the House and the
Senate, and the White House and Congress. The separate but
complementary roles of these branches of Government, working together
and sharing a unity of purpose, made that bill a better law than either
could have made through a unilateral initiative.
Preserving Our Freedoms, supra note 119, at 2 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-
VT), Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary).
121. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, U.S. Barred Legal Review of Detention, Lawyer Says,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 2004, at A14 (quoting Miles P. Fischer, the chairman of the bar
association's Committee on Military Affairs and Justice as saying, "JAG officers
were given very little opportunity to participate in the order establishing military
commissions."). See also Jeanne Cummings, Gonzales Rewrites Laws of War - White
House Counsel's Methods Outrage Military Legal Experts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002, at
A4 ("Career Pentagon lawyers in the Judge Advocate General's Office were furious
that they read first in news reports that Mr. Gonzales had devised the legal
framework for military commissions.")
122. See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, Some Observations on the Future of U.S. Military
Commissions, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 151, 152-53 (2009).
In his book War by Other Means, John Yoo attributes President Bush's circumvention
of the interagency team to departmental infighting. He writes:
Defense wanted to decide, but Ashcroft, ever a defender of his bureaucratic
turf, wanted a veto. After a contentious White House meeting, President
Bush broke the deadlock by deciding that only he would decide when an al
Qaeda detainee would be sent before a military court - which was the right
outcome, placing the responsibility where it ought to rest.
Yoo, supra note 5, at 206.
Additionally, Yoo puts much of the blame to come to an expedient
recommendation at the feet of the military, whom he describes as nalve and
unwilling to accept the challenges of the twenty-first century. He writes:
The Defense Department wanted a showcase of military justice at its finest,
with rules of substance and procedures that would withstand any scrutiny,
both at home and abroad. It was a laudable goal, but it inevitably led to
long bureaucratic delays among all the involved agencies. Some military
lawyers also resisted creating the commissions . . . . Military commissions,
they argued, would 'taint' the court-martial process. Military commissions
became another flash point in the struggle pitting the military
establishment against Rumsfeld and his civilian advisers in his effort to
transform the military in order to address twenty-first-century challenges.
Id. at 206.
123. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 121.
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Without the benefit of his interagency experts, Congress, or the
advice of a recent precedent 24 the President looked back to FDR's
July 2, 1942 military order 25 establishing a military commission.126
Given the disapprobation Ex Parte Quirin has garnered, it was a
questionable model on which to rely.127
President Bush cited four sources of authority in his November
13, 2001, Military Order: the Commander-in-Chief Power;128 the
AUMF; 10 U.S.C. § 821 (Article 21, UCMJ); and 10 U.S.C. § 836
(Article 36, UCMJ). Although Bush Administration officials
124. Although the U.S. Government had not employed military commissions
since World War II, the Administration of George H. W. Bush briefly considered
using commissions to try the bombers of Pan Am flight 103, which had detonated
over Lockerbie, Scotland. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 5, at 204.
125. FDR issued two proclamations establishing military commissions. The first
established the commission's jurisdiction and precluded judicial review of its
decision. See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 132, 5101 (July 7, 1942). The
second named the eight defendants, the prosecutors, and the defense team as well
as delineated the commission's structure. See Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 132,
5103 (July 7, 1942). See generally Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military
Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes 3-4 (John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 153, 2002), available at http://www.law.
uchicago.edu/Lawecon/ index.html.
126. See, e.g., LouIs FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 31340, MILITARY
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 1 (2002) ("In creating a military commission
(tribunal) to try the terrorists, President Bush modeled his tribunal in large part on
a proclamation and military order issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1942, after the capture of eight German saboteurs."); President Bush's Speech on
Terrorism (Transcript), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at Al ("Military commissions have
been used by presidents from George Washington to Franklin Roosevelt .... ).
127. See supra note 11. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The [Quirin] case was not this Court's finest hour."); 2009
Military Commissions Hearing before Armed Services, supra note 65, at 15 (statement of
Sen. Lindsey Graham) ("When you look at the history of military commissions, the
World War Two German saboteurs trials is not exactly the showcase you would
want to use."); Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and
Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 83 (1980) ("By going to such
lengths to justify Roosevelt's proclamation, the Chief Justice, while preserving the
form of judicial review, gutted it of substance."); David J, Danelski, 'The Saboteur's
Case, J. OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY 1, 61 (1996) (characterizing the opinion as "a
rush to judgment, an agonizing effort to justify afait accompli," and an "institutional
defeat" for the Supreme Court); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L. J. 1259, 1290-91 (2002)
(" [T]here are reasons to discount the case itself as statutory precedent. . Quirin
plainly fits the criteria typically offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration.
. ."); Glenn Sulmasy, Ex Parte Quirin and Military Commissions Under the Obama
administration,41 U. TOL. L. REV. 767, 768 (2010) ("The story of Ex Parte Quirin
demonstrates why such commissions should not be used for al Qaeda fighters.").
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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repeatedly drew parallels between President Bush's Military Order
of November 13, 2011, and FDR's military order of July 2, 1942,129
scrutiny of the two orders reveals significant dissimilarities.
First, the laws of war have undergone meaningful change since
the trial of the Nazi saboteurs. As a result of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, treatment of enemy combatants has advanced
significantly. Moreoever, when FDR issued his Military Order,
Congress had already declared war against foreign states.
Consequently, under Justice Jackson's consequential tripartite
framework for evaluating claims of executive power, FDR was
arguably acting "pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress."130 President Bush, conversely, could not point to a
declaration of war. He did, however, cite the AUMF as a source of
authority in his Military Order, although the AUMF never explicitly
refers to the establishment of military commissions. In fact, the
Hamdan Court would hold that in establishing commissions the
President had exceeded congressional limits codified in Articles 21
and 36, UCMJ. Unlike FDR, whose authority was "at its maximum,"
President Bush was acting within "a zone of twilight."' 3'
The Orders can further be distinguished with respect to scope.
FDR's Order was unambiguous in two critical respects. First, there
was no question as to whom the Order applied to, as FDR's second
proclamation included the names of the eight saboteurs.132
Moreover, there was little doubt as to the saboteurs' guilt.133 These
two facts - neither of which existed in the circumstances
surrounding President Bush's Military Order - cannot be
overemphasized. As Professors Goldsmith and Sunstein explain,
the clear-cut scope and guilt of those to be tried served a powerful,
129. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed., Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2011, at A27 ("The language of the order is similar to the language
of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt. . . ."); Yoo, supra
note 5, at 205 ("In fact, [President Bush's military order] read just like the order
issued by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942 . . . ").
130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
131. Id. at 637. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 639 (2006) ("If the
President has exceeded these limits, this becomes a case of conflict between
Presidential and congressional action - a case within Justice Jackson's third
category, not the second or first.").
132. See Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 132, 5103 (July 7, 1942).
133. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 125, at 14.
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psychological role in legitimizing the FDR commissions.134
In stark contrast to FDR's military order, the scope of President
Bush's order is indeterminate and potentially applies to a sweeping
range of unidentified individuals. 35 The military order does not
apply to U.S. citizens, although it could apply to the more than 20
million aliens residing in the United States.136 The overbroad
standard to bring noncitizens before a military commission is a
Presidential determination that there is reason to believe an
individual: was a member of al Qaeda (though he or she need not
have participated in the 9/11 attacks); has engaged in, aided,
abetted, or conspired in an act of international terrorism; or has
harbored one of the aforementioned groups of individuals. As
Professors Tribe and Katyal explain, "[tihe Order's terms sweep so
broadly that they reach a Basque separatist who kills an American
citizen in Madrid, or a member of the Irish Republican Army who
threatens the American embassy in London." 137
Finally, the Orders diverge in terms of offenses triable by
military commission. FDR's order limited the offenses to those
"who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States
134, Id. ("A vivid sense of the identity of the perpetrators could well heighten the
sense that an expeditious proceeding is appropriate, and under the right conditions,
such a sense could also weaken the protests of those who insist on what they see as
procedural requirements.").
135. Section 2(a)(1) of the Military Order delineates those subject to the order
and reads:
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual
who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from
time to time in writing that:
(1) There is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused,
threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects
on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (1) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order ....
Military Order, supra note 27, § 2(a)(1).
136. The Department of Homeland Security estimates that in 2010, the U.S.
population included 8.1 million legal permanent residents. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2010 1
(2011). The Congressional Research Service estimates that in 2008 the U.S.
population included 11.9 million unauthorized aliens. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41207, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2010).
137. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 127, at 1261.
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... and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to
commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of
the law of war."138 The military order issued on November 13, 2011
did not include the substantive offenses with which to try terrorists.
The Department of Defense released that document, Military
Commission Instruction No. 2 (MCI2), Crimes and Elements for
Trial by Military Commissions, on April 30, 2003.139 MCI2
delineates eighteen substantive war crimes, eight other offenses
triable by military commission, and seven additional forms of
liability and related offenses, to include, inter alia, the inchoate
crimes of conspiracy, solicitation, and attempt. 140 Providing MST is
not listed as a crime in the MCI2. Although MCI2 states that
"[t]hese crimes and elements derive from the law of armed conflict"
the expansive range of substantive offenses, particularly inclusion of
inchoate crimes, makes this claim questionable. 141
Bypassing his interagency team, ignoring Congress, relying on
dubious precedent, and seeking to further codify the Bush Doctrine
in ambiguous yet sweeping language, the President's hastily written
military order was the subject of intense criticism by constitutional
lawyers, 142 international lawyers, 143 academia, 144 and the media. 145
138. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 132, 5101 (July 7, 1942).
139. Draft instructions were released on February 28, 2003. See generally DEP'T OF
DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 2 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/milcominstno2.pdf.
140. Id. §§ 6A-C.
141. Id. § 3A. See, e.g., KENNETH HURWITz, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRIALS UNDER
MILITARY ORDER: A GUIDE TO THE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1-2 (2006)
(Deborah Pearlstein ed.) ("Military Commission Instruction No. 2 expands the
notion of "armed conflict" to include isolated incidents, and even attempted
crimes. By doing this, crimes that traditionally have fallen outside military
jurisdiction can now, for purpose of the military commissions, be included under
the mantel of "laws of war."').
142. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 127, at 1266 (warning that President
Bush's military order was unconstitutional as Congressional authorization was
required by law to provide for trials of terrorists).
143. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 337, 338, 342, 344 (arguing that President Bush's military order
undermines the nation's commitments to the rule of law, enervates our ability to
lead an international campaign against terrorism, and endangers U.S.
servicemembers).
144. Letter to the Honorable Patrick J- Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.
(Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public-Affairs/
letterleahy.pdf (expressing the views of more than 250 law professors that the
militarily order undermines the tradition of separation of powers and fails to
32 [Vol. 36:1
2012] Military Commissions and the Charge of Material Support for Terror
While much of this criticism has focused on challenges to civil
liberties, the absence of procedural safeguards, separation of powers
comply with constitutional and international standards of due process). For a
listing of the original signatories to the letter, see
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ origsig.pdf.
145. See, e.g., Editorial, A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at A24
(claiming that "President Bush's use of military tribunals would erode the very
values he was trying to protect."); William Safire, Editorial, Voices of Negativism,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A35 ("The sudden seizure of power by the executive
branch, bypassing all constitutional checks and balances, is beginning to be
recognized by cooler heads in the White House, Defense Department and C.I.A. as
more than a bit excessive.").
Much of the criticism of President Bush's military order extends beyond the specific
order to criticism in general of military commissions. Generally, proponents of
commission argue that the emphasis the criminal justice system places on defendants'
rights makes it incompatible with trying terrorists in Article III courts. See, e.g., Ruth
Wedgewood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A18 ("U.S.
Marines may have to burrow down an Afghan cave to smoke out the leadership of al
Qaeda. It would be ludicrous to ask that they pause in the dark to pull an Afghan-
language Miranda card from their kit bag. This is war, not a criminal case.").
On the other hand, opponents of military commission contend that federal courts
are well-equipped to prosecute terrorists, as evidenced by the number of
prosecutions achieved between September 11, 2001, and September 2011. See CTR.
ON LAW AND SEC., N.Y. UNIV. LAW SCH., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 2 (2011)
("Approximately 300 prosecutions, from 2001 to 2011, resulted in indictments
related to jihadist terror or national security charges. Of the several hundred
resolved cases in this category, 87% resulted in convictions, roughly the same
conviction rate that we find for all federal criminal indictments."). See also RICHARD
B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2009) (Of
the 289 defendants in their data set from September 12, 2001 to June 2, 2009, 91%
received a conviction of any charge, either at trial or as a result of a guilty plea.).
Moreover, opponents of military commissions often contend that treating terrorists as
combatants conveys a status of which they are undeserving. For example, in
sentencing Richard C. Reid, the shoe bomber, to life imprisonment, Federal District
Court Judge William G. Young discounted Reid's claim that he was a righteous
warrior, admonishing, "[y]ou are not an enemy combatant, you are a terrorist.
You are not a soldier in any army, you are a terrorist. To call you a soldier gives you
far too much stature."). Pam Belluck, Threats and Response: The Bomb Plot; Unrepentant
Shoe Bomber is Given a Life Sentence for Trying to Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003,
at A13. See also Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for
Violations of the Law of War: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong.
41-42 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed) ("I think, just for the record, that there is a
value to trying some of these individuals in civilian courts because they are criminals,
and because when they try to claim a mantle of warrior, that is feeding into their
appeal out in the greater Islamic world . . . ."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should
be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 ("The trials will thus
dignify terrorists as soldiers in Islam's war against America. This is exactly the wrong
message to send. Al Qaeda members are international outlaws, like pirates, slave
traders, or torturers.").
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issues, and a lack of institutional independence, it has largely
ignored a critical area - global due process - which will be
considered in the next section.
3. Global Due Process: The Geneva Debate
This section considers what Professor Gerald R. Neuman has
referred to as "global due process rights." Global due process rights
can be thought of as those rights to which all persons are entitled,
either as a result of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
Constitutional rights, ascension to international treaties by their
states, or application of customary international law.146 This section
begins by surveying the international treaties to which the United
States is a signatory as well as delineating the minimum due process
rights necessary at a military commission. This section concludes
that the 2009 MCA meets these international norms except in one
key area.
This section next considers the Bush administration's
justification for application or non-application of such standards.
While the Bush Administration initially determined that the Geneva
Conventions would not apply to members of either al Qaeda or the
Taliban, the Administration later modified this position. This
section considers the intellectual foundations for nonapplication of
the conventions and argues that the final determination represented
a difference without distinction.
a. Unpacking "A Regularly Constituted Court"
Minimum due process requirements necessary at military
commissions are derived from international agreements as well as
customary international law.147  The first source includes
international treaties to which the United States is a signatory,
notably the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These treaties are legally
binding upon the United States.148 The second source includes
146. See generally Gerald L. Neumann, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L. J.
909, 920 (1991).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.").
148. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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customary international law, codified particularly in Article 75,
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. These norms are
legally binding upon the United States as well. 149 Taken together,
these sources of law contain interrelated fair trial standards
applicable to military commissions.
The United States ratified the four Geneva Conventions in
1955.150 The Conventions' myriad protections apply only to
hostilities comprising an "armed conflict." 151 Hostilities falling
short of a de facto armed conflict do not trigger application of the
Conventions, but remain within the scope of municipal criminal
law.152 Indisputably, the 9/11 attacks constituted an armed attack,
as evidenced by the responses of the international community.153
The Geneva Conventions apply in their entirety to "all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them."154 Conversely,
149. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that "international
law is our law" so long as "there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision"). See also Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words:
Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature
of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 205, 208 (2008)
("The understanding of the Founders and Framers that all persons are bound by
the law of nations provides an important basis for recognition that the United Sates
Congress, the executive branch, and the states are also bound by the law of
nations.").
150. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; GPW, supra note 62; Civilian Convention, supra note 69.
151. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross Commentary (1960).
[hereinafter Civilian Commentary].
152. See, e.g., Noelle Higgins, The Application of International Humanitarian Law to
Wars of National Liberation, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2004), available at
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/al32.pdf.
153. See S.C. Res. 1368, j 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (finding that
the 9/11 attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security and
recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance
with Chapter VII of the Charter); Press Release, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sep. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_18553 .htm?mode=pressrelease (invoking, for the first time in its storied
history, Article V of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack
against one or more members shall be considered an attack against them all).
154. Civilian Convention, supra note 69, art. 2.
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existence of an internal or noninternational armed conflict 155
between states and substate armed groups, "only triggers
application of Common Article 3's 'mini convention' protections." 156
As discussed, the international armed conflict between the United
States and Afghanistan likely terminated in June 2002.157
Consequently, as the conflict can be characterized as a
noninternational armed conflict, only the safeguards of Common
Article 3 would apply to military commissions. Indeed, the Hamdan
Court expressly held that Common Article 3 applies to the non-
international armed conflict with al Qaeda. 158 Similarly, U.S. policy
dictates that all individuals held as detainees in the war on terror
will receive the protections of Common Article 3.159
Among the protections afforded by Common Article 3
applicable to military commissions are due process requirements on
state parties choosing to prosecute individuals during a time of
155. Although Common Article 3 does not define the term "armed conflict not of
an international character," the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia provides substantial clarity. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I,
Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (holding that internal hostilities
constitute an armed conflict if violence is 'protracted' as opposed to sporadic).
Additionally, the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions provides a functional
definition of "armed conflict not of an international character." See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 1(2) 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978)
[hereinafter APII] ("This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflict.").
156. BOVARNICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 26; Civilian Convention, supra note 69, at
art. 3.
157. See supra note 76.
158. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) ("The Court of Appeals
thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3 does not apply to
Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being international in scope does not
qualify as a conflict not of an international character. That reasoning is erroneous.")
(internal citations omitted). See also Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of
Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and
International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2007) ("By applying
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the noninternational armed
conflict against al Qaeda, the Court effectively ruled that participants in this conflict
do not fall outside the minimum scope of the benefits and obligations of binding
international humanitarian law.").
159. Dep't of Def. Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program (May 9, 2006).
See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01D, Implementation
of the DoD Law of War Program (Apr. 30, 2010).
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armed conflict. Common Article 3 prohibits "the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples."o60 Although Common Article 3 never defines
this phrase, the official commentary to the Conventions
contemplates a prohibition of "summary justice."161
At a minimum, "a regularly constituted court" must be
independent and impartial.162 These two requirements ensure that
judges are not influenced by personal bias or prejudice.163 Although
human rights organizations have warned that trials of civilians by
military courts would likely compromise independence and
impartiality, 64 the history of military commissions in the war on
terror resoundingly debunks this contention.165
160. Civilian Convention, supra note 69, art. 3(l)(d).
161. Civilian Commentary, supra note 151, at 38 ("We must be very clear about
one point; it is only 'summary' justice which it is intended to prohibit. No sort of
immunity is given to anyone under this provision."). See also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
734 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Whatever else may be said about the system that was
created by Military Commission Order No. 1 . this system - which features
formal trial procedures, multiple levels of administrative review, and the
opportunity for review .does not dispense 'summary justice."').
162. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights holds
that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 1719 signed by the United
States on Oct. 5, 1977; ratified on June 5, 1992 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Additionally,
GPW mandates that POWs be tried by courts offering "essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality." GPW, supra note 62, at art. 84. This obligation is
further codified in Additional Protocol II. APII, supra note 155, at art. 6(2) ("No
sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty
of an offense except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the
essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.").
163. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee, Slovakia, 18 CCPR/C/79/Add.79 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b032c.html.
164. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, 22
CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b032c.html ("The Committee also notes that the trial of civilians in
military or special courts may raise serious problems as far as the equitable,
impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned.").
165. Of all the charges leveled at military commissions, perhaps the most
unsupported is the contention that military judges and military defense counsel
beholden to the executive would succumb to executive compulsion to unfairly
convict defendants. The record resoundingly indicates that military judges have
37
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
While the Hamdan Court recognized the "general" nature of the
Common Article 3 requirements, it held that the phrase "must be
understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial
protections recognized by customary international law."166 In
particular, the Court expressed grave concern with a "glaring"
omission of a fundamental fairness - the right of an accused and his
attorney to be present for his trial and to be privy to the evidence
against him.167 Military Commission Order No. 1 (MC1),168 which
governed the procedures for military commissions at the time,
provided that an accused, as well as his civilian defense counsel,
could be excluded from any portion of the trial proceeding.169 This
proved critical for the plurality, 70 which held that the military
commissions convened by President Bush did not meet the
minimum requirements of Common Article 3.171 Rule 804 of the
2010 Manual for Military Commissions revises MC1 and expressly
provides that the accused shall be present at "every stage of the
scrupulously upheld the law and military defense counsel have zealously
represented their unpopular clients. See, e.g., Legal Issues Hearings, supra note 13, at
22 (statement of LTC Darrel Vandeveld, USAR, former prosecutor at the Office of
Military Commissions, Guantdnamo Bay) ("Still, the judges at Guantanamo have
displayed a remarkable independence that has clearly confounded the architects of
the commissions system, who evidently believed that both the military judges and
the commissions panel members would serve as little more than an 'amen chorus. .
. .'"). See also Newton, supra note 122, at 158 ("Defense attorneys have been widely
lauded in both human rights circles and in the press as being diligent and dedicated
in the defense of their clients."); Patricia M. Wald, Foreword to the Military
Commission Reporter, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 449, 451 (2009) ("Insofar as it is possible to
evaluate the energy and stamina of defense counsel from the commissions' rulings
alone, it appears that they left no stone unturned in advocating for their unpopular
clients.").
166. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633.
167. Id. at 613-14.
168. The Department of Defense originally promulgated Military Commission
Order No. on March 21, 2002. The Secretary of Defense amended the order on
August 31, 2005. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 (Aug. 31, 2005).
169. Id. § 6(B)(3) (noting that grounds for closure include, but are not limited to,
protection of classified information).
170. Because Justice Kennedy agreed that the military commission to try Salim
Hamdan was unauthorized under Articles 21 and 36, UCMJ, he determined there
was "no need to decide whether Common Article 3 of the Conventions requires
that the accused have the right to be present at all stages of a criminal trial" and did
not join the plurality with respect to that section. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 564.
171. Id. at 635 ("Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of
flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are
general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But
requirements they are nonetheless.").
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trial."172
In contradistinction to the ambiguous language of common
article 3, article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United States ratified in 1992,
delineates an unambiguous list of trial protections for the accused.
This list includes, inter alia, the presumption of innocence;173 the
right to be tried without undue delay;174 the right to counsel;175 the
right to examine witnesses appearing against him and the right to
have witnesses produced;176 the right to have the free assistance of
an interpreter;'" the right against self-incrimination;178 and the right
to appeal to a higher tribunal.179 The 2009 MCA8o substantially
172. DEP'T OF DEF., 2010 MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 11-70 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 MANUAL FOR COMMISSIONS]. Rule 804 permits the proceeding to
continue in the absence of the accused in three instances: for certain in camera and ex
parte presentations (Rule 804a); removal for disruptive behavior after receiving a
warning from the military judge (Rule 804b); and voluntary absence (Rule 804c-d).
173. ICCPR, supra note 162 art. 14(2).
174. Id. art. 14(3)(c).
175. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
176. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
177. Id. art. 14(3)(f).
178. Id. art. 14(3)(g).
179. Id. art. 14(5).
180. In the spring of 2009 President Obama declared his intention to revive
military commissions with changes to the procedural rules. See, e.g., Peter Finn,
Obama Set to Revive Military Commissions, Changes Would Boost Detainee Rights,
WASH. POST, May 9, 2009, at A01. President Obama signed the 2010 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on October 28, 2010. See Press Release, The
White House, Remarks by the President at the Signing of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-national-defense-
authoriz ation-act-fiscal-year-2010. Included in the NDAA was an array of changes
to the rules governing military commissions. On May 4, 2010, the Defense
Department released a 281 page set of procedures for conducting commissions in
accordance with the 2009 MCA. See 2010 MANUAL FOR COMMISSIONS, supra note 172.
The 2009 MCA replaced and greatly reformed the 2006 MCA. While a detailed
analysis of the two acts is beyond the scope of this article, the 2009 MCA
significantly reformed the 2006 MCA in several key areas worth noting briefly.
First, the 2009 MCA replaced the phrase "unlawful enemy combatant" with the
term "unprivileged enemy belligerent. See 2009 MCA, supra note 19, at § 948a(7).
Second, while the 2006 MCA precluded defendants from invoking the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights, the 2009 MCA repeals this restriction. See id.,
supra note 19, at § 9 47(g); 2009 MCA § 948b(e).
Third, while the 2006 MCA barred the use of statements obtained by torture as
evidence in a trial, it authorized the use of statements obtained as a result of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment taken before enactment of the Detainee
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complies with all of these guidelines.181
Treatment Act (prohibiting inhumane treatment of detainees). See JENNIFER K.
ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40752, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006:
BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 23 (2009). Per the 2006 MCA, such
statements were admissible if the military judge found that "the totality of the
circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative
value," and "the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence." 2006 MCA, supra note 19, at § 948r(d). The 2009 MCA
unequivocally bars admissibility of such statements. See 2009 MCA, supra note 19,
at 948r(a) ("No statement obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment shall be admissible in a military commission under this
chapter, except against a person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence
that the statement was made.").
Fourth, while the 2009 MCA continues to authorize use of hearsay evidence, it
significantly restricts admission. The 2006 MCA barred hearsay only "if the party
opposing [it] demonstrate[d] that the evidence [was] unreliable or lacking
probative value." 2006 MCA, supra note 19, at § 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii). The 2009 MCA
places the burden of demonstrating reliability on the proponent of the evidence.
ELSEA, supra note 180, at 27.
Fifth, the 2009 MCA includes provisions for capital cases to include appointment of
at least one learned counsel. 2010 MANUAL FOR COMMISSIONS, supra note 172, at II-
32.
While these changes are significant, the newfound legitimacy with which military
commissions have been accorded is arguably due less to substantive changes than a
change in presidential administrations and the general opprobrium the left had for
President Bush's policies on Iraq and the war on terror. See, e.g., Chisun Lee, Obama's
Preventive Detention Problem: Breaking it Down, PROPUBLICA BLOG (May 22, 2009, 4:38
PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/obamas-preventive-detention-problem-
breaking-it-down-522 (quoting U.S. Army Major General (Ret.) John Altenburg,
Retired Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Army and appointing authority for
military commissions, as stating "[T]he Bush administration's 'arrogance and
naivete' about public perception had tarnished the otherwise valid notion of
detaining terrorism suspects under a wartime rationale [and . .] allow[ed] critics to
define the terms of the debate to be the terms of domestic criminal law. . . .").
181. 2009 MCA, supra note 19, § 9491(c)(1) ("that the accused must be presumed
to be innocent until the accused's guilt is established by legal and competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. §948s ("The trial counsel assigned to a
case . . shall cause to be served upon the accused and military defense counsel a
copy of the charges . sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense."); id. §
948q(b) ("Upon the swearing of the charges ... the accused shall be informed of the
charges and specifications against the accused as soon as practicable."); id. § 949(c)
(delineating the duties of defense counsel); id. § 9481(b) (" [T]he convening authority
of a military commission . . . may detail to or employ for the military commission
interpreters who shall interpret. . for the accused"); id. § 948r(b) ("No person shall
be required to testify against himself or herself at a proceeding of a military
commission under this chapter."); id. §§ 950f-g (detailing appellate review by the
United States Court of Military Commission Review; the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia; writ of certiorari to Supreme Court).
In a timely new book, journalist William Shawcross explores the form of justice al
Qaeda defendants should receive by considering the Nuremburg precedent.
Shawcross, a journalist with significant progressive credentials and the son of
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Despite its salutary advancements, the 2009 MCA bears a
potentially ruinous resemblance to the 2006 MCA in a single critical
respect - the charge of MST. In spite of reservations voiced by the
Obama administration, 182 Congress chose not to eliminate the crime
in the 2009 MCA. Consequently, despite the veritable
enhancements the revised MCA has made, questions of legitimacy
continue to haunt military commissions. 183
The charge of MST will be considered in detail in Part II.
Nonetheless, in discussing whether the revised military commission
system comports with minimum global due process rights, a brief
discussion is in order. Inclusion of the crime potentially constitutes
retroactive punishment forbidden by the ex post facto clause,184
codified in both the U.S. Constitution 185 and Article 75 of Additional
Hartley Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor at Numerbug, concludes that the
military commissions of today afford significantly greater procedural due process
rights than the Nuremburg trials ever contemplated. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 38,
at 101("[Nuremburg] gave fewer rights to the accused than did the military
commissions created in the United States during the Bush administration. Any
German in the dock of Nuremburg would be astonished to learn of his rights,
privileges, and entitlements if he were suddenly transferred . . . to the court in
Guantdnamo."). See also Wells C. Bennett, Book Review: Justice and the Enemy:
Nuremburg, 9/11, and the Trial of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, by William Shawcross,
LAWFARE (Jan. 7, 2012. 1, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/01/justice-and-the-enemy-nuremberg-911-and-the-trial-of-khalid-sheik-
mohammed/.
182. See, e.g., Military Commissions, Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th
Cong. 3 (2009) (submitted statement of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General)
("[T]here are serious questions as to whether material support for terrorism or
terrorist groups is a traditional violation of the law of war.")
183. See, e.g., JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41163, THE MILITARY
COMMISSIoNs ACT OF 2009: OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES 13 (2010) ("Similarly,
defining as a war crime the 'material support for terrorism' does not appear to be
supported by historical precedent.").
184. The Supreme Court has held that there are three categories of ex post facto
laws:
(1) a law that punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was
innocent when done; (2) a law that makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime, after its commission; or (3) a law that deprives one
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed.
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 37-38 (1990). See also ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 511 (Clinton Rossiter, ed., Signet Classics 2003) ("The
creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting
of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of
law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorable and most formidable instruments of tyranny.").
185. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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Protocol I (API).186 For example, the misconduct that resulted in
Salim Hamdan's conviction of providing MST occurred between
February, 1996 - November, 2001 - nearly five years before
186. Article 75(4)(c) states in full:
[N]one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the
national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it
was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if,
after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the
imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
Article 75 provides fundamental guarantees for individuals detained by the enemy
during an international armed conflict. In his plurality opinion in Hamdan, Justice
Stevens suggested that Article 75 elaborates the protections depicted in Common
Article 3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006).
Although the United States is not a signatory to API, the fundamental guarantees of
Article 75 arguably constitute customary international law. For example, a former
Bush Administration State Department legal advisor has written:
More broadly, this customary law notion of fundamental guarantees found
more expansive expression in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. While the United States has major objection to parts
of Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an
articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy
are entitled.
William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 321-22 (2003).
President Obama has stated that the United States will adhere to the guarantees of
Article 75 "out of a sense of legal obligation." Upon signing E.O. 13567 (Periodic
Review of Individuals Detained at Guantdnamo Bay) the President made several
important statements to include the following:
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which sets forth fundamental
guarantees for persons in the hands of opposing forces in an international
armed conflict, is similarly important to the international legal framework.
Although the Administration continues to have significant concerns with
Additional Protocol I, Article 75 is a provision of the treaty that is
consistent with our current policies and practice and is one that the United
States has historically supported.
Our adherence to these principles is also an important safeguard against
the mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. The U.S.
Government will therefore choose out of a sense of legal obligation to treat
the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it
detains in an international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to
adhere to these principles as well.
Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on GuantAnamo and
Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy.
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codification of the charge in the 2006 MCA.187 Construing the 2006
MCA to permit prosecutions for acts committed before its
promulgation would result in a conflict between the MCA and
international law, and a violation of the Charming Betsy Canon.188
The DoD appears to be aware that the charge of MST is potentially
problematic as section 950p(d) of the 2009 MCA appears to be an
effort to withstand constitutional challenges on ex post facto
grounds.189
Having surveyed the global due process rights mandated at a
military commission, this article now considers the Bush
Administration's controversial application of those rights.
b. Application of the Geneva Conventions: A Difference Without
Distinction
Soon after the United States began detaining Taliban and al
Qaeda members, the question arose as to what global due process
rights they were entitled to. The answer initially provided by
President Bush was far fewer rights than those required by
international agreements. On January 18, 2002, the President
determined that captured Taliban and al Qaeda members were not
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.190 The
187. See United States v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, D-012, Def.'s Reply to Gov't
Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Ex Post
Factor Charges, 12, 15, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/O/
pdfs/Hamdan%20(AE098).pdf.
188. Pursuant to the doctrine, courts interpret ambiguous acts of Congress to
avoid conflicts with international law. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("It has also been observed that an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains .....
189. The provision states in full:
EFFECT.- The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have
traditionally been triable by military commission. This chapter does not
establish new crimes that did not exist before the date of the enactment of
this subchapter, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission. Because the provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that
have traditionally been triable under the law of war or otherwise triable by
military commission, this subchapter does not preclude trial for offenses
that occurred before the date of the enactment of this subchapter, as so
amended.
2009 MCA, supra note 19, at § 950p(d).
190. See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Katharine Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush
to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12
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Administration's decision was based on a belief that those
individuals had not only forfeited their rights to the protections, but
also that granting Taliban and al Qaeda members the safeguards
would debase the conventions in the future.191
The decision was substantially shaped by a legal opinion
originating in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) on January 9, 2002. In that opinion, John Yoo and Robert
Delahunty, a senior executive service official in OLC, provided the
framework for a wholesale rejection of the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions to the war on terror.192 Although President
Bush would modify his determination, the Yoo opinion serves as the
analytical outline for the debate that ensued within the
administration. A brief discussion of the memo is therefore useful.
The opinion is written in four parts. Part one examines the War
Crimes Act (WCA)193 of 1996 and relevant international treaties.
Part two examines whether al Qaeda detainees may claim the
protections of the Geneva Conventions. The opinion concludes that
(claiming that "Mr. Bush's first decision to reject the conventions, reached in secret
on Jan. 18 and never announced, was based on advice from the Justice Department
and from the White House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales."). See also John Mintz, Bush
Shifts Position on Detainees; Geneva Conventions to Cover Taliban, but not al Qaeda,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2008, at AO1 ("The president decided on Jan. 18 to deny the
captives coverage under the conventions and, more significantly, not to declare
them prisoners of war.").
191. Marc A. Thiessen, a former Bush White House speechwriter, quotes Stephen
Hadley, President Bush's second national security advisor, as explaining:
We defended the Geneva Conventions, and al Qaeda violated them in
every respect. They would hide among civilians to protect themselves and
they would kill innocent civilians to achieve their objectives. There could
not be anything more inconsistent with international standards for how
you conduct a conflict. And, in light of that, we were supposed to treat
them like normal POWs? Why is that a humane, forward-thinking policy?
See, e.g., MARC A. THIESSEN, COURTING DISASTER: HOW THE CIA KEPT AMERICA SAFE
AND How BARACK OBAMA IS INVITING THE NEXT ATTACK 31 (2010). Contra
SHAWCROSS, supra note 38, at 117 ("If one accepts that terrorists like Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed have deliberately eschewed the protections of the Geneva Conventions
by refusing to act according to the laws of war, then there is an argument that they
should be treated as criminals rather than as prisoners of war.").
192. Draft Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep't of
Defense from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, re. Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/legalmemos.html [hereinafter Yoo
Memo].
193. The War Crimes Act criminalizes breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
allowing the United States to prosecute war criminals in federal court. See War
Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2401).
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as a nonstate actor, al Qaeda "is not eligible to sign the Geneva
Conventions." 194 Consequently, "neither the Geneva Conventions
nor the WCA regulate the detention of al Qaeda prisoners captured
during the Afghanistan conflict." 195 Part three considers application
of the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban. While this "presents a
more difficult legal question" to the authors, they ultimately
conclude that "Afghanistan was without the attributes of statehood
necessary to continue as a party to the Geneva Conventions, and the
Taliban military, like al Qaeda, is therefore not entitled to the
protections of the Geneva Conventions."196
Having determined that positive law does not apply to al
Qaeda or Taliban detainees in the war on terror, part four considers
whether customary international law may provide the detainees
with any such protections. The authors conclude that it does not, as
"customary international law ... does not bind the President, or
restrict the actions of the United States military, because it does not
constitute federal law recognized under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution." 197
The day after President Bush's determination, the Secretary of
Defense ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform
all combatant commanders that al Qaeda and Taliban individuals
"are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949."198 Although Judge Advocates
General (JAGs) had grave concerns that non-application of the
conventions could imperil the safety of Service members in the
future, JAGs were again shut out of the process. 199
194. Yoo Memo, supra note 192, at 11.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 14.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Memorandum for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Sec'y of
Def. Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002), available at
http://lawofwar.org/ Rumsfeld%20Torture%20memo 0001.jpg.
199. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 5, at 35 ("Some, such as Senator Lindsey Graham
(himself a JAG), have suggested that the JAGs were shut out of the decision
process."); ROBERT 0. BOORSTIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MEMORANDUM ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS 1 (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/kfiles/b79532.html (quoting Rear Admiral John Huston (Ret.),
the Navy Judge Advocate General from 1997 to 2000, as saying, "[w]hen you say
something down the chain of command like, '[t]he Geneva Conventions don't
apply, that sets the stage for the kind of chaos that we've seen."). But see Shanker &
Seelye, supra note 190, at A12 (noting that in time "Mr. Rumsfeld came to reflect the
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The Administration's conclusions were the subject of criticism
by the International Red Cross, 200 international allieS, 201 human
rights organizations, 202 the media, 203 members of the President's
own Cabinet, 204 JAGs,205 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. 206 Within a week of Secretary Rumsfeld's diktat, White House
Counsel Alberto Gonzales provided a memorandum to President
Bush summarizing departmental conflicts regarding the decision
not to grant Prisoner of War status to members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban. 207
concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who rely on the Geneva Conventions to protect
captured Americans, and was displeased by what he saw as the clumsy public
release of the administration's decisions.").
200. See, e.g., Press Release, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War (Feb. 9, 2002) (noting "[t]here are divergent views between the
United States and the ICRC on the procedures which apply on how to determine
that the persons detained are not entitled to prisoner of war status" and "[t]he
ICRC remains firmly convinced that compliance with international humanitarian
law in no manner constitutes an obstacle to the struggle against terror and crime.").
201. See, e.g., McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 67, at 302 (noting international
criticism of the decision "from a variety of sources"); Shanker & Seelye, supra note
190, at A12 (noting the decision complicated relations with European allies,
particularly Britain and France).
202. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Prisoners of War at Guantdnamo: Bush Policy Endangers
American and Allied Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/05/opinion/05iht-edroth-ed3-.html (Mr.
Roth is the executive director of Human Rights Watch).
203. See, e.g., William Safire, Colin Powell Dissents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at
A21 ("Condi Rice's spokesman claimed the Gonzales memo was only a 'draft,'
confirming suspicions that Gonzales signs off on half-baked memos and orders.").
204. BOORSTIN, supra note 199, at 1 ("Objections and warnings from Secretary of
State Colin Powell, his legal advisor, and senior Pentagon officials were brushed
aside.").
205. See supra notes 121 & 199.
206. Jack L. Goldsmith, a man with impeccable conservative credentials, who
served in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has written:
The State Department vehemently opposed this argument. So did the
Pentagon, where the normally mild-mannered Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, argued passionately against Yoo's
position. He believed ... that the Geneva Conventions were ingrained in
U.S. military culture, that an American soldier's self-image is bound up
with the Conventions, and that as we want our troops, if captured treated
according to the Conventions, we have to encourage respect for the law by
our own example.
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 113-114 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
207. See Memorandum for the President From Alberto R. Gonzales on Decision
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Gonzales begins his memo by reiterating the conclusions of the
Yoo/Delahunty memo, namely that the Third Geneva Convention
does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In
language that has become infamous, Gonzales writes, "[i]n my
judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict
limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint
some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy be afforded
such things as commissary privileges, scrip (i.e., advances of
monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments." 208
Gonzales next acknowledges that "[n]evertheless, you should be
aware that the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State has expressed
a different view." 209
Secretary Powell wrote separately to Gonzales explaining "that
the draft [memorandum] does not squarely present to the President
the options that are available to him. Nor does it identify the
significant pros and cons of each option." 210 In his memo, Powell
clearly presents the two options available to the President: the status
quo (the conventions do not apply to the war on terror) or a
determination that the Geneva Conventions do apply to the war on
terror with POW status to be determined on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with article 5, GPW.211 The Third Geneva Convention,
article 5, states in part:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with
al Qaeda and the Taliban 2 Uan. 25, 2002), available at http://news.1p.findlaw.com
/hdocs/ docs/ torture/gnzlsl2502mem2gwb.html [hereinafter Gonzales Memo].
208. Id. When this quote originally appeared in a May 24, 2004, Newsweek article,
the authors altered the quote by terminating it after the word "provisions." The
authors further failed to use an ellipsis to indicate the omission. As presented in
the Newsweek article, the quote appears to indicate that Gonzales found the Geneva
Conventions' limitations on interrogations "quaint" - clearly not the case when the
entire quote is presented. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture: The Road to Abu
Ghraib Began After 9/11, When Washington Wrote New Rules to Fight a New Kind of
War, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26 ("Gonzales concluded in stark terms: 'In my
judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.'").
209. Gonzales Memo, supra note 207, at 1.
210. Memorandum to Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs from Colin L. Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for
the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afg.
1 (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB /NSAEBB
127/02.01.26.pdf [hereinafter Powell Memo].
211. Id.
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a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal. 212
The President, however, had made a "group status
determination" that article 5 tribunals could be dispensed with, as
the detainees were all enemy combatants. 213 In his book The Terror
Presidency, Jack Goldsmith, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the
OLC, decries this determination. He writes:
Whatever its legal merits, this was an inadequate response to
concerns that particular individuals were not enemy fighters but
instead were innocent farmers scooped up in Afghanistan. To the
skeptical slice of American public and to most U.S. allies, it
seemed as though a single and self-interested judge was
consigning scores of people to indefinite detention without a
modicum of due process.214
Secretary Powell elucidates a critical point in his memo that
both Gonzales and Yoo appear to have misconstrued regarding
GPW. The Bush Administration consistently argued that granting al
Qaeda and/or Taliban members POW status would preclude the
United States from effectively interrogating terrorists during the war
on terror.215 Powell essays to debunk this misperception. 216
Article 17 of GPW states in part, "Every prisoner of war, when
questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first
names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, person or
serial number, or failing this, equivalent information." 217 Article 17
additionally mandates that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
212. GPW, supra note 62, art. 5. U.S. procedures for conducting an article 5
tribunal are laid out in Army Regulation 190-8. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG.
190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES, AND
OTHER DETAINEES 2 (Oct. 1, 1997).
213. GOLDSMITH, supra note 206, at 118.
214. Id. at 118-19.
215. See, e.g., Shanker & Seelye, supra note 190, at A12 ("By denying captives full
Geneva protections, the Administration said, it could more thoroughly interrogate
them to uncover future terrorist plots . . . .").
216. Powell Memo, supra note 210, at 2 ("Both [options] provide the same
practical flexibility in how we treat detainees, including with respect to interrogation
and length of the detention.") (emphasis added).
217. GPW, supra note 62, at art. 17.
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secure from them information of any kind whatever." 218
Consequently, Article 17 does not preclude, but merely proscribes,
in accordance with customary international law and U.S. policy, 219
"legitimate U.S. efforts to interrogate terrorist suspects." 220 As two
practitioners explain:
Insisting that article 17 prohibits all forms of interrogations
ignores the purpose and spirit behind the Third Geneva
Convention and renders its protections counterproductive.
Prohibitions on mental and physical abuse contained in the Third
Geneva Convention should be strictly followed.... Thus,
allowing some interrogation more accurately reflects the spirit
and goals of the framers of the Third Convention. Instead of
focusing on whether any questioning is allowed, the debate
should concern permissible tactics of questioning under article
17.221
Powell's memo cogently summarizes the pros and cons of the
two options presented to the President. With respect to the dangers
he perceived of maintaining the status quo, the former national
security advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff articulates
the following policy rationales: (1) "it will reverse over a century of
U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and
undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops"; (2) "It
has a high cost in terms of negative international reaction"; (3) "it
will undermine public support among critical allies"; (4)
"Europeans and others will likely have legal problems with
extradition or other forms of cooperation in law enforcement,
including bringing terrorists to justice"; (5) "it may provoke some
individual foreign prosecutors to investigate and prosecute our
officials and troops"; (6) "it will make us more vulnerable to
domestic and international legal challenge and deprive us of
important legal options." 222
Powell articulates a single, albeit illusory, advantage - "[tihis is
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 5-26 (2006) (expressly prohibiting "[a]cts of
violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or exposure to
inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation "). See also
BOVARNICK ET AL., supra note 57, at 90 ("It's not what you ask but how you ask it.").
220. Roth, supra note 202.
221. McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 67, at 312.
222. Powell Memo, supra note 210, at 2.
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an across-the-board approach that on its face provides maximum
flexibility, removing any question of case-by-case determination for
individuals."9223
Although Gonzales found Powell's "arguments for
reconsideration and reversal [to be] unpersuasive" 224 President Bush
apparently concluded otherwise, executing a volte-face that had the
curious effect of satisfying no one225 and was itself the subject of
further criticism.226 On February 7, 2002, in an unscheduled press
conference, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer announced that the
President had decided that the Geneva Conventions would now
apply to members of the Taliban but that under GPW, article 4,227
they were not entitled to POW status. Fleischer further
acknowledged that the change in policy would in no way alter
treatment of members of the Taliban as they were already being
treated humanely, prompting one reporter to label the
announcement "a difference without distinction." 228 Members of al
Qaeda would continue to be outside the protections of the
conventions but would also continue to be treated humanely. 229
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Gonzales Memo, supra note 207, at 3.
225. See, e.g., Katharine Seelye, In Shift, Powell Asks Bush to Review Stand on War
Captives, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al ("On the other side were Vice President
Dick Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Alberto Gonzales, the White
House Counsel. Officials said that Secretary Powell had actually sought Geneva
protection for both the Taliban and al Qaeda, and that Mr. Bush took the middle
position.").
226. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 202 ("The decision appears to reverse public
statements by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and even President George W. Bush himself that the detainees in the Guantinamo
Bay base in Cuba didn't merit protection under the laws of war."); Mintz, supra
note 190, at A01 (quoting Professor Sean D. Murphy, an expert on the Geneva
Conventions as saying, "I'm a little mystified by the decision.... The more you
appear to say that people are not entitled to coverage under international rules, the
more Washington risks endangering U.S. forces.").
227. To qualify as a POW under article 4 an individual must satisfy the following
four conditions: "(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly; and (d) that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war." GPW, supra note 62, art. 4(A)(2).
228. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, White House
Press Sec'y Announcement of President Bush's Determination Re Legal Status of
Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov
/s/l/38727.htm.
229. Id. For an argument that members of al Qaeda must be covered by the
Civilians Convention if not covered by GPW, see HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. against
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Although this revised policy generated considerable criticism from
JAGs, their views were ignored once again.230
The announcement raised more questions than it answered.
What protections, for example, would be accorded to a member of al
Qaeda who had been integrated into the Taliban forces?231 What
precisely was meant by "humanely" as the President's order neither
defined the term nor provided subsequent guidance? 232 Also
unanswered was whether the Administration intended to convene
Article 5 tribunals as mandated by GPW in cases of doubt and
advanced by Secretary Powell. 233 Finally, the announcement failed
to indicate if the Taliban would be afforded protections under other
conventions, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention protecting
Torture in Isr. v. Govt of Israel [2005] (holding that international law recognizes
two classes of persons - combatants and civilians. A third category of unlawful
combatants has not yet been recognized by international law). See also Prosecutor v.
Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 271 (Nov. 16, 1998) ("If an individual is
not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of
the First or Second Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of
Convention IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are satisfied.").
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explains the groups of civilians
protected. The Commentary explains there are two main classes of protected
persons: "(1) 'enemy nations' within the national territory of each of the Parties to
the conflict, and (2) 'the whole population' of occupied territories (excluding
nationals of the Occupying Power)." Civilian Commentary, supra note 151, at 46.
Civilians not protected include the following groups: (1) Nationals of a State which
is not bound by the convention; (2) nationals of a neutral or co-belligerent State, so
long as the State in question has normal diplomatic representation in the State in
whose territory they are; and (3) persons covered by one of the other three
conventions. Id.
230. See, e.g., COMM. ON ARMED SERvS., U.S. SENATE, INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT
OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 3 (2008) [hereinafter ARMED SERVICES, 2008 INQUIRY].
The Armed Services Committee concluded:
Several military officers, including members of the Judge Advocate
General (JAG) Corps, have described difficulties in interpreting and
implementing the President's February 7, 2002 order. A former Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) for the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) stated that he
thought the President's order was a tough standard for the Department of
Defense (DoD) to apply in the field because it replaced a well-established
military doctrine (legal compliance with the Geneva Conventions) with a
policy that was subject to interpretation. The President's order was not,
apparently, followed by any guidance that defined the terms "humanely"
or "military necessity." As a result, those in the field were left to interpret
the President's order. (citation omitted).
231. Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as
POWs, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 478 (2002).
232. ARMED SERVICES, 2008 INQUIRY, supra note 230, at 3.
233. Murphy, supra note 231, at 478.
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civilians (GCIV).234
Apart from the public infighting and reversals which marked
the President's decision-making process, the decision not to grant
POW status to members of the Taliban and al Qaeda, or at the very
least to hold Article 5 tribunals, can be criticized on historical and
policy grounds.
As Powell indicated in his memo to Gonzales, the Bush
Administration's initial decision denying application of the Geneva
Conventions to the war on terror "reverse[d] over a century of U.S.
policy and practice. . . ."235 A brief historical survey indicates that
the United States has afforded, or been afforded, POW status in a
number of ambiguous circumstances in which the applicability of
GPW was in question.
During the Civil War, the United States was neither legally nor
customarily required to treat Confederate soldiers as POWs. 236 The
United States, and indeed, the rest of the world viewed the war as
an "internal rebellion." 237 Consequently, the United States would
have been within its legal rights to try Confederate Soldiers as guilty
of treason, according them none of the protections as POWs. The
Supreme Court endorsed this view in 1862, holding, "[t]hey have
cast off their allegiance and made war on their Government, and are
none the less enemies because they are traitors." 238 The better
angels of our nature prevailed, however, and POW status was
"accorded as a matter of grace." 239
Similarly, during the Vietnam War, the United States treated
the Vietcong as POWs as a matter of policy, although they arguably
could not be said to have met the criteria of Article 4, GPW.240
Additionally, in December 1994, Chief Warrant Officer Two
(CW2) Bobby Hall, a U.S. Army pilot, strayed into North Korean
234. Id. at 479.
235. Powell Memo, supra note 210, at 2.
236. JAMES M. GILLISPIE, ANDERSONVILLES OF THE NORTH: THE MYTHS AND
REALITIES OF NORTHERN TREATMENT OF CIVIL WAR CONFEDERATE PRISONERS 83 (2008).
237. Id.
238. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 674 (1862).
239. Id. at 673.
240. See, e.g., MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973
62 (1975) ("As indigenous offenders, the Viet Cong did not technically merit
prisoner of war status, although they were entitled to humane treatment under
Article 3, Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions.").
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airspace on a routine flight and was shot down by North Korean air
defense forces. 241 While the crash killed his co-pilot, CW2 Hall was
taken into custody by the North Koreans. 242 Although there was a
question whether an "armed conflict" existed between the United
States and the DPRK, North Korea accorded CW2 Hall POW status
and released him after 13 days.243
Finally, in October 1993, during the Battle of Mogadishu, Chief
Warrant Officer Two (CW2) Michael Durant, a Blackhawk pilot, was
shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade and captured by a group
of Somalis loyal to warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. 244 Although
Aideed and his followers were not required to follow GPW as
Somalia (like Afghanistan in 2001) was a failed state, the United
States demanded assurances that Durant be treated consistently
with the provisions of GPW.245 Fearing international prosecution,
Aideed agreed and although Durant was not technically granted
POW status, his treatment was consistent with the protections of
GPW during his 13 days of captivity. 246 In considering the case of
CW2 Durant, two practitioners have written, "[i]f the Third Geneva
Convention protections are binding on a Somali warlord, non-state
parties must be granted the same protection."247
Apart from worldwide condemnation, jeopardizing U.S.
Servicemembers in future conflicts, and undermining the military
commissions system, it is unclear what the United States achieved in
its meandering, public controversy and ultimate determination
regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the war on
terror. As stated above, affording al Qaeda and Taliban members
241. See Dan Sewell, Pilot Freed by North Korea Makes It Home, Florida Town
Jubilant at Return of Flier, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 31, 1994, at 3. See also Leanora Minai, A
Soldier's Story, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1995, at lA.
242. See U.S. Copter Pilot Back in Florida Hall Tells Supporters He's Glad to Be Home,
Extends his Sympathy to Dead Airman's Family, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec.
31, 1994, at 28A.
243. POWMIA Flag Replaces U.N. Banner, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 1994, at
12A.
244. See MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR 333
(1999); Ellen Yan, POW's Kin Hopes for His Safety, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1993, at 4. See
generally MICHAEL J. DURANT, IN THE COMPANY OF HEROES (1996).
245. McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 67, at 310.
246. See id. Sec also Mark C. Hub, U.S. Captive Says He's Well Treated; Somalis
Provide Daily Medical Care, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1993, at A01.
247. McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 67, at 310.
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POW status would not hamper lawful interrogations. 248
Similarly, an argument that the United States did not want to
accord the terrorists behind 9/11 "combatant immunity" 249 can also
be debunked. Perhaps the most critical protection offered by GPW
is combatant immunity. The immunity is, in the words of Professor
Derek Jinks, "often misunderstood." 250  In order to trigger
combatant immunity, a POW must comply with the laws of war, for
only lawful attacks on opposing military forces garner the protection
of immunity.251 An individual who perpetrates a war crime, a crime
against humanity, or any terrorist act will not receive combatant
immunity. 252 Consequently, as Professor Jinks explains, "[plroperly
understood, the scope of combatant immunity therefore underscores
its relative insignificance on the policy front." 253
There is, however, one perfectly valid reason for denying POW
status to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Under GPW, article
102 entitles POWs to the same trial courts as the detaining power
provides to its own military members. 254 Consequently, if an Article
5 tribunal determined an individual to be properly classified as a
POW, the United States would be required to try that individual by
248. See supra text accompanying notes 217-21.
249. POWs may not be prosecuted for their lawful participation in hostilities.
See, e.g., Major Geoffrey S. Corn & Major Michael L. Smidt, "To Be or Not to Be, That
is the Question" Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel,
ARMY LAW, June 1999, at 14. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 793 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("It must be remembered that legitimate 'acts of warfare,'
however murderous, do not justify criminal conviction. In Ex parte Quirin, we
cautioned that military tribunals can punish only 'unlawful' combatants; it is no
'crime' to be a soldier.") (citations omitted). This provision is extra-conventional as
GPW never specifically mentions the privilege. Nevertheless, it is considered to be
customary international law. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW
Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 376 (2004).
250. Id. at 422 ("Moreover, several developments - including the changing
character of armed conflict and the general trajectory of humanitarian law . . . have
diminished the importance of the privilege.").
251. Id. at 437.
252. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 202; Jinks, supra note 249, at 436.
253. Id. at 437.
254. Article 102 states in full:
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the
case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if,
furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
GPW, supra note 62, art. 102.
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court-martial rather than by military commission. 255 Curiously, this
argument was never publicly advanced by the Bush Administration.
4. By The Numbers: An Assessment
Between November 13, 2001, (the date of President Bush's order
authorizing military commissions) and January 20, 2009 (the day
President Bush left office), military commissions convicted three
individuals. During that same period, federal courts convicted close
to 300 individuals of terrorism offenses. 256 As Josef Stalin famously
proclaimed, "quantity has a quality all its own," 257 and while the
dearth of convictions is not dispositive of a final judgment on
commissions, such figures are relevant as part of an overall
assessment. This analysis is particularly relevant as proponents of
commissions have consistently advanced the argument that the
federal courts are ill-equipped to handle terrorism charges. 258 This
section considers the three cases brought before military
commissions during the Bush Administration and offers an
assessment.
The first person to be charged by military commission since
World War II was David Hicks, a former kangaroo-skinner turned
soldier of fortune, in June 2004.259 In light of the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Hamdan in 2006, charges had to be
withdrawn and re-referred on February 7, 2007. Hicks had been
captured in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance and turned over
to coalition forces in December, 2001.260 The U.S. Government
charged Hicks with one count of MST and one count of attempted
murder in violation of the laws of war.261 On March 30, 2007, Hicks
255. The official commentary to article 102 provides:
The rules of the Convention therefore outweigh national legislation and
the States party to the Convention must modify their own legislation if
necessary, and in particular their military penal code, in order to respect
the minimum standards set forth in Chapter III.
GPW Commentary, supra note 63, at 476 (internal citations omitted).
256. See, e.g., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 145, at 2.
257. Talk: Josef Stalin, WIKIQUOTE, http://www.en.wikiquote.org/wiki/
Talk:Joseph _Stalin, (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
258. See, e.g., supra note 145.
259. See Hicks to Serve Nine Months' Jail, BBC NEws, Mar. 31, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6512945.stm; LEIGH SALES, DETAINEE 002:
THE CASE OF DAVID HICKS XI (2007).
260. Id. at 270.
261. See AE002 Continuation to Military Comm'ns Form 458 (Charge Sheet),
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pled guilty to the charge of MST. Although the military commission
panel sentenced Hicks to seven years confinement, the Convening
Authority reduced his sentence to nine months pursuant to his offer
to plead guilty. 262 For political reasons Hicks was allowed to serve
the remainder of his sentence in Australia. 263 Hicks was hardly an
auspicious beginning for the military commission system. As one
reporter wrote in Harpers:
In the end, the Hicks case paints a very sordid portrait of the Bush
military commissions. His case was rushed forward for
transparently political reasons: Australian Prime Minister
Howard was facing growing anger among Australians over the
Hicks case, and he acknowledges pressing the U.S. to bring the
case on early and to bring it to a quick conclusion. This explains
why the case was convened before the military commissions rules
had even been completed. 264
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen, was captured by
militia forces in Afghanistan on November 24, 2001, when a vehicle
United States v. David Matthew Hicks (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES /MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
262. See AE027 Offer for a Pretrial Agreement & Appendix A to Offer for a
Pretrial Agreement, at 1 & 6, United States v. David Matthew Hicks (Mar. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx. In addition to
capping Hicks's sentence at nine months, the Convening Authority agreed to
dismiss specification 2 (attempted murder in violation of the law of war) with
prejudice and the U.S. Government agreed to transfer Hicks to Australia no later
than sixty days from the announcement of his sentence.
263. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantdnamo, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1981, 2014 (2008) ("He was released from Guantinamo on a plea bargain - the
result, apparently, of a political deal between Australian prime minister John
Howard, who was hurting politically because of Hicks's prolonged detention, and
Vice President Cheney.").
264. Scott Horton, The Plea Bargain of David Hicks, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Apr. 2,
2007, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/04/horton-plea-bargain-hicks.
In contradistinction to Hicks's trial by military commission, John Walker Lindh
pled guilty to substantially the same charge as Hicks in a U.S. district court in
Alexandria, Virginia, on July 15, 2002. Lindh's guilty plea included a cap of 20
years confinement. See, e.g., John Walker Lindh Pleads Guilty, PBS NEWsHOUR (July
15, 2002, 12:45 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/lindh_07-15-
02.html. On October 4, 2002, Judge T.S. Ellis, III sentenced Lindh to 20 years
without possibility of parole. See, e.g., Guy Taylor, Tearful Lindh Gets 20 Years for
Fighting for Taliban, 'Shoe Bomber' Reid Pleads Guilty, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at
A01. In 2007, specifically citing the lenient sentence Hicks received, Lindh's parents
and attorneys to no avail - appealed to President Bush to commute Lindh's
sentence. See, e.g. Bob Egelko, Lindh's Parents Seek His Freedom, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19,
2007, at B3; Adam Liptak, A Case of Buyer's Remorse That Could Linger For Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at A12.
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he was driving containing anti-aircraft missiles was stopped by anti-
Taliban forces. 265 Hamdan's captors turned him over to coalition
forces who eventually transferred him to Guantdtnamo Bay, where
he was held without charge for eighteen months.266 On July 13,
2004, the government charged Hamdan with numerous terrorism-
related charges, but before he could be tried, he filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington on April 6, 2004.267 Hamdan's case eventually reached
the Supreme Court, which held that the military commission
violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva
Conventions. Additionally, the Court held that Hamdan was
entitled to the protection of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.268
On May 10, 2007, charges were withdrawn and re-referred
under the newly convened 2006 Military Commissions Act,
charging Hamdan with one specification of conspiracy and eight
specifications of providing MST.269  At Hamdan's military
commission, the government evidence showed that Hamdan had
attended an al Qaeda training camp, had served as bin Ladin's
bodyguard and personal driver, to whom he had pledged bayat or
unquestioned allegiance, and on numerous occasions delivered
weapons and ammunition to an al Qaeda storage facility. 270
During Hamdan's military commission he moved to dismiss
the charge of MST, arguing the commission lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the charge as it was not a violation of the law of
war. 271 While noting that the evidence establishing MST as a war
crime "is mixed," the military judge ultimately rejected Hamdan's
claim.272 The military commission found Hamdan not guilty of the
conspiracy charge but guilty of five of the specifications of
265. Brief for the United States at 12-13, United States v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Gov't Brief, Hamdan].
266. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1259 (2011).
268. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
269. Gov't Brief, Hamdan, supra note 265, at 13.
270. Id. at 8-9.
271. Id. at 15.
272. D012 Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) & DO50 Def. Request to
Address Supplemental Auth. at 5-6, United States v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan (July
14, 2008) [hereinafter Hamdan, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss] ("[T]he Commission
is inclined to defer to Congress's determination that this is not a new offense.").
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providing MST.273 On August 7, 2008, the military commission
sentenced Hamdan to 66 months of confinement, with the military
judge awarding Hamdan confinement credit for 61 months. 274
Hamdan was transferred to his native Yemen and released in
January 2009, where he currently resides with his family. 275
Hamdan's conviction was automatically appealed to the United
States Court of Military Commission Review. In its first direct
appeal of a conviction by a military commission convened under the
2006 MCA, the court approved Hamdan's conviction on June 24,
2011.276 Hamdan has appealed three issues 277 to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 278
Days after the announcement of Hamdan's conviction, William
Glaberson of The New York Times wrote:
The verdict in the first war crimes trial at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba,
is in: One poorly educated Yemeni, with an impish sense of
humor and two little girls, is guilty of supporting terrorism by
driving Osama bin Laden. With credit for time served, the
sentence is no more than five months. But the other, perhaps
more important verdict - the judgment on the Bush
administration's military commission system - is still out.279
273. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1260 (2011). The convictions
on the material support to terrorism charge consisted of providing material support
to terrorists (as currently codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A) and providing material
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (as currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2339B). See Gov't Brief, Hamdan, supra note 265, at 14-15.
274. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
275. Id.
276. See Gov't Brief, Hamdan, supra note 265, at i-ii.
277. Hamdan claims that the military commission lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the charge of providing material support to terrorism as it is not a
violation of the law of war. Hamdan additionally asserts that his conviction is a
violation of the Ex Post Facto clause as Congress signed the 2006 MCA into law
nearly five years after the alleged conduct occurred. Finally, Hamdan claims that
2006 MCA violates the Equal Protection Clause by subjecting aliens, and not U.S.
citizens, to military commissions. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
278. Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. United States, CMCR-09-002 (2011), appeal
docketed, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2011). According to Charles Schmitz,
Hamdan's interpreter at his military commission, it was important to Hamdan to
clear the conviction because "[i]n Yemen they look at him as a criminal. He's been
stained." See Jess Bravin, White House Defends Use of War Crime Tribunals, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748704905604575027551871743276.html.
279. William Glaberson, A Conviction, but a System Still on Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
10, 2008, at A27.
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With Hamdan's appeal pending, this remains as true today as it did
in 2008.
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahiul, a Yemeni citizen,
allegedly served as Osama bin Laden's bodyguard and al Qaeda's
media chief, producing propaganda videos.280 Military prosecutors
first charged al Bahlul in February 2004 with numerous terrorist-
related charges. With passage of the 2006 MCA charges were
withdrawn and re-referred in February 2008. At that time the
Government charged al Bahlul with one count of conspiracy,
alleging various acts; one count of solicitation to commit the same;
and one count of providing MST.281 Al Bahiul initially requested to
represent himself, but then refused to defend himself at trial. 282 A
military panel found al Bahlul guilty of all charges and sentenced
him to life imprisonment. 283  Al Bahlul's conviction was
automatically appealed to the Court of Military Commission
280. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Guantdnamo Jury Sentences Bin Laden Aide to Life Term,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2008, at A10. The video garnering the most attention was "The
Destruction of the American Destroyer Cole" - an inflammatory film inciting jihad
against the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1161 (U.S.C.M.C.R., 2011).
281. See Continuation to Military Comm'ns Form 458 (Charge Sheet), Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/
MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
282. See Scott Higham, Detainee Tells Hearing He was Member of Al Qaeda; Suspect
Seeks to Represent Self in Military Proceeding,WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at A03
A preliminary matter the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had to
decide was whether the appeal should be dismissed. The government had moved
to disqualify defense counsel, thereby terminating the appeal, as evidence strongly
suggested that Mr. al Bahlul had emphatically and repeatedly instructed his
counsel not to file an appeal on his behalf. See, e.g., Motion of the United States to
Require Petitioner's Counsel to Demonstrate Auth. to Pursue the Appeal or, in the
Alt., to Dismiss the Appeal at 2, United States v. Ali Harnza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 2011). In a reply to the government's motion,
al Bahlul's counsel claimed that the "inquest into Mr. Bahlul's relationship with his
counsel" should be rejected by the court as Mr. Bahlul understood the simple
procedure to forfeit his appellate rights yet never did so. See Response to the
United States' Motion to Require Counsel to Demonstrate Auth. to Pursue Appeal
or, in the Alt., to Dismiss, at 1-2, United States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011). On February 6, 2012, a three-judge
panel for the D.C. Circuit denied the Government's motion holding that
"Respondent's evidence does not provide an adequate basis for the court to
question counsel's authority to represent the petitioner in this case." Ali Hamza
Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, CMCR-09-001 (2011), No. 11-1324, Order,
Document No. 1356724 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2012).
283. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at A19.
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Review, which upheld his conviction on September 9, 2011.284 Al
Bahiul has appealed his case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.285
Surveying the results of military commissions, Colonel Morris
Davis, the third chief prosecutor in the Guantdnamo military
commissions, stated after al Bahlul's conviction, "In seven years
we've managed to complete three trials: Hicks, Hamdan, and al
Bahlul, or as I'd summarize it: a dupe, a driver, and a default. . . ."286
Indeed, the only three commissions completed under the Bush
Administration hardly instilled confidence in the system. Although
President-elect Obama promised wholesale change, as the next
section illustrates, this was easier said than done.
B. The Obama Administration: Change Proves Elusive
1. A Bipartisanship Approach to Bifurcation?
In 2006, Senator Obama was one of thirty-four senators who
voted against the 2006 MCA. 287  A former constitutional law
professor, Senator Obama campaigned for the presidency on a
promise of restoring America's image abroad, 288 closing the
detention facility at Guantdnamo Bay, 289 and governing as a
transformative, post-partisan president.290 It therefore came as little
surprise that less than an hour after his inauguration, the President
requested a stay on military commissions to reassess the scope of his
authority to detain enemy combatants. 291
284. United States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141
(U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).
285. Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, CMCR-09-001 (2011), appeal
docketed, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 2011).
286. Finn, supra note 280, at A10 (describing al Bahlul as a "default" because he
did not defend himself).
287. S. 3930, 109th Cong., (2d Sess. 2006) (as amended), available at
http://www.sen
ate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call_1ists/roll-callvotecfm.cfm?congress=109&session
=2&vote=00259 (last visited Sept., 18, 2012).
288. See, e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll Finds McCain Edge on Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2008, at A19.
289. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantanamo Open, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A16.
290. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Obama Memos: The Making of a Post-Partisan
Presidency, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/ 2012/01/ 30/120130fafactlizza.
291. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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Within two days of his inauguration, the President further
issued three executive orders with significant ramifications for the
treatment of detainees in the war on terror. E.O. 13,491 banned the
use of enhanced interrogation techniques and mandated that
treatment and interrogation of detainees apply the standards set
forth in Army Field Manual 2-22.3.292 E.O. 13,492 tasked the
Executive branch with reviewing the individualized circumstances
for the more than 240 detainees held at GuantAnamO 293 and
mandated the closure of the facility within a year.294 Finally, E.O.
13,493 established a Special Interagency Task Force charged with
identifying lawful options for the disposition of detainees
apprehended in the war on terror.295 While there is no denying that
these actions, as well as enactment of the 2009 MCA, represented
critical developments in military commissions and began the
arduous transformation to a legitimate system, partisan politics and
political miscalculations have all precluded the wholesale change
President Obama and many of his supporters had believed possible.
2. From Complementarity to Competiveness
On May 21, 2009, President Obama outlined his
administration's approach to trying terrorist suspects in a symbolic
speech at the National Archives, the home of the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence. The National Archives speech can
be viewed as revealing both a critical component of the President's
political philosophy, as well as the schisms that his ideology has
produced with a key constituency.
President Obama has long had a complicated relationship with
the far-left. 296  Feeling betrayed that the President would not
entertain a truth and reconciliation commission proposed by
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VA) to investigate torture of enemy
292. Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2002) (revoking Exec.
Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40704 (July 24, 2007) (directing limited compliance
with the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of detainees in the war on terror).
293. Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 2(g), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2002).
294. Id. at § 3.
295. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009).
296. See, e.g., Bob Burnett, Will the Left Support Obama, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6,
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-burnett/2012-will-the-leftsuppor b
1189102.html; Ben Johnson, Left-Wing Blog: Should We Support Obama's Impeachment,
FLOYD REPORTS, Nov. 23, 2010, http://floydreports.com/left-wing-blog-should-we-
support-obamas-impeachment/ ("With Barack Obama's crimes against liberty
becoming increasingly brazen, calls for his impeachment have intensified.").
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combatants by Bush Administration officials, 297 segments of the left
appear to have adopted former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's
dictum that "consensus is the absence of principles." 298 While such
a philosophy may have currency in a parliamentary system, for a
post-partisan president who introduced himself to the national
media by famously declaring there is not a red America or blue
America but one United States of America, 299 consensus is the
lifeblood of governing and at the very heart of President Obama's
political philosophy300 - a fact that has greatly complicated his
297. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Senator Pushes Idea of Truth Commission, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2009, at A17. In his May 21, 2009 speech at the National Archives, President
Obama explained:
I recognize that many still have a strong desire to focus on the past. When
it comes to actions of the last eight years, passions are high. Some
Americans are angry; others want to re-fight debates that have been
settled, in some cases debates that they have lost. I know that these
debates lead directly, in some cases, to a call for a fuller accounting,
perhaps through an independent commission. I've opposed the creation of
such a commission because I believe that our existing democratic
institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability.
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09 [hereinafter National Archives Speech]. See also Fran Quigley,
Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the Executive
Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 271, 271 (2010) ("However, the subsequent
Administration of President Barack Obama, although affiliated with a different
party and on record as opposed to acts of torture sponsored by the previous
Administration, has also declined to pursue prosecution of high-level members of
the Bush administration.").
298. The full quote from Lady Thatcher reads:
Ah consensus ... the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values
and policies in search of something in which no one believes, but to which
no one objects; the process of avoiding the very issues that have to be
solved, merely because you cannot get agreement on the way ahead. What
great cause would have been fought and won under the banner "I stand
for consensus."
Bill Wink, Consensus Equals Surrender: The Absence of Leadership, AGENDA 21, Nov. 8,
2007, available at http://www.middletownca.com/CONSENSUS-EQUALS-
SURRENDER.htm (quoting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher).
299. In his keynote address before the 2004 Democratic National Convention,
senatorial candidate Obama rejected the division of the United States into red and
blue states. See The Media and the Message, Excerpts from Speeches on Broad Variety of
Issues at the Convention in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2008, at P8.
300. See, e.g., RON SUSKIND, CONFIDENCE MEN: WALL STREET, WASHINGTON, AND
THE EDUCATION OF A PRESIDENT 25 (1st ed. 2011) ("[Obama's] instincts were always
to push for consensus, and then affirm it, usually with some trenchant shift that
would make it his own."). See also JODI KANTOR, THE OBAMAS 322 (1st ed. 2012) ("It
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relationship with the left.30  The National Archives speech is
illustrative. While the speech includes soaring rhetoric affirming the
vitality of the rule of law, one announcement in particular infuriated
the President's increasingly disaffected supporters on the left.
In his speech, President Obama repeatedly returns to the
mantra that there is no conflict between liberty and security. 302 As
Jodi Kantor, author of The Obamas writes, "It was a classic Obama
statement, following the same theme as his 2004 convention speech
about red and blue America; once again, he was promising to
resolve what seemed to be irresolvable."303
The policy delineated in the National Archives speech endorses
a bifurcated approach to trying suspected terrorists and
distinguishes five distinct groups of detainees. The first group
includes those who have violated criminal laws and should
properly be tried in federal courts; the second group includes those
who have violated the laws of war and should be tried in reformed
military commissions; the third group includes 21 detainees whom
the courts had ordered released; the fourth group includes detainees
whom the Administration had determined can be safely transferred
to other countries.30 4
The fifth group - "the single toughest issue that we will face" -
includes detainees who cannot be prosecuted because evidence may
be tainted, but continue to pose a clear danger to the United
States.30 For this group, the President announced a policy of
prolonged (preventive) detention, allowing authorities to hold
was the same problem his wife had worried about for years: her husband was a
believer and a conciliator; he seemed to have a kind of optimistic bias, trusting
things would work out.").
301. The President's penchant for consensus and finding common ground with
those whom he disagrees was on display as early as the inauguration when the
President chose Evangelical Pastor Rick Warren to deliver the inaugural invocation.
The move infuriated many of the President's liberal supporters. See, e.g., Alexander
Mooney, Obama's Inaugural Choice Sparks Outrage, CNN, Dec. 17, 2008, available at
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-17/politics/obama.warren_1_gay-marriage-gay-
equality-gay-rights-proponents?_s=PM:POLITICS.
302. See, e.g., National Archives Speech, supra note 297 ("But I believe with every
fiber of my being that in the long run we also cannot keep this country safe unless
we enlist the power of our most fundamental values.").
303. KANTOR, supra note 300, at 105.
304. National Archives Speech, supra note 297.
305. Id. ("These are people who, in effect, remain at war with the United
States.").
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detainees at Guantinamo without charges. 306 Well aware of the
outcry this policy would provoke with the left, the President
convened an awkward White House meeting with a dozen law
professors and leaders of civil liberties and human rights groups the
day before his National Archives speech.307 According to one
participant, when the President informed his guests that he was
considering indefinite detention for particular detainees, it was an
"'oh my God' moment."3 08 Once again, the left was infuriated with
the President.309
While the President's "preventive detention" policy garnered
the most attention from the press, the more important
announcement concerned the bifurcated approach with a preference
for criminal trials in domestic courts.310 This has been easier said
306. Id. ("Let me repeat: I am not going to release individuals who endanger the
American people.").
307. KANTOR, supra note 303, at 105 ("The encounter was uncomfortable from the
start. The visitors felt betrayed by the president."). See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama
is Said to Consider Preventive Detention Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 2009, at A18.
308. KANTOR, supra note 303, at 107.
309. See, e.g., Human Rights Attorney Vince Warren: Obama's "Preventive Detention"
Plan Goes Beyond Bush Admin Policies, DEMOCRACY Now!, May 22, 2009, available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/5/22/vincewarren (quoting Warren,
Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and participant at the
May 20, 2009 White House meeting as saying, "The problem is that he goes out the
next day, and he has a speech in which he not only embraces the opposition,
meaning George Bush's policies, but then he comes out with things that even
George Bush didn't come out with, like preventive detention."). See also Margaret
Talev & David Lightman, Obama Outlines Plans for Guantdnamo Detainees,
MCCLATCHY NEWS, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
2009/05/21/68608/ obama-outlines-plans-for-guantanamo.html (quoting Kenneth
Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, as saying, "President Obama
wrapped himself in the Constitution and then proceeded to violate it by
announcing he would send people before irredeemably flawed military
commissions and seek to create a preventive detention scheme that only serves to
move Guantdnamo to a new location and give it a new name."); Lee, supra note 180
("Holding prisoners at Guantanamo, without the certainty of trial or release, was a
defining feature of the previous administration's counterterrorism policy - and
some of its fiercest critics expected Obama to change the policies.").
310. The criteria the Obama Administration sought to employ in choosing the
proper venue appears to date back to a July 2009 Justice Department memo entitled
"Determination of Guantdnamo Cases Referred for Prosecution." While
acknowledging that referred cases will typically be prosecuted in federal courts, the
DoJ guidance notes that the inquiry to try cases in a reformed military commission
will turn on the following three factors: strength of interest (to include the location
in which the offenses occurred); efficiency (to include foreign policy concerns and
resource concerns); and a variety of other prosecution considerations. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Determination of Guantanamo Cases Referred for Prosecution (2009),
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than done, however. The debacle over where to try Khalid Sheik
Mohamed (KSM) - the man the 9/11 Commission Report described
as "the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks" 31 1 - illustrates the
challenges to bipartisan bifurcation. Attorney General Eric Holder
initially determined that KSM would be tried in the federal
courthouse in Manhattan. Later claiming that the trial would be
"the defining event of my time as attorney general," 312 Holder
appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 18,
2009, to explain his controversial decision. The Attorney General
testified that both the federal courts and military commissions have
a viable role to play in the war on terror and as a prosecutor he
would determine the venue based upon the evidence. 313
In April 2011, succumbing to congressional restrictions limiting
funds to transfer Guantinamo detainees to the United States, the
Administration reversed course and announced that KSM would be
tried by military commission. The Attorney General explained:
We must face a simple truth: those restrictions are unlikely to be
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/taba-prel-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf.
311. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 37, at 145. In addition to his role as the
mastermind behind 9/11, a three-year investigation concluded by Georgetown
University in 2011 confirmed that KSM had executed Wall Street Journal reporter
Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed
U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR20110
12000057.html.
Following KSM's Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing on March 10, 2007,
the Pentagon released the verbatim transcript. During that tribunal, KSM boasted
that "I decapitated with my blessed right hand the head of the American Jew,
Daniel Pearl, in the city of Karachi, Pakistan. For those who would like to confirm,
there are pictures of me on the Internet holding his head." DEP'T OF DEF., Verbatim
Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, Mar. 10,
2007, http://www.defense.gov/news/transcript_isnl0024.pdf.
During his hearing, KSM additionally claimed that, among other actions, "[he] was
responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center Operation"; "[he] was responsible for
the Shoe Bomber Operation to down two American airplanes"; "[he] was
responsible for surveying and financing the assassination for several former
American Presidents, including President Carter"; and "[he] was responsible for
planning to destroy the Sears Tower by burning a few fuel or oil tanker trucks
beneath or around it." Id.
312. Jane Mayer, Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheik Mohammed, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2010/02/15/100215fafactmayer.
313. Press Release, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Eric Holder Testifies
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag
/testimony/ 2009/ ag-testimony-091118.html.
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repealed in the immediate future . .. . And we simply cannot
allow a trial to be delayed any longer for the victims of the 9/11
attacks or for the families who have waited nearly a decade for
justice. 314
In July 2011, President Obama appointed Brigadier General
(BG) Mark Martins, a man he had served with on the Harvard Law
Review, as the sixth chief prosecutor of the military commissions in
seven years.315 BG Martins recently underscored his commitment to
a bifurcated approach on December 1, 2011, in a keynote address at
the American Bar Association's annual review of national security
law.316
Congress, however, has been unwilling to endorse a bipartisan
approach to bifurcation. 317  The 2011 National Defense
314. Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5,
2011, at Al.
315. BG Martin's appointment received widespread praise. Jack Goldsmith
wrote on the Lawfare blog:
I think this is an inspired choice, and not just (or even mainly) because of
Martins' sterling resume. As much as anyone I know, Martins has thought
deeply about military commissions . .. and most importantly the need for
commission trials to be conducted in a manner that is legitimate and
widely perceived to be so. Some will draw analogies to Robert Jackson's
prosecutorial efforts at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, but in truth
Martins faces a more daunting legitimating task than Jackson did.
Jack Goldsmith, Mark Martins to be Chief Prosecutor, Military Commissions, LAWFARE
(June 23, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/mark-martins-to-
be-chief-prosecutor-military-commissions/.
General David Petraeus (Ret.) similarly extolled BG Martins's appointment,
claiming, "Martins believes in military commissions being responsible, effective
institutions within our larger system of national security institutions.
Extraordinary. Truly impressive." See Willy Stern, Rebrander in Chief, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Oct. 3, 2011, at 14. On his popular blog, Hugo Dixon, a former editor of
the Financial Times claimed, "[i]f anybody can provide a measure of legitimacy to
the trials of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Brigadier General Mark Martins may be
that person." See Hugo Dixon, Guantdnamo's Detox Man (Oct. 4, 2011, 13:28 EDT),
http://blogs. reuters.com/hugo-dixon/2011/10/04/guantanamos-detox-man/.
316. Benjamin Wittes, Remarks of Brigadier General Mark Martins, Chief Prosecutor,
Military Commissions, Keynote Address at the American Bar Association's 21st Annual
Review of the Field of National Security Law, LAWFARE (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:30 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/mark-martins-remarks-at-aba/
(acknowledging that while federal courts would often be the best venue for
practical purposes, certain cases implicate significant national security interests and
would be best tried in a reformed military commission).
317. While some argue that Congressional actions amount to little more than
partisan politics in an election year, others point to the case of Ahmed Ghailani as
"stiffening resistance to civilian trials." See, e.g., Charlie Savage, In a Reversal,
Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at Al. The Ghailani case has
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become a political Rorschach test, with both the far right and the far left using the
case to justify their extremist views.
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was the first detainee held at Guantinamo Bay to be tried
in a civilian court. Ghailani was tried in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in June 2009 for his involvement in the 1998
bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya,
which killed 224 people and injured thousands. See, e.g., United States v. Ghailani,
761 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). On November 17, 2010, a jury found
Ghalani guilty of one charge of conspiracy to destroy government property but
acquitted him of 284 counts of murder and conspiracy. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman,
Verdict Replies to Terrorists and to Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at A24. The
acquittals resulted, in part, from a decision by the District Court Judge, Lewis A.
Kaplan, to exclude a key prosecution witness as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The
witness would have testified that he had sold Ghailani the explosives but was only
discovered by the Government after interrogators subjected Ghailani to coercive
interrogation techniques. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Prepares to Lift Ban on
Guantdnamo Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2011 at Al. Although Judge Kaplan
sentenced Ghailani to life without parole and "the same evidentiary problems that
impeded his prosecution in federal court would likely have arisen in a military
commission," the case of Ahmed Ghailani has become a cause c616bre to those who
argue that that federal courts should play no role in prosecuting terrorists. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Wittes, The Politics of the Ghailani Verdict, LAWFARE (Nov. 17, 2010, 11:14
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/the-politics-of-the-ghailani-verdict/.
The question of whether a military commission could have fared better, particularly
in light of the commission's unimpressive record, as well as the fact that Ghailani
will spend the rest of his life in a super-max facility is often lost in the debate in
favor of sheer bombast. For example, the incoming Chairman of the House
Homeland Security Committee, Representative Peter King (R-N.Y.) proclaimed the
following upon learning of the acquittals:
I am disgusted at the total miscarriage of justice today in Manhattan's
federal civilian court. In a case where Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was facing
285 criminal counts, including hundreds of murder charges, and where
Attorney General Eric Holder assured us that 'failure is not an option,' the
jury found him guilty on only one count and acquitted him of all other
counts including every murder charge. This tragic verdict demonstrates
the absolute insanity of the Obama administration's decision to try al-
Qaeda terrorists in civilian courts.
John McCormack, Peter King Rips Obama on Ghailani Verdict, WEEKLY STANDARD,
(Nov. 17, 2010, 7:54 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/peter-king-rips-
obama-ghailani-verdict_518137.html.
Not to be outdone by the far right, the far left issued its own indictment of the
process. The Center for Constitutional Rights issued the following statement:
CCR questions the ability of anyone who is Muslim to receive a truly fair
trial in any American judicial forum post-9/11. Both the military
commission system and federal criminal trials have serious flaws.
However, on balance the Ghailani verdict shows that federal criminal
trials are far superior to military commissions for the simple yet
fundamental reason that they prohibit evidence obtained by torture. If
anyone is unsatisfied with Ghailani's acquittal on 284 counts, they should
blame the CIA agents who tortured him.
Center for Constitutional Rights Responds to Ghailani Verdict, CRT. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
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Authorization Act (NDAA), signed into law on January 7, 2011,
prohibited any authorized funds to the DoD from being used to
transfer detainees held at Guantinamo Bay to the United States for
any purpose.318 Section 1032 of the 2011 NDAA reads in full:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for
fiscal year 2011 may be used to transfer, release, or assist in the
transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or
possessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee
who - (1) is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States; and (2) is or was held on or after
January 20, 2009, at United States Naval Station. 319
The purpose of this provision was to preclude prosecution of
detainees currently held at Guantinamo in Article III courts. 320
Because the bill authorized billions of dollars for the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the President chose not to veto it.321 In signing the
Act, the President sharply criticized the Congress and vowed to seek
its repeal:
Section 1032 represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge
to critical executive branch authority to determine when and
where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees, based on the facts and
the circumstances of each case and our national security interests.
The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in
our efforts to protect the Nation and must be among the options
available to us. Any attempt to deprive the executive branch of
that tool undermines our Nation's counterterrorism efforts and
has the potential to harm our national security. 322
RIGHTS, Nov. 17, 2010, http://ccrjustice.org/Ghailani-verdict.
318. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40754, GUANTANAMO
DETENTION CENTER: LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 5(2011).
319. 2011 NDAA, supra note 32, § 1032.
320. See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S 10937 (Dec. 22, 2010) (statement by Sen. Patrick
Leahy) (expressing that he was "deeply concerned that this section takes away one
of the greatest tools we have to protect our national security - our ability to
prosecute terrorism defendants in Federal courts."). See also David B. Rivkin, Jr., &
Lee A. Casey, The Wrong Way to Stop Civilian Terror Trials, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010,
at A17 ("Conditioning federal appropriations so as to force the president to exercise
his prosecutorial discretion in accordance with Congress's wishes rather than his
own violates the Constitution's separation of powers ability to prosecute terrorism
defendants in Federal courts.").
321. See Charlie Savage, New Measure to Hinder Closing of Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at All.
322. Press Release, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523, 111th Cong. (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523.
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The 2012 NDAA, signed into law by the President on December
31, 2011, contains similar provisions. Section 1032 of the law mirrors
the prohibition on the use of authorized funds for the transfer of
detainees at Guantinamo Bay to the United States, as originally
included in section 1032 of the 2011 NDAA.323 Although section
1028 authorizes the President to grant a waiver for a detainee to be
brought to the United States for trial in federal court, as The New
York Times wrote in a recent editorial, "the legislation's ban on
spending any money for civilian trials for any accused terrorist
would make that waiver largely meaningless." 324 Despite threats of
vetoing the legislation, the President ultimately chose to sign the
law. 325 In a statement issued by the White House on December 31,
2011, the President expressed frustration with those in Congress
seeking to bar his bifurcated approach:
Section 1027 renews the bar against using appropriated funds for
fiscal year 2012 to transfer Guantdnamo detainees into the United
States for any purpose. I continue to oppose this provision...
For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations have
successfully prosecuted hundreds of terrorists in Federal court.
Those prosecutions are a legitimate, effective, and powerful tool
in our efforts to protect the Nation. Removing that tool from the
executive branch does not serve our national security.326
3. By the Numbers: An Assessment
Since commissions were restarted in the spring of 2010, as of
this writing four detainees have pled guilty under the revised
Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2009. The government initially
charged Ibrahim Mahmoud al Qosi on February 8, 2008, with
conspiracy, alleging various objects, and providing MST. 327 On July
7, 2010, al Qosi pled guilty to both charges. 328  The military
323. 2012 NDAA, supra note 32, § 1028.
324. Editorial, Politics over Principle, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2011, availalble at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/opinion/politics-over-principle.html.
325. Charlie Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat Over Military Authorization Bill
After Revisions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2011, at A30.
326. See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R.
1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/ 12/31/statement-president-hr-1540.
327. MC Form 458 (Charge Sheet), Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi (Feb. 8,
2008), http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
328. See PE1 (Stipulation of Fact), Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi (July, 2010),
available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
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comnission sentenced al Qosi to 14 years confinement but, pursuant
to the plea agreement, the Convening Authority ordered that al
Qosi's punishment beyond two years from July 7, 2010 be
suspended.329
Omar Ahmed Khadr, a former Canadian child soldier, was once
one of the youngest detainees held at Guantinamo Bay. On July 7,
2002, the then-fifteen-year-old threw a grenade during a firefight
that killed Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer.330 A military
panel sentenced Khadr to 40 years confinement. Pursuant to a
guilty plea, his confinement was capped at eight years and Khadr
was allowed to transfer to Canada to serve the remainder of his
sentence. 331
Noor Uthman Muhammed, a Sudanese citizen was the third
detainee to plead guilty under the 2009 MCA. The government
charged Noor with conspiracy and MST for serving as a deputy
commander of a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. 332 A
military panel sentenced Noor to 14 years confinement but pursuant
to a guilty plea, his sentence was capped at 34 months.333
In what was an uncommon victory for the Office of Military
Commissions, on February 29, 2012, Majid Shoukat Khan pleaded
guilty to conspiracy, MST, espionage, murder, and attempted
murder in violation of the laws of war. 334 In 1996, at the age of
sixteen, Khan and his family emigrated to the United States from
Pakistan and ultimately received asylum in the Baltimore area
where Khan graduated from high school. 335 In 2002 Khan returned
to his native Pakistan where he admitted to providing MST in the
bombing of the J.W. Marriot hotel in Indonesia, which killed eight
329. Final Action, Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
330. See PE001-A (Stipulation of Fact), Omar Ahmed Khadr, T 35-42 (Oct. 13,
2010), http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx
331. See, e.g., Warped Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at A34.
332. MC Form 458 (Charge Sheet), Noor Uthman Muhammed (December 12,
2008), http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryConmissions.aspx.
333. See Cheryl Pellerin, Military Commission Panel Sentences Guantdnamo
Detainee, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERV., Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62876.
334. See, e.g., Charles Stimson, Majid Khan: Anatomy of a Terrorist's Plea Bargain,
HERITAGE FouND., (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/
03/ guantanamo-detainee-majid-khan-anatomy-of-a-terrorist-plea-bargain.
335. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, 'High Value' Detainee Is Said To Reach Tentative Plea
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at A17.
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people in the summer of 2003, and conspiring with Khalid Sheikh
Mohamed in an assassination attempt of former Pakistani President
Perez Musharraf. 336 Following his capture in 2003, Khan was held at
secret CIA foreign prisons before being transferred to Guantdnamo
Bay in 2006.337
Khan's unconventional pretrial agreement capped his sentence
at 25 years but promised to further reduce his confinement to 19
years provided that he "provides full and truthful cooperation and
substantial assistance," to the U.S. Government. 338 Such assistance
will most certainly include testimony against KSM, among others,
when the September 11th mastermind is finally brought to trial
before military commission. Khan's sentencing will be delayed for
four years, so as to provide Khan time to make good on his promise
to cooperate. Analysts have heralded the Khan guilty plea as a
"turning point" in the war on terror. 339 Not only does Khan's
intimate experience with al Qaeda make him "uniquely valuable" to
the government, but testimony by Khan will allow federal
prosecutors to avoid using evidence tainted through coercion,
heretofore a major stumbling block in federal courts. 340
As of this writing, the case against Abd al-Rahim Hussein
Muhammed Abdu al-Nashiri is ongoing with trial set to begin in the
spring of 2012. Al-Nashiri is a Saudi citizen alleged to have
masterminded the U.S.S. Cole bombing, which killed seventeen
sailors, and is alleged to have headed al Qaeda operations in the
Persian Gulf prior to his capture in November 2002.341 Al-Nashiri is
336. MC Form 458 (Charge Sheet), Majid Shoukat Khan (Feb. 13, 2012), available
at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
337. Eric Rich, Terrorism Suspect Alleges "Mental Torture", WASH. POST, May 16,
2007, at A02.
338. AE013, Appendix A to Offer for Pretrial Agreement, U.S. v. Majid Shoukat
Khan (Feb. 13, 2012), at I 2, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military
Comnissions.aspx; Stimson, supra note 334.
339. See, e.g., Matthew Hay Brown, Turning Point Seen in Terror Prosecutions,
BALT. SUN, Fed. 29, 2012, at 1A; Stimson, supra note 334 ("The historic plea, which
the military judge accepted, is a significant milestone in the war against terrorism
and likely foreshadows cases to come.").
340. Brown, supra note 339, at 1A (quoting Karen Greenberg, director of the
Center on National Security at Fordham law school as explaining the "clean"
evidence Khan can provide "takes away what has haunted these cases from the
beginning.").
341. RAPHAEL PERL & RONALD O'ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20721,
TERRORIST ATTACK ON USS COLE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESs 2 (2001).
71
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
charged with, inter alia, perfidy, murder in violation of the law of
war, conspiracy, and terrorism.342 The Government did not charge
al-Nahiri with MST. In an effort at greater transparency, BG
Martins chose the widely lauded act of televising al-Nashiri's
arraignment. A closed-circuit television feed broadcasted the
arraignment and voir dire from Guantinamo to a U.S. Army
installation at Fort Meade, Maryland. 343 According to a participant
who attended the arraignment, "attendance was surprisingly high at
the Ft. Meade base theater."344
In remarks made to National Public Radio, BG Martins
underscored that after two acts of Congress, a Supreme Court
decision, and an executive review, the military commissions system
is at long last a fair and transparent form of justice. 345 "Reasonable
people looking at this system will see that it really will withstand
scrutiny," he said. 346 Undeniably, BG Martins is correct. Why then
the Government would choose to compromise the integrity of the
system and risk hard-won victories with the questionable charge of
providing MST is befuddling indeed. It is to that subject that this
article now turns.
III. A Self-Inflicted Wound:
The Charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism
While the attacks of 9/11 ushered in a paradigmatic shift,
casting a reluctant 347 military in the lead role in counterterrorism, an
342. See MC Form 458 (Referred Charge Sheet), Abd al-Rahim Hussein
Muhammed Abdu al-Nashiri (Sept. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES /MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
343. Dina Temple-Raston, Guantanamo Trial Opens with a Series of Firsts, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Nov. 9, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/09/142159649/guantanamo-trial-opens-with-a-
series-of-firsts.
344. Keith Gerver, Al-Nashiri Arraignment Coverage: Voir Dire and Arraignment,
LAWFARE (Jan 7, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.awfareblog.com/2012/01/justice-
and-the-enemy-nuremberg-911-and-the-trial-of-khalid-sheik-mohammed/.
345. See, e.g., Johnson,Yale Speech, supra note 35 ("We are working to make the
system a more transparent one, by reforming the rules for press access to military
commissions proceedings, establishing close circuit TV, and a new public website
for the commissions system.").
346. Temple-Raston, supra note 343 (quoting Brigadier General Mark Martins,
Chief Prosecutor, Military Commissions).
347. In his presidential memoirs President Bush expresses exasperation with the
military's pain-staking approach to military commissions, writing:
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emasculated law enforcement underwent its own transformation.
This shift is best described as a focus on prevention rather than
reaction. 348 Essential to this preventive strategy are the material
support provisions codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B. 349
Apart from the sheer efficacy these statutes play in circumventing
attacks, the provisions are important in two other respects. First,
their widespread use can be viewed as the consistent application of
the Bush Doctrine to "make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them." Second, the
material support provisions have greatly exacerbated the delicate
tension between civil liberties and national security.350  In its
It had taken two and a half years for the Defense Department to work out
the procedures and start the first trial. No doubt it was a complex legal
and logistical undertaking. But I detected a certain lack of enthusiasm for
the project. With all the pressures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it never
seemed like the tribunals were a top priority.
BUSH, supra note 40, at 178.
348. Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 163 (statement of Paul Rosenweig,
Senior Legal Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation) ("Equally important, it is
policing of a different form - preventative rather than reactive, since there is less
value in punishing terrorists after the fact when, in some instances, they are willing
to perish in the attack."). See also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010) ("The material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive
measure - it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the
attacks more likely to occur.").
349. On May 5, 2004, the Assistance Attorney General, Criminal Division
testified:
Our offensive strategy targets both the perpetrators of violence and those
who give them material support. The chronology of a terrorist plot is a
continuum from idea, to planning, to preparation, to execution and attack.
The material support statutes help us strike earlier on that continuum - we
would much rather catch terrorists with their hands on a check than on a
bomb.
Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 177 (statement of Christopher A. Wray,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
350. As Mr. Rosenzweig explained before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The traditional law enforcement model is highly protective of civil liberty
in preference to physical security. . The post-September 11 world
changes this calculus in two ways. First, and most obviously, it changes
the cost of the Type II errors [described as false negatives]. Whatever the
cost of freeing John Gotti or John Mohammed might be, they are
substantially less then [sic] the potentially horrific costs of failing to stop
the next al-Qaeda assault. Thus, the theoretical rights-protective construct
under which our law enforcement system operates must, of necessity, be
modified to meet the new reality. We simply cannot afford a rule that
"better 10 terrorists go undetected than that the conduct of 1 innocent be
mistakenly examined."
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laudable effort at keeping the country safe, the Bush Administration
was willing to recalibrate that balance through the use of the
provisions.351
This Part consists of three sub-sections. Subpart A considers
the origins and scope of the material support statutes. Subsection B
considers the seminal case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP) - a critical development in the application of 18 U.S.C. §
2339B. Sub-section C concludes the article by analyzing the CMCR's
recent holdings that MST constitutes a war crime, thereby bringing
violations within the subject matter jurisdiction of military
commissions.
A. Origins of the Material Support Provisions: A Tale of Two
Statutes
1. A Long and Winding Road
The roots of the current material support provisions, codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, can be traced back to the early years
of the Reagan administration. On December 14, 1981, Rep. Matthew
J. Rinaldo (R-N.J.) introduced H.R. 5211, a bill that sought to
criminalize military or intelligence assistance to terrorists or terrorist
organizations designated by the President. 352 According to Rinaldo,
he was "amazed to read accounts of Americans providing vital
weapons and logistics support and services to Colonel Qadhafi" of
Libya. 353 Rinaldo further explained he introduced the bill following
the bombshell that a CIA agent, Edwin Wilson, had provided the
Libyan dictator with weapons, logistics support, and assisted in the
construction of a laboratory that could be used for development of
nuclear weapons. 354 As Professor Robert M. Chesney has explained,
Id. at 163-64.
351. See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, and Terror, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec.
1, 2003, at 15, 17. Michael Chertoff, the second Secretary of Homeland Security
under President Bush and coauthor of the USA PATRIOT Act has written: "[t]hat
balance [between civil liberties and national security] was struck in the first flush of
the emergency. If history shows us anything, however, it shows that we must be
prepared to review and if necessary recalibrate that balance."
352. The Anti Terrorism and Foreign Mercenary Act, H.R. 5211, 97th Cong.
(1981).
353. The Anti Terrorism and Foreign Mercenary Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2 (1982) (statement of Rep. Matthew J. Rinaldo, Rep.
New Jersey).
354. Id. See also Peter Carlson, International Man of Mystery, WASH. POST, June 22,
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H.R. 5211 was "[t]he first proposal to criminalize the provision of
assistance to terrorists or terrorist organizations."3 5 5 Although H.R.
5211 died in committee, the idea of criminalizing support to
international terrorists would live on.
In 1984, Representative Dante Fascell (D-Fla) introduced H.R.
5613, a bill that sought to prohibit U.S. citizens and businesses from
training or supporting international terrorist organizations. 356 The
bill met intense criticism, to include allegations that it violated the
First Amendment, and died in committee as well. 357
The term "material support" first appeared in federal
legislation in the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).358
Sponsored by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), the INA359 was
a far-reaching reform of U.S. immigration laws.360 While domestic
law already excluded aliens from the United States who "engage in
terrorist activity," the INA expanded the scope of this phrase.
Under the INA, it was now permissible to exclude an alien from the
United States if that individual had committed an act of providing
material support to a terrorist organization or a member of such an
organization. 361  While significant, this milestone in the
development of the material support provisions merely precluded
2004, at C01.
355. Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 128 (statement of Professor Robert
M. Chesney).
356. Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act
of 1984, H.R. 5613, 98th Cong. (1984).
357. See, e.g., Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations
Act of 1984, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 3 (1984)
(statement of Joseph M. Hassett and Jerry J. Berman, American Civil Liberties
Union) ("H.R. 5613 is clearly unconstitutional. It violates the fundamental principle
of our constitutional law that a 'blanket prohibition of association with a group
having both legal and illegal aims. . . ."').
358. See, e.g., Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow's Terrorists, 2 J NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 297, 316 (2008).
359. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter INA].
360. See, e.g., The American Presidency Project, George Bush, Statement on
Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 (Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117#axzzljYtQfMGX (quoting President George
H.W. Bush as heralding the legislation as "the most comprehensive reform of our
immigration law in 66 years.").
361. INA, supra note 359, § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv). See also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA &
RUTH ELLEN WASEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32564, IMMIGRATION: TERRORIST
GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION AND REMOVAL OF ALIENS 7 (2010); Aiding Terrorists Hearing,
supra note 30, at 129 (statement of Professor Robert M. Chesney).
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aliens from gaining admission to the United States rather than
criminalizing the support activities of American citizens. That
development would be spurred on by the first attack against the
United States by al Qaeda.
Following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1992
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act. 362 The act included what is now section 2339A, a prohibition on
"providing material support to terrorists." Specifically, section
2339A makes it a crime to provide "material support or resources"
to any recipient when the donor knew or intended that the support
was to be used "in preparation for, or in carrying out a violation of"
any one of several crimes specified in the statute.363 As such, section
2339A includes a specific intent element. 364 As originally enacted,
material support included a plethora of items and services and was
defined in reference to the following items and services:
Currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets,
but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not
directly involved in such violations. 365
Critics argued section 2339A did not go far enough in
prohibiting support to terrorists. Specifically, they pointed to the
provision's specific intent standard as creating a pernicious loophole
that would-be supporters could exploit. So long as a donor believed
her aid was being used for a lawful purpose the law did nothing to
preclude that support.366  Consequently, as Professor Chesney
explains, "[a] person could donate thousands of dollars to Hamas or
Hezbollah, for examples, so long as he or she thought the money
might be spent on the political or social services those groups
362. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) [hereinafter VCCA].
363. Id. § 12005(b).
364. David Henrik Pendle, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material Support
Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 777, 784 ("But § 2339A did not
foreclose the possibility of donors supporting criminals: a donor would not be
liable for supporting a criminal so long as he or she did not know or specifically
intend the aid to do so.").
365. VCCA, supra note 362, § 12005(a). This definition has been expanded by
Congress. See also infra note 375.
366. See, e.g., Pendle, supra note 364, at 783.
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provided." 367
Congress would address this loophole through enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 2339B. As was the case with section 2339A, however, it
would take another terrorist attack on American soil to provide the
final impetus. On April, 19 1995, in what remains the worst act of
domestic terrorism on U.S. soil, Timothy McVeigh detonated an
explosive-filled Ryder truck in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in downtown Oklahoma City.368 In response to the attack,
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA).369
Section 303 of the AEDPA created a wholly new material
support offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Critical to the breadth of the
material support provision was a finding by Congress that "foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization
facilitates that conduct."3 70 Section 219 of the AEDPA created the
corresponding foreign terrorist designation system codified at 8
U.S.C. 1189.371 As one practitioner has written, "[a]s the first major
anti-terrorism legislation after a large-scale domestic terrorist attack
in the United States, [§ 2339B] represented an unprecedented
broadening of U.S. anti-terror laws.372
367. Chesney, supra note 38, at 13.
368. See, e.g., David Johnston, Terror In Oklahoma: The Overview: Oklahoma
Bombing Plotted for Months, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at Al.
369. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-21, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
370. Id. § 301(a)(7).
371. Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 150 (statement of William E.
Moschella, Assistant Attorney General) (noting that "[a]lthough 2339B was enacted
in April 1996, it did not become operational until the Secretary of State designated
the first set of 30 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) on October 7, 1997."). Al
Qaeda was not designated an FTO until October 8, 1997. See U.S. Dep't of State,
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Oct. 8, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/
global/terrorism/fto_1999.html#fto (stating that "Al-Qaida, led by Usama bin
Ladin, was added because it is responsible for several major terrorist attacks,
including the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.").
372. Peterson, supra note 358, at 321.
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2. The "Watershed Legislative Development of Terrorist Financing
Enforcement"373
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, once the Secretary of State designates
an organization as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and
publishes that designation in the Federal Register, it becomes a
crime to "knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or [to] attempt[] or conspire[] to do
so."374 Unlike the specific intent mens rea requirement of section
2339A, the donor only needs to know the organization was
designated an FTO when she attempted to provide something
falling within the broad ambit of material support, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).375 A showing that the donor intended to
373. A Review of the Tools to Fight Terrorism, Hearing of the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security of the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 9 (2004)
(statement of Barry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Justice Department,
Criminal Division).
374. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2011).
375. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) states that material support is the same definition
used in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), although Congress has repeatedly expanded the
definition. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act added "expert
advice and assistance" to the statutory list of prohibited items and services. See
PATRIOT Act, supra note 59, § 805(A)(2)(B). Additionally, the PATRIOT Act
increased the potential prison term from 10 to 15 years and if death occurs from a
violation of the statute, an individual may be sentenced to life in prison. Id. §
810(d)(1-2). In 2004, through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA), Congress revised 2339B(a)(1) to unequivocally indicate the mens rea
requirement. The amendment reads as follows: "[t]o violate this subsection, a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization, that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity, or
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism." See Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6602(a), 118 Stat. 3638
(2004) (internal citations omitted). This amendment unambiguously eschewed a
specific intent standard in favor of a more permissive knowledge standard, thereby
precluding any U.S. citizen from providing any assistance to any FTO, regardless of
the donor's intent or the FTO's lawful purposes. As Professors James Dempsey and
David Cole have written, "[i]f this law had been on the books in the 1980s, it would
have been a crime to give money to the African National Congress during Nelson
Mandela's speaking tours here, for the state Department routinely listed the ANC
as a 'terrorist group."' JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 318
(1999).
IRTPA additionally provided definitions for the terms "training" and "expert
advice or assistance." Id. § 6603(b)(2-3). As amended by IRTPA, the definition of
material support, as currently codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) reads as follows:
[T]he term 'material support or resources' means any property, tangible or
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
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further an illegal activity is not required, thereby closing the
loophole presented by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 376 The DOJ's Office of
Legal Education has referred to section 2339B as "the closest thing
American prosecutors have to the crime of being a terrorist." 37
a. The Designation Process: "Terrorism Is Whatever the Secretary of
State Decides It Is"378
As indicated, designation of an organization as an FTO is the
trigger for a section 2339B violation. A brief consideration of the
process is therefore warranted. The process begins in the State
Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
(S/CT), which is responsible for "continually monitor[ing] the
activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify
potential targets for designation." 379  Once S/CT identifies a
possible FTO, it compiles an administrative record, consisting of
both classified and open source information. 380 Per 18 U.S.C. §
1189(d)(4), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury, may then designate the
organization an FTO based upon the administrative record
provided that she determines the following:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization
engages in terrorist activity or retains the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. . . ; and (C) the terrorist
activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
Id. § 6603(b)(1).
376. See, e.g., Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 139 (statement of
Professor David Cole). See also Katherine R. Zerwas, No Strict Scrutiny - The Court's
Deferential Position on Material Support to Terrorism in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5337, 5339-40 (2011).
377. JEFFREY A. BREINHOLT, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC.,
COUNTERTERRORISM ENFORCEMENT: A LAWYER'S GUIDE 264 (2004).
378. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 375, at 119.
379. See U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [hereinafter State/FTOs]
(explaining that "[w]hen reviewing possible targets, S/CT looks not only at the
actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group
has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or
retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.").
380. Id.
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United States nationals or the national security of the United
States.381
Seven days prior to making a designation, the Secretary of State
notifies select members of Congress. 382 Congress then has seven
days to review the proposed designation. 383 At the end of this seven
day period, assuming Congress does not disapprove the
designation, notice appears in the Federal Register. 384 No notice to
the FTO is required. A designation under the act continues for two
years, unless revoked by the Secretary or Congress based upon a
"change in circumstances."3 8 5 There is no limit to the number of
redesignations the Secretary may authorize.
An FTO may seek judicial review of the designation, within
thirty days of publication in the Federal Register, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.386 The
terms of judicial review are, however, largely stacked in the
government's favor. The court is limited to reviewing the
administrative record as well as any classified information
submitted on behalf of the government but the FTO is not allowed
to submit any information. 387 Moreover, classified information is
not disclosed to the FTO but reviewed by the court ex parte and in
camera. 388 The court may only "hold unlawful and set aside" a
designation that it finds to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; (D)
lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a
whole or in classified information submitted to the court under
paragraph (2), or (E) not in accord with the procedures required
by law. 389
Not surprisingly, few FTOs have challenged their designations
381. 18 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2011).
382. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
383. Id.
384. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
385. Id. § 1189(a)(6)(A)(i)
386. Id. § 1189(c)(1).
387. Id. § 1189(a)(3)(B).
388. Id.
389. Id. § 1189(c)(3).
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in court and those that have were unsuccessful in having a
designation overturned. 390  Even when the court has found a
procedural due process violation, deference to the Secretary's
designation has precluded meaningful relief to the FTO. People's
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) is illustrative.
In 1999, in what was the first challenge to the process, two
designated FTOs (PMOI and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)
sought judicial review claiming the designation scheme violated due
process, particularly as the designation made it a crime to donate
money to both groups. 391 The court held for the government,
claiming that "[a] foreign entity without property or presence in this
country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or
otherwise." 392  As neither group possessed such presence or
property at the time of their designation, they were not entitled to
due process. This, however, was not the end to the litigation.
Two years later, the Secretary of State designated the National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) an FTO as it was "an alter ego
or alias of the PMOI." 393 The NCRI claimed a due process violation
and sought judicial review. Unlike the PMOI, the government
acknowledged that the NCRI had an office in the National Press
Building in Washington, D.C., and a bank account in the United
States.394 Relying on the precedent set in PMOI, the court held that
the NCRI was therefore entitled to notice and a hearing. 395 While
the court clearly found a violation of due process, 396 rather than
reverse the designation, it remanded it to the Secretary of State to
take remedial action.397
390. See, e.g., Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86
IND. L. J. 543, 560 (2011); Randolph N. Jonakait, Double Due Process Denial: The Crime
of Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125, 130 (2004).
391. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
392. Id.
393. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F. 3d 192, 197 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
394. Id. at 201.
395. Id. at 209.
396. Id. at 200 ("The United States's defense against the constitutional claims of
the petitioners is two-fold: (1) that the petitioners have no protected constitutional
rights and (2) that even if they have such rights, none are violated. Both lines of
defense fail.").
397. Id. at 209.
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Two years later and for a third time, the Secretary designated
the organization an FTO. In accordance with the court's ruling, the
Secretary provided the organization notice and a hearing. In what
was its third petition to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the organization
advanced the "colorable argument" that the Secretary's use of
classified information in making the designation violated the
PMOI's right to due process. 398 The court, however, ultimately
dismissed the claim, noting that "[tihe Due Process Clause requires
only that process which is due under the circumstances of the case"
and the Secretary had provided the PMOI an opportunity to
respond to the unclassified material. 399 As such, there was no due
process violation.
The actions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in the NCRI/PMOI litigation has led some critics
to claim the deference the court will naturally afford the Secretary's
determination in the area of national security "effectively gives the
Secretary of State a blank check to blacklist disfavored groups." 400
Other criticisms can be identified as well, which are the subjects of
the next two sections.
b. Is Immaterial Material?
A second criticism leveled at section 2339B is it is overbroad as
it criminalizes innocuous behavior absent proof of specific intent to
further illegal activities. 401 DOJ's Office of Legal Education has used
the term "strategic overinclusiveness" in describing terrorist
financing enforcement. 402 Regardless of the term used, section
2339B appears to criminalize seemingly nonthreatening support,
evident in the following colloquy between Justice Sotomayor and
Solicitor General Kagan during oral arguments in Holder v.
398. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) ("Granted, petitioners argue that their opportunity to be heard was not
meaningful, given that the Secretary relied on secret information to which they
were not afforded access.").
399. Id. (holding that "[w]e already decided in NCOR that due process required
the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.").
400. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 375, at 119.
401. See, e.g., Aiding Terrorists, supra note 30, at 142 (statement of Professor David
Cole).
402. JEFFREY A. BREINHOLT, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., TERRORIST
FINANCING 7 (2003), http://justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usab5104
.pdf.
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Humanitarian Law Project:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under the definition of this statute,
teaching these members to play the harmonica would be
unlawful. You are teaching - training them in a lawful - in a
specialized activity. So how do we - there has to be something
more than merely a congressional finding that any training is bad.
GENERAL KAGAN: Well, I think here we have the congressional
definition of what kind of training is bad, and that definition
focuses on training in specialized activities. Now, you say, well,
maybe training a - playing harmonica is a specialized activity. I
think the first thing I would say is there are not a whole lot of
people going around trying to teach Al-Qaeda how to play
harmonica. 403
As Justice Sotomayor observes, while both 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A
and 2339B include the same definition of material support, it is
limited to delineating what activities constitute "material support"
by reference, without explaining why. Webster's defines "material"
as "having real importance or great consequences." 404 Reference to
other statutes employing "material" yields a similar result. In 1988,
for example, the Supreme Court considered what constitutes a
"material representation" for immigration purposes. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia held that "the test of whether ...
misrepresentations are 'material' is whether they can be shown. ..
to have been predictably capable of affecting, i.e., to have had a
natural tendency to affect, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's decisions." 405
Consequently, support that is "material" should denote a
substantial assistance to terrorist activity. In other words, there
should be a discernible nexus between the contribution and a
terrorist act. This is often not the case, however. As a federal judge
in Miami wrote in 2005, "a cab driver could be guilty for giving a
ride to an FTO member to the UN, if he knows that the person is a
member of an FTO." 406 Similarly, Professor David Cole has written,
"[u]nder this law it would be crime for a Quaker to send a book on
403. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498).
404. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary (2012), http://www.merriam-webster.
com/ dictionary/material.
405. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 760 (1988).
406. United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1337 (2005).
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Ghandi's theory of nonviolence ... to the leader of a terrorist
organization in hopes of persuading him to forgo violence." 407
The Board of Immigration Appeals at DOJ considered the
degree of materiality for support to be material in a 2006
immigration case. Although an immigration judge found that S-K, a
citizen of Burma and an ethnic Chin, had a well-founded fear of
prosecution were she to be returned to Burma, the board of appeals
upheld the judge's denial of her application for asylum.408 S-K had
provided material support to the Chin National Front (CNF), "an
organization which uses land mines and engages in armed conflict
with the Burmese Government." 4 09
S-K argued that her contribution to the CNF, consisting of a
pair of binoculars and a small donation of cash, was not material
and went "against congressional intent to tie materiality to terrorist
activity." 410 Sustaining S-K's denial of asylum, the board cited a
Third Circuit case holding that "the provision of very modest
amounts of food and shelter to individuals who the alien reasonably
should have known had committed or planned to commit terrorist
activity did constitute material support."41 1 The board further cited
an assertion made by the Department of Homeland Security in light
of the Third Circuit's decision that "the term 'material' support is
effectively a term of art and that all the listed types of assistance are
covered, irrespective of any showing that they are independently
'material."' 412
The precedent established above has far-reaching
consequences. While there is no denying the effectiveness of section
2339B, 413 the statute has shifted criminalizing behavior away from
407. Cole, supra note 30, at 10. In Professor Cole's example there is no
appreciable nexus between the support (providing a book on nonviolence) and any
terrorist activity, and yet, under 2339B and the Holder v. HLP holding (considered in
section IIIB), the Quaker would be guilty of violating the material support statute.
408. Matter of S-K, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 937, 946 (BIA 2006).
409. Id. at 937.
410. Id. at 942.
411. Id. at 944 (citing Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F. 3d. 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2004)).
412. Id. at 945.
413. See, e.g., BREINHOLT, supra note 377, at 264 (noting that the material support
provision statutes are critical to "one of the most important law enforcement
response to 9/11."). See also Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 8 (statement
of William Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy,
DOJ) ("[Tihe material support statues are an invaluable tool for prosecutors seeking
to bring charges against and incapacitate terrorists before they are able to cause
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actual violence perpetrated by terrorists towards seemingly
innocent conduct, implicating both First and Fifth Amendment
concerns along the way. It is those concerns this article now
considers.
c. Expressive Association and Personal Guilt
Although the Supreme Court considered section 2339B's
constitutional implications at length in Holder v. HLP, it is
worthwhile here to briefly sketch the arguments. Critics maintain
that because section 2339B criminalizes conduct based upon support
of a disfavored group, rather than the actor's intentions, it imposes
guilt by association and violates the First and Fifth Amendments.414
Congress appeared to be mindful of possible constitutional
complications when it wrote the statute. The law specifically
provides that "[n] othing in this section shall be construed or applied
so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 415
At the height of the Cold War the Supreme Court held that "[i]n
our jurisprudence guilt is personal." 416 That case considered the
conviction of Junius Scales. Scales was a regional chairman of the
U.S. Communist Party.417 A district court had found him guilty of
violating the membership clause of the Smith Act, making it a crime
to be a member of any organization advocating the overthrow of the
government by force or violence. 418 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
Scales's conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Scales asserted violations of the First Amendment (the Act
"infringe[d] on free political expression and association") and the
death and destruction."); Jonakait, supra note 390, at 125 ("The criminalizing status,
Section 2339B, creates a major prosecutorial tool in the fight against terrorism.");
Chesney, supra note 38, at 20 ("Prosecutors have made extensive use of the
terrorism-support laws since 9/11."); Cole, supra note 30, at 9 ("Virtually every
criminal 'terrorism' case that the government has filed since September 11 has
included a charge that the defendant provided material support to a terrorist
organization.").
414. See, e.g., Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 142 (statement of
Professor David Cole). See also Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law Project:
Promoting Human Rights in a Post-9/11 World, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 519,
522 (2011).
415. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (2011).
416. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961).
417. Id. at 244.
418. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1956).
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Fifth Amendment ("it impermissibly imputes guilt to an individual
merely on the basis of his associations and sympathies").4 19
Although the Court affirmed Scales's conviction by 5-4, it
introduced the contemporary constitutional test for criminalizing
association.
For Justice Harlan, the author of the majority opinion, the test
begins by assessing an individual's relationship to the
organization's criminal activity. 420 When that relationship can be
characterized as "nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical
member[ship]," personal guilt must be proven to convict the
individual on the basis of the relationship. 4 21 On the other hand, if
the individual was an active member "with knowledge of the
Party's illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about" its
unlawful ends, personal guilt is not required for a conviction. 422 The
Court explained:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by
reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent
overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal
advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by
this Court to be such a relationship. 423
With respect to Scales's First Amendment claim, the Court held
that as he was an active member of the Communist Party and had
the specific intent to violently overthrow the government "as
speedily as circumstances would permit,"424 his speech was not
protected. 425 Nevertheless, the Court held that the First Amendment
circumscribes the government from imposing liability solely on the
basis of an individual's associations. The Court explained, "[i]f
there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group




423. Id. at 224-25.
424. Id. at 220.
425. Id. at 228.
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having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real
danger that legitimate political expression or association would be
impaired."426
Scales therefore stands for the proposition that in order to
criminalize membership in an unpopular organization, the
government must prove the accused was both an active member
and the accused possessed the specific intent to bring about the
organization's illegal activities. 427 The Court has extended these
principles to subsequent First 428 and Fifth429 Amendment
jurisprudence. Holder v. HLP, however, would prove an exception.
B. Developments in the Material Support Provisions: Holder v.
HLP
Holder v. HLP is a seminal case in the development of MST with
far-reaching consequences for the charge of MST at military
commissions. After a series of detainee caseS430 in which the Court
made clear that the executive's "authority and expertise in these
matters do[es] not automatically trump the Court's own
obligation,"431 Holder marks a forceful return to a jurisprudence
426. Id. at 229.
427. Id. at 228-29.
428. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 414, at 527 (noting the Court applied this
reasoning eight years later in the seminal First Amendment case, Brandenburg v.
Ohio). Citing Scales, the Brandenburg Court held that "an 'active' member who has a
guilty knowledge and intent of the aim to overthrow the Government by violence
may be prosecuted." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1969) (internal
citations omitted).
429. See, e.g., Aiding Terrorists, supra note 30, at 141 (statement of Professor David
Cole) ("Recognizing that guilt by association is a philosophy "alien to the traditions
of a free society and the First Amendment itself. . . ." (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982))).
430. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the degree of
control the United States exercised over Guantinamo Bay was adequate to trigger
the application of habeas corpus rights); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment guarantees a citizen held in the United States as
an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision
maker); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding in part that the military
commissions inaugurated by President Bush were invalid as the President failed to
comply with the UCMJ); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that
detainees at Guantdnamo Bay had a right to habeas corpus under the Constitution
and the 2006 MCA was an unconstitutional suspense of that right).
431. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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marked by great deference to executive and legislative judgments. 432
The plaintiffs in Holder sought a declaratory judgment and
injunction to prevent the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.433
Plaintiffs sought to provide varied support, consisting of monetary
contributions, humanitarian aid, legal training, and political
advocacy, to two dual-structured 434 FTOs; the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE).435
The plaintiffs claimed that section 2339B was impermissibly vague
and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that the statute offended their
freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment. 436
Having found the case justiciable, as "[p]laintiffs face[d] 'a credible
threat of prosecution,"' Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, considered each alleged violation.
As a preliminary matter, the Court first considered whether to
apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 437 The plaintiffs had
urged the Court to read a specific intent element into section 2339B.
This would have terminated the litigation as none of the assistance
they sought to provide to the PKK and the LTTE had the purpose of
furthering either groups' terrorist activities. 438 Chief Justice Roberts
declined to do so, as it would be "inconsistent with the text of the
statute." 439 While the plaintiffs argued that the Scales precedent
432. See, e.g., The Supreme Court 2009 Term: Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REv. 259,
267 (2010) (arguing that the Court's methodology "was consistent with approaches
the Court has adopted in cases involving serious but amorphous national security
threats" such as Korematsu v. United States and Dennis v. United States).
433. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714.
434. A dual-structured FTO is an organization that has been designated by the
Secretary of State in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1189, which also engages in lawful
political and humanitarian activities.
435. The Secretary of State designated both groups as FTOs in 1997. See Holder,
130 S. Ct. at 2713. According to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism's most recent list of 49 FTOs, both groups continue to be
designated as FTOs as of September 15, 2011. See State/FTOs, supra note 379.
436. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
437. The doctrine holds that a federal court should rule on a constitutional issue
only as a last resort. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.").
438. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
439. Id. ("Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of §
2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization's connection to terrorism, not
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should apply,440 the Court briefly dismissed that case as
incongruent, writing that Scales only requires a specific intent mens
rea where the statute prohibits membership in a group.441
In his dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer concluded that a construction avoiding the
troublesome constitutional issues was "fairly possible." 442  The
dissent interpreted section 2339B so that "knowingly" described the
words "material support." That is, under the dissent's construct,
section 2339B would criminalize First Amendment protected speech
only when the donor knew or intended that the support would
further the FTO's terrorist acts.443 Although the Court's perfunctory
dismissal of Scales is questionable, 4 4 Chief Justice Roberts appears
to have the better argument. Indeed, as noted above, one of the
purposes in enacting section 2339B was to close the loophole
presented by 2339A's specific intent element." 5
Having concluded that avoidance of the constitutional issues in
this case would "pervert[] the purpose" of the statute, the Court
readily dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment challenge." 6 The
Court concluded that the statutory terms provided by Congress -
particularly in light of numerous revisions - "provide[d] a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited."" 7  Indeed,
the dissent agreed that section 2339B "is not unconstitutionally
vague."448
specific intent to further the organization's terrorist activities.").
440. See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
441. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718 ("This action is different: Section 2339B does not
criminalize mere membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization. It
instead prohibits providing 'material support' to such a group. Nothing about
Scales suggests the need for a specific intent requirement in such a case.") (internal
citations omitted).
442. Id. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
443. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
444. See, e.g., Zerwas, supra note 376, at 5351 ("But, by limiting Scales to its facts,
the HLP Court ignored the plain language of the Scales decision."). See also Shanor,
supra note 414, at 528 ("This holding is significant not only because the Court
arguably sub silentio overruled the Communist Party precedents, but because in so
doing it adopted a vision of the scope of the right of association that potentially
collapses to all but a solitary speech act.").
445. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
446. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
447. Id. at 2720 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
448. Id. at 2731 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The bulk of the opinion concerns the freedom of speech
challenge. The analysis appeared to begin in the plaintiffs' favor.
The Court rejected the government's argument that intermediate
scrutiny should apply. Rather, the Court indicated it would apply
strict scrutiny as the statute regulated the content of what the
plaintiffs could say to the FTOs.449 Despite Gerald Gunther's
famous aphorism that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory and fatal in
fact," Holder proved to be an exception. 450 The Court (as well as the
dissent) had little difficulty determining the "Government's interest
in combating terrorism" is compelling - satisfying the first part of
the strict scrutiny test.45 1
The key question turned on whether section 2339B's means
were narrowly tailored. The plaintiffs argued that their intent
should be dispositive. If, as they argued, their sole purpose was to
promote the FTOs' peaceful ends, the ban on material support
would not be the least restrictive means to further that interest.452
Once again, the Court found plaintiffs' intent inconsequential.
Citing Congress's finding that "foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct,"453
with approbation, the Court explained that even material support
meant to inspire peaceful conduct could be manipulated by FTOs.45 4
"Such support," it continued, is "fungible," as it "frees up other
resources within the organization that may be put to violent
ends."455
The Court failed to cite any case law on this point or undertake
its own evaluation of the facts. Rather, the Court based its
449. Id. at 2725.
450. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006)
(stating that " [t]his phrase, coined by the late legal scholar Gerald Gunther in 1972,
has been called 'one of the most famous epithets in American constitutional law'
and has effectively defined the strict scrutiny standard in the minds of lawyers for
two generations.").
451. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
452. Id.
453. Id. (citing Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
21, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
454. Id. at 2725.
455. Id.
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conclusions on "common sense,"456 the findings made by
Congress,457 and statements of support from the State
Department.458 Ultimately, the majority emphasized the importance
of not substituting its own evaluation of evidence for that of the
executive and legislative branches, concluding, "evaluation of the
facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to
deference."4 59
The dissent pointed to the lack of case law or congressional
support for the proposition that all of the support the plaintiffs
sought to provide was "fungible," 460 and concluded that "the
majority's arguments stretch the concept of 'fungibility' beyond
constitutional limits." 461  Professor David Cole, counsel for the
plaintiffs, raised a forceful point in congressional hearings and
during oral argument that greatly enervates the majority's
"fungibility" or "freeing-up theory." The definition of material
support, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) exempts "medicine and
religious articles" from the definition. 462 Yet, donations of medicine
and religious articles "are just as capable of freeing up resources as
456. Id. at 2726 n.6 ("Both common sense and the evidence submitted by the
Government make clear that material support of a terrorist group's lawful activities
facilitates the group's ability to attract 'funds,' 'financing,' and 'goods' that will
further its terrorist acts.").
457. See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
458. The majority references an affidavit by the acting coordinator for
counterterrorism, Mr. Kenneth R. McKune, twelve times in its opinion. See, e.g.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 ("[t]he experience and analysis of U.S. Government
agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly support Congress's finding
that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations - even those for seemingly
benign purposes - further those groups' terrorist activities.").
459. Id. See also Zerwas, supra note 376, at 5348 ("The Court ultimately based its
finding that the law was narrowly tailored on a tautology: the law was passed
because it was necessary and it could not have been necessary were it not narrowly
tailored.").
460. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2738 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Neither Congress nor the
Government advanced these particular hypothetical claims. I am not aware of any
case . . in which the Court accepted anything like a claim that speech or teaching
might be criminalized lest it, e.g., buy negotiating time for an opponent. . .
461. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
462. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498) ("This is a statute
that doesn't bar all aid, it doesn't even bar all speech. It permits unlimited
provision of religious materials, even if they advocate jihad, but proscribes any
secular material, even if they are advocating peace.").
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the prohibited donations."463 Curiously, the dissent never
addressed this point.
The Court treated the plaintiffs' final claim that section 2339B
violated their freedom of association similarly to the speech claims.
The Court viewed the statute as not prohibiting membership with
an FTO but rather prohibiting "the act of giving material support"
to the FTO. 4M
Under the Court's deferential holding in Holder, it is clear that
the Court will not require a specific intent mens rea to find a
violation of the statute. This is critical as it essentially assures a
conviction on the charge of providing MST in the federal courts.
Holder therefore makes it all the more inexplicable that the
government continues to charge detainees with providing MST
before military commissions, where the same conviction can only be
secured by proving the charge is a traditional law of war violation.
That is the focus of the final section.
C. A Crime by Any Other Name: MST as a Law of War Violation
This section considers the CMCR's two recent holdings that
MST is a violation of the law of war. 465 It begins by considering the
subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions. As military
commissions are Article I courts, their subject matter jurisdiction is
limited, in this case by the Define and Punish Clause. 466 Moreover,
because military commissions' only purpose is to "define and
punish ... Offenses against the Laws of Nations," their jurisdiction
463. Aiding Terrorists Hearing, supra note 30, at 144 (statement of Professor David
Cole).
464. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2730.
465. On June 24, 2011, the en banc United States Court of Military Commission
Review held that Congress had authority under the Define and Punish Clause to
declare MST a violation of the law of war and therefore, the military commission's
assertion of jurisdiction over the charged offenses was proper. United States v.
Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1313 (2011). Less than three months after the
Hamdan decision, the en banc CMCR decided U.S. v. Ali Hamza Ahmd Suliman al
Bahlul, 2011 WL 4916373 (U.S.C.M.C.R., Sept. 9, 2011) (holding that evidence was
sufficient to establish the military commission's subject-matter jurisdiction over the
crimes of MST, conspiracy, and solicitation). As the al Bahlul court relied heavily on
its decision in Handan, the section will focus on the Hamdan decision.
466. Congress specifically invoked the Clause in legislating the 2006 MCA. See
H.R. REP. No. 109-664, pt.1, at 24 (2006) ("The offenses defined here are not new
crimes, but rather reflect the codification of the law of war into the United States
Code pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority to 'Define and Punish []
Offences against the Law of Nations."').
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is limited to law of war violations. The dispositive question is
therefore whether MST constitutes a violation of the law of war.
The final section, which offers a critical analysis of the CMCR's
recent holding in United States v. Hamdan, concludes that MST does
not constitute a law of war violation and therefore exceeds the
limited jurisdiction of military commissions.
1. Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
Depending upon the source of their authority, federal courts
fall into one of two broad categories. Article III of the Constitution
vests "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."467 Article III courts are
courts of broad jurisdiction. 468 Additionally, under Article I of the
Constitution, Congress has the power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court."469 Military commissions are Article I
courts and are therefore courts of limited jurisdiction. 4 70
To prosecute an accused in a military commission, the court
must have subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Military
commissions derive their authority pursuant to Congress's
enumerated power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations.471 Consequently, commissions' jurisdiction is limited to
those offenses which are violations of the laws of war. Were a
military commission to try a crime other than a law of war violation,
it would overreach its special jurisdiction and its pronouncement
would be void. This is an indisputable notion; recognized by the
Judicial, 472 Legislative 473 and Executive branches. 474
467. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
468. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 649 (2004) ("Article III permits
Congress to create lower federal courts and to invest those courts with a broad
range of original and appellate jurisdiction .....
469. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
470. See, e.g., Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy et al., 9 U.S. 173, 179 (1809).
471. U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.").
472. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603 (2006) ("At a minimum, the
Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for which it seeks to
try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to be an offense against
the law of war."). See also Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) ("Neither
Congressional action nor the military orders constituting the commission
authorized it to place petitioner on trial unless the charge preferred against him is
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The law of war is the "customary and treaty law applicable to
conduct of warfare on land and to relationships between
belligerents and neutral states." 4 75 Violations of the law of war are
war crimes. 476 War crimes came to prominence as a result of World
War II and efforts to hold members of the Nazi party responsible for
violations of the international laws and customs governing wars.477
Specifically, Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremburg International
Military Tribunal gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to try those who
had committed war crimes.478
American jurisprudence has required a consistently established
precedent in determining what constitutes a war crime. In 2004, for
example, the Supreme Court held that "[a]ctionable violations of
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
of a violation of the law of war."); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) ("We are
concerned only with the questions whether it is within the constitutional power of
the National Government to place [appellant] on trial before a military commission
for the offenses charged.").
473. See, e.g., 2006 MCA, supra note 19, § 948b(a) ("This chapter establishes
procedures governing the use of military commission to try alien unlawful enemy
combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law
of war and other offenses triable by military commission."); 2009 MCA, supra note
19, at § 948(d) ("A military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to
try persons subject to this chapter for any offense made punishable by this chapter.
. . or the law of war .... ).
474. The President, through two of his representatives, has recognized
commissions' limited jurisdiction to try war crimes. See, e.g., 2009 Military
Commissions Hearing before Armed Services, supra note 65, at 9 (statement of the
General Counsel for the Department of Defense, Jeh Johnson) ("Military
commissions are obviously for violations of the law of war."); id. at 7 (statement of
Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice,
David S. Kris) ("Military commissions can help do the same for those who violate
the law of war - not only detain them for longer than might otherwise be possible
under the law of war, but also brand them as illegitimate war criminals.").
475. DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3
(1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. The law of war is also referred to as international
humanitarian law. See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (2007), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/ other/whatis-ihl.pdf.
476. FM 27-10, supra note 475, at 188.
477. See, e.g., MARKO DIVAC O'BERG, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE
ABSORPTION OF GRAVE BREACHES INTO WAR CRIMES LAW164-65 (2009).
478. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS, AND CHARTER OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL. LONDON, art. 6 (Aug. 8, 1945),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/350-530014?OpenDocument.
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obligatory." 479 Two years later, grappling with whether conspiracy
was a violation of the law of war, the Hamdan plurality held that
such precedent must be by "universal agreement and practice."480
Additionally, the Court held that "[a]t a minimum, the Government
must make a substantial showing that the crime for which it seeks to
try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to be an
offense against the law of war."481
Both Judge Allred (the military judge at Hamdan's commission)
and the Hamdan CMCR disregarded this precedent. Indeed, Judge
Allred's conclusion that the evidence establishing MST as a war
crime is "mixed" 482 clearly runs counter to these holdings, as a
"mixed" precedent cannot be by "universal agreement and
practice." 483 For its own part, the CMCR eschews the universality
standard and instead relies upon an inapposite holding by a federal
district court.484
Notwithstanding Judge Allred's and the CMCR's holdings, the
government would certainly appear to have the weaker argument
that MST constitutes a war crime. MST has never been charged by
an international tribunal, 485 nor does it have any support in current
international treaties or customary law. 486  The International
479. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
480. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603 (2006).
481. Id.
482. Hamdan, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 272, at 5.
483. See, e.g., James G. Vanzant, Note, No Crime Without Law: War Crimes, Material
Support for Terrorism, and the Ex Post Facto Principle, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1053, 1067
(2010). While acknowledging this precedent, Judge Allred chose to defer to
Congressional findings that MST constituted a war crime. See Hamdan, Ruling on
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 272, at 5 ("But where Congress has acted under its
Constitutional authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, a
greater level of deference to that determination is appropriate.").
484. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (quoting United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 189, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)) ("Hence, provided that the acts in question
are recognized by at least some members of the international community as being
offenses against the law of nations, Congress arguably has the power to criminalize
these acts pursuant to its power to define offenses against the law of nations.").
485. T. Jack Morse, Note, War Criminal or Just Plain Felon? Whether Providing
Material Support for Terrorism Violates the Laws of War and Is Thus Punishable by
Military Commission, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-73 (surveying the charged
offenses at Nuremburg, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)).
486. Brief for Salim Ahmed Hamdan at 28, Professor David Glazier as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (2011)
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Committee of the Red Cross, 4 87 a United Nations Human Rights
Council Special Rapporteur, 488 and the United States Congressional
Research Service 489 have all voiced varying degrees of skepticism
that MST is a war crime.
MST is neither identified as a war crime in the U.S. Army JAG
Corps' Law of War Deskbook,490 nor in the War Crimes Act (WCA)
of 1996, which postdates 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 491 The WCA's omission
is particularly revealing. As Professor David Glazier, an amicus
curiae for the petitioner in Hamdan v. U.S., observes, "since Congress
was clearly familiar with the offense at the time of the War Crimes
Act enactment, the fact that it is not included is logically
significant." 492 Finally, the statute of the International Criminal
Court, referred to as "the most comprehensive, definitive and
authoritative list of war crimes . . "493 never mentions the crime of
MST.494
While the CMCR concedes that MST does not appear in any
international treaties or enumerated offenses, the court relies on a
smattering of international and historic irrelevancies to conclude by
analogy that the "underlying wrongful conduct of providing
material support for terrorism ... was a cognizable offense under
(No. 11-1257) [hereinafter Glazier brief].
487. A comprehensive study undertaken by the ICRC in 2005 on customary
international humanitarian law does not discuss MST or any analogous crime. See
1 INT'L. COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
625 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
488. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, 12, U.N. Doc.A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov. 22, 2007),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MISSION,,USA,4757c5f52,0.html
(concluding that the crime of providing material support to terrorism goes "beyond
the offences under the laws of war.") [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report].
489. See, e.g., ELSEA, supra note 180, at 10 ("Similarly, defining as a war crime the
'material support for terrorism' does not appear to be supported by historical
precedent.").
490. BOVARNICK ET AL., supra note 57.
491. See War Crimes Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
492. Glazier brief, supra note 486, at 28.
493. Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another Round,
16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 979, 990 (2005) (quoting Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands, Human
Rights, the Laws of War and International Crimes, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 5 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
494. See generally Rome Statute, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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the law of war." 4 95 Not only is the court's reasoning logically
unsound, but offenses established through analogical reasoning
have been declared by the Supreme Court to be "not compatible
with our constitutional system." 4 96
There is a perfectly logical reason why MST has never been
recognized as a war crime. As noted above, combating terrorism
has largely been the responsibility of domestic law enforcement - at
least until the advent of the war on terror. 497 While it is true the
Bush Administration succeeded in paradigmatically shifting that
responsibility from a fully capable law enforcement to a reluctant 98
military, that shift does not transform a domestic crime into a war
crime. That is precisely what Congress did in incorporating MST in
the 2006 and 2009 MCAs. Whether Congress exceeded its authority
in doing so is the subject of the next section.
2. Does Saying So Make It So: The Define and Punish Clause
At the heart of the debate over military commissions'
jurisdiction lies a power "[r]arely cited by the Supreme Court, relied
upon in only a handful of cases." 499 As the only reference to
international law in the Constitution, the Define and Punish Clause
authorizes regulation by Congress of any subject governed by
international law.500
The historical record indicates that congressional regulation
under the clause is limited to clarifying existing norms of
international law rather than creating wholly new ones.501 For
495. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
496. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972) (holding that
punishment by analogy, though common in Soviet Russia, is incompatible with the
American constitutional system).
497. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
498. See, e.g., Legal Issues Hearing, supra note 13, at 36 (Statement of Rear Admiral
John D. Hutson(Ret.), Former Judge Advocate General of the Navy) (expressing
concerns that the U.S. military's lead role in military commissions will compromise
the military's position as one of the most "highly respected institution[s] in the
United States").
499. Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to 'Define and
Punish.. Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 (2000).
See also United States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1170 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) ("Judicial review of the scope of Congressional authority
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations is infrequent.").
500. Stephens, supra note 499, at 520.
501. See, e.g., id. at 474 ("The debates at the Constitutional Convention made
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example, the English Parliament was similarly circumscribed in
incorporating international legal norms into the domestic code. 502
Before the signing of the U.S. Constitution, Blackstone observed that
Parliament could provide definitional certainty to offenses but did
not have the power to alter their substance.50 3 President Lincoln's
Attorney General endorsed Blackstone's view at the conclusion of
the Civil War. In an opinion as to whether those who conspired to
assassinate President Lincoln could be tried by military commission
Attorney General Speed concluded:
To define is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing
in being; to make is to call into being . . Congress has the power
to define, not to make, the laws of nations ... Hence Congress
may define those laws [and] may modify [those laws] on some
points of indifference. 504
The view that Congress's authority is circumscribed by existing
norms is echoed in much of the contemporary scholarship.os
Finally, in the handful of cases in which the Supreme Court has
considered the Clause, "[t]hese cases indicate that the Clause today
means exactly what the framers intended when they drafted the
Constitution: that is, the Offenses Clause grants Congress the power
clear that Congress would have the power to punish only actual violations of the
law of nations, not to create new offenses."). See also A.J. Colangel, Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and
International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 141 (2007) ("[T]his is not to say that the
founders intended to give Congress free reign to determine offenses against the law
of nations. . It is clear from the drafting history of the Clause that only offenses
established by the 'consent' of nations .. . would qualify.").
502. Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 12, Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (2011) (No. 11-1257)
[hereinafter Conlaw Scholars brief].
503. Id.
504. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71 (quoting James Speed, Opinion of the
Constitutional Power of the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President, 11
Op. Atty. Gen. 297, 299 (1865).
505. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to Define and
Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEx. L. REV. 843, 849 (2007) ("The Law
of Nations Clause is viewed by the majority of academic commentators as a rather
limited power to either enact regulatory statues governing the conduct of
individual persons who violate international law, or to constitute tribunals to
adjudicate the conduct of such individuals."). See also Samuel T. Morison, History
and Tradition in American Military Justice, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (2011) ("If the
distinction between 'making' and 'defining' is substantially correct, it suggests that
Congress has the flexibility to 'modify on some points of indifference' . . but could
not reasonably be construed as having a license to create new offenses out of whole
cloth .... ").
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to impose sanctions on existing violations of international law, but
not to create new norms."506 The CMCR, however, jettisoned these
views in the name of deference. The al Bahlul court held:
On the other hand, there is substantial authority supporting the
Government's position that "greatest deference" is due Congress'
determination that the offenses of which appellant stands
convicted constitute offenses under the law of nations;
particularly where that determination directly implicates both
national security interests in an ongoing armed conflict and
foreign affairs, including interpretation of treaty obligations and
customary international law.50 7
The CMCR's immoderate willingness to defer to Congress,
despite the evidence that the body had exceeded its authority under
the Define and Punish Clause, is an illustration of the court's apathy
toward safeguarding its emphatic role in declaring "what the law
is."508 As the final sections considers, it would not be the court's
last.
3. A Deferential CMCR Creates a New War Crime
The CMCR's Hamdan decision rests on a survey of distinct
sources of international law and dubious American precedent.
Before turning to the substantive issues, the court signals the
deference it will accord the government. Early in the opinion the
court explains:
With the enactment of the 2009 M.C.A., two different Presidents
and two different Congresses have spoken on the issue of how
military commissions should be conducted. After vigorous
Congressional debate, the 2009 M.C.A. did not change the
jurisdiction of military commissions nor did it eliminate the
offense of providing material support for terrorism.509
This deference is, however, misplaced given the well-known
views of the current Administration with respect to MST. In a 2009
Congressional hearing considering revisions to the 2006 MCA, two
representatives of the executive branch urged Congress not to
506. Conlaw Scholars brief, supra note 502, at 21.
507. Al Bahlul, 2011 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71.
508. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
509. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1262 (2011).
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include the charge of MST in the forthcoming 2009 MCA.510 The
court, however, makes no apologies for its selective deference. In a
statement detached from recent Supreme Court national security
jurisprudence,s11 as well as Chief Justice Marshall's maxim in
Marbury v. Madison,512 the Court curiously pronounced that "the
Supreme Court has consistently refrained from interfering in
congressional decisions made pursuant to the national security
clauses."513
The CMCR then turns to the issue at hand. The court's opinion
commits two fatal errors. First, as will be considered in greater
detail below, it conflates the crime of MST with the broader crime of
terrorism. Second, it confounds mere criminal acts with war crimes.
As the court explains, "[w]e have an independent responsibility to
determine whether appellant's charged conduct existed as well-
recognized criminal conduct." 514  That is not the court's
responsibility. Rather, the proper question before the court was to
determine whether MST has substantive, historical precedence as a
war crime and therefore, whether Congress exceeded its authority by
including it in the 2006 and 2009 MCAs. As the court demonstrates,
the fact that the community of nations views terrorism (rather than
MST) as a domestic crime merely supports the view that Salim
Ahmed Hamdan should be tried in the federal courts, not a military
commission with the exclusive authority to adjudicate violations of
the laws of war. In a telling subheading entitled "Criminalization of
Analogous Global Conduct,"5 1 5 the court considers the following
three distinct sources of international law.
510. 2009 Military Commissions Hearing before Armed Services, supra note 65, at
App. G at 46 (prepared statement of the General Counsel for the Department of
Defense, Jeh Johnson) ("After careful study, the Administration has concluded that
appellate courts may find that "material support for terrorism" . is not a
traditional violation of the law of war. We believe it would be best for material
support to be removed from the list of offenses triable by military commission .
."); id. at App. H at 52 (statement of Assistant Attorney General, National Security
Division, Department of Justice, David S. Kris) (noting "there are serious questions
as to whether material support for terrorism or terrorist groups is a traditional
violation of the law of war.").
511. Holder v. Humanitarian notwithstanding, see supra note 430.
512. 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
513. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
514. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
515. Id.
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a. International Conventions and Declarations
With a brief analysis of the four Geneva Conventions and a
smattering of international terrorism conventions, the CMCR
concludes that "international conventions and treaties provided an
additional basis in international law that appellant's charged
conduct in support of terrorism was internationally condemned and
criminal."516 The court's argument appears to be that because acts
of terrorism are internationally condemned, MST is a law of war
violation. In effectuating this leap the court commits three inter-
related errors.
First, the court compounds the distinct crimes of terrorism and
MST.517 While the laws of war criminalize certain terrorist acts, such
as spreading terror among civilian populations,518 such acts, unlike
MST, require a specific mens rea and knowledge by the
perpetrator. 519 As an amicus brief for Hamdan explains, "[c]reation
of a war crime without requiring specific intent and knowledge of
the particular attack and its consequences for civilians would
represent a dramatic and unprecedented change in the Law of
Armed Conflict." 520
Second, and assuming arguendo that crimes of terrorism and
516. Id. at 1284.
517. Both the 2006 and 2009 MCAs define terrorism as:
The intentional[] kill[ing] or inflict[ing] great bodily harm on one or more
protected persons, or intentionally engag[ing] in an act that evinces a
wanton disregard for human life, in a manner calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government or civilian population by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.
2006 MCA, supra note 19, § 950(v)(b)(24); 2009 MCA, supra note 19, § 950(t)(24).
518. See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 69, art. 33 (holding that "all
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited"); APII, supra note 155, art.
4(2)(d) (prohibiting "acts of terrorism" against all persons who do not take a direct
part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities); id. art. 13(2) (prohibiting "acts or
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population").
519. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana & Knodewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 322 (May 28, 2008)
(acquitting defendants of terrorism as they lacked the specific intent to spread
terror); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. It-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 108
(Nov. 20, 2006) (reversing the Trial Chamber's holding as "no reasonable trier of
fact could have reached the Trial Chamber's conclusion that [Galic] had the intent
to spread terror").
520. See, e.g., Brief for Salim Ahmed Hamdan at 4, International Legal Scholars as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d
1247 (2011) (No. 11-1257) [hereinafter ILS brief].
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MST are analogous, neither a single convention nor declaration the
court cites stands for the proposition that terrorism is a war crime.
Quite the contrary, the sources cited by the court merely illustrate
that terrorism is a crime of international concern to be tried by
member states' domestic law enforcement. 521
Third, few of the conventions and declarations the court cites
are analogous in any manner to the crime of MST. Of those that are,
they once again call for punishment under domestic criminal codes
rather than military commissions or international tribunals. 522
Absent from the court's survey is any source standing for the
proposition that MST is a war crime. The absence of a General
Assembly resolution on this point is telling as such resolutions
"serve as valuable hortatory evidence of emerging legal
principles." 523
b. International Criminal Tribunals
The CMCR fares no better in its analysis of international
criminal tribunals. The court relies on the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the proposition that
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is analogous to MST. In a harbinger
of what is to come, the court begins its analysis by incorrectly
identifying Slobodan Miloevid as "Prime Minister." 524
521. U.S. v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1282-83 (2011) ("Describing terrorism
as a crime of international significance, the treaties oblige the parties to criminalize
various facets of terrorism in their domestic criminal codes and to cooperate
amongst themselves to prevent and punish acts of terrorism.").
522. See, e.g., Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism of
1994, G.A. Res. 49/60, §5(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994) ("To ensure the
apprehension and prosecution of extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of their national law."). See also
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G. A.
Res. 54/109, 19, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197, 39 I.L.M. 270 (Dec. 9, 1999) ("The State Party
where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in accordance with its domestic law
or applicable procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.. . .").
523. Gregory J Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876,
876-77 (1983).
524. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. See Prosecutor v. Milo~evid, Second
Amended Indictment, Case IT-02-54-T (July 28, 2004) (explaining that after serving
two terms as President of the Republic of Serbia, Miloievic was elected President of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and served in that position until October 6,
2000).
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During Hamdan's military commission, the military judge
struck all allegations relating to joint criminal enterprise and held
that "the Government may not proceed to trial on its 'enterprise'
theory of liability." 525 Undeterred by Judge Allred's ruling, the
CMCR concludes that "the doctrine brings a similar analytical nexus
to providing material support for terrorism." 526
JCE is a theory of individual liability that allows a crime to be
attributed to a distinct individual so long as that individual was part
of a group intending to perpetrate the crime. 527 The doctrine
requires a synthesis of membership, organizational liability, and
participation by the defendant. 528 As acknowledged by the CMCR,
JCE is not a stand-alone substantive offense. 529
The court focuses its attention on the appeal chamber decision
in Prosecutor v. Tadi6. Duiko Tadid was a Bosnian Serb and former
member of a paramilitary force responsible for an attack on a
predominantly Muslim community in the Prijedor region of Bosnia,
described by a Balkan observer as one of the "most abhorrent cases
of 'ethnic cleansing"' during the Bosnian War.5 30 Although the Trial
Chamber held that Tadi6 had played no role in the killing of five
Bosnian men from the village of Jaskici, the Appeals Chamber
overturned this decision and convicted Tadid on the basis of JCE.531
Because Tadid had taken part in "the common criminal purpose to
rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population" and he had the
intent to "further the criminal purpose," he could be held
responsible for the deaths as they were "foreseeable." 532
The ICTY has identified three instances in which JCE could give
rise to criminal liability. First, the "basic" form of JCE occurs when
525. Appellant's Supplemental Brief on Joint Criminal Enterprise and Aiding
the Enemy at 2, United States v. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, C.M.C.R Case No. 09-002
(Feb. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Appellant's Supplemental Brief].
526. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
527. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 98 (2005).
528. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
529. Id.
530. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBURG 29 (1997).
531. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Judgment by the Appeals Chamber, Case IT-94-1-A
(July 15, 1999), at 1 22 [hereinafter Tadi6, Judgment].
532. Id. 4 1'231-32.
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all co-perpetrators act pursuant to a common plan.533 Second, a
"systematic" form of JCE exists when the common plan is
characterized by systematic ill-treatment and typically occurs in a
detention or concentration camp.534 Finally, an "extended" form of
JCE exists. With this type of liability, an individual such as Tadid
shares a common plan with his co-perpetrators, cleansing, for
example, the Prijedor region. Even were one of the co-perpetrators
to act outside that common plan, by, for example, murdering five
Bosnia men, Tadi6 could be held liable because such a crime were
foreseeable. 535
While all three categories share the same acteus reus, the mens
rea differs slightly. The basic form of JCE liability requires a specific
intent. 536 The systematic form of JCE requires knowledge of the
system of ill-treatment as well as intent to further that system. 537
The extended form requires intent to participate in and further the
common criminal plan as well as an intentional contribution made
toward realizing the common plan."53 8 The contribution to the
common plan "need not be substantive ... [but] should at least be a
significant contribution to the crimes for which the accused is found
responsible. 539 That is to say, the contribution must be material.
Unlike the charge of MST, an immaterial contribution would not be
sufficient. 540
In addition to this intent requirement, JCE can be readily
distinguished from MST in three other respects. First, under all
three types of JCE liability, three elements are required: (1) a
plurality of persons; (2) engaging in a common plan involving the
commission of a crime; (3) and the participation of the accused in
the common plan. 541 None of these elements are required under
MST. Indeed, Salim Hamdan's MST charge contained no references
533. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Judgment by the Appeals Chamber, Case IT-98-32-






539. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1287 (2011).
540. See Id.
541. Vasiljevic, IT-898-32-A, at 100.
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to either an "enterprise," or a "common plan."542 Second, under
JCE, material means material. That is, the contribution toward the
end-state must be significant. Finally, and most significantly, JCE is
not a substantive offense but a form of imputed liability. To draw a
nexus between Hamdan's behavior and JCE is to mix apples and
oranges.
c. Non-United States Domestic Terrorism Laws
In its final section considering sources of international law the
CMCR reviews anti-terrorism laws from Canada, India, and
Pakistan. 543 The CMCR's al Bahlul decision three months later
considers no fewer than eleven nations' domestic efforts at fighting
terrorism. 544 The CMCR obviously found this section persuasive
given its expansive survey in al Bahlul, yet it is entirely irrelevant as
it only serves to again underscore the supposition that terrorism is a
domestic crime. This survey, not to mention the absence of anything
approximating MST, renders this section moot.
d. Historical Precedent for Wrongfully Providing Aid to the Enemy
In the court's final section upholding Hamdan's conviction of
MST the court analogizes MST to the crime of aiding the enemy. In
what is arguably the weakest part of the decision, the court surveys
a number of historical precedents in drawing this analogy. The
court's analysis can withstand only the gentlest of examinations,
and suffers from two fundamental flaws.
First, the precedents considered by the court are entirely
American. Indeed, one writer has commented that the Hamdan
decision "represents the apotheosis of the United States' utterly self-
referential approach to international law." 54 5 As the practices of a
single state cannot establish a norm for the law of nations,546 the
court's failure to consider the practices of a sampling of states
542. Appellant's Supplemental Brief, supra note 525, at 16.
543. Hamdan, 801 F.Supp. 2d at 1289-92.
544. United States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1198-1201 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) (surveying domestic anti-terrorism legislation from
Brazil, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, and
Sweden).
545. Heller, Opinio Juris Blog, supra note 18.
546. See, e.g. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) (holding that a "comity,
courtesy or concession [must] grow, by the general assent of civilized nations .... ).
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greatly undermines its analysis.
Second, the precedent with which the court begins - the First
Seminole War - and the execution of two British citizens for
allegedly assisting the Seminoles5 47 is "one of the most notorious
episodes in the annals of American history." 548 Indeed, on March
24, 2011, the General Counsel to the Seminole Tribe of Florida wrote
to Secretary of Defense Gates requesting that the government
withdraw the "highly offensive and historically inaccurate" al Bahlul
brief to the CMCR.549 On April 7, 2011, Department of Defense
General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, issued a formal apology to members
of the Seminole tribe.550 Likely aware of the incident, the CMCR
wrote in its decision that it "takes no comfort in the historical
context in which these events occurred" and cites them only "as an
embryonic effort of the United States to deal with the complexity of
fighters in irregular warfare."5 5 1
Although the charge of aiding the enemy "is almost as old as
warfare itself," 552 and although Hamdan was never charged with
547. In 1818, then Major General Andrew Jackson led an invasion into Spanish
Florida at the incitement of slave-holders whose slaves had fled to Florida. In
addition to resisting Jackson's forces, both the runaway slaves and the Seminole
Indians residing in Florida had supported the British during the War of 1812.
During hostilities, Jackson's forces captured two British citizens, Alexander
Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister, believed to have been aiding the Seminoles. The
two men were tried by military commission, found guilty of aiding, abetting, and
comforting the enemy by supplying them with the means of war, and executed. See
Morison, supra note 505, at 140-45; David Glazier, The Laws of War: Past, Present, and
Future: Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT'L
L. 5, 27 (2005). See generally JOHN MISSALL & MARY Lou MISSALL, THE SEMINOLE
WARS: AMERICA'S LONGEST INDIAN CONFLICT (2004).
548. Morison, supra note 505, at 123. See also Motion for Leave to File a Reply
Brief at 26-27, U.S. v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul, C.M.C.R. Case No. 09-
001 (Mar. 15, 2011) (quoting JOSHUA R. GIDDONS, THE EXILES OF FLORIDA 37 (1858)
("Perhaps no portion of our national history exhibits such disregard of international
law, as this unprovoked invasion of Florida."); WINTHROP, supra note 64, at 465
("Thus, Arbuthnot's execution was "wholly arbitrary and illegal. For such an order
and its execution a military commander would now be indictable for murder.").
549. Letter from Jim Shore, Gen. Counsel, Seminole Tribe of Florida, to Hon.
Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense (Mar. 24, 2011), available at
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2011/03/25/17/SeminoleLtr. toHon.
Robert Gates_1_.source.prodaffiliate.56.pdf.
550. Carol Rosenberg, Pentagon Lawyer Regrets Serminole-al Qaeda Analogy, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/08/2158076/pentagon-
lawyer-apologizes-for.html.
551. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1295 (2011).
552. Id. at 1292.
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the offense, questions of interpretation garnered considerable
attention from the CMCR. On February 3, 2011, the court requested
a supplemental brief from counsel on whether "the offense of aiding
the enemy [is] limited to those who have betrayed an allegiance or
duty to a sovereign nation." 553
According to the government's brief, while it is true that
Hamdan was not charged with aiding the enemy, the material
support he provided to al Qaeda could be characterized as conduct
equivalent to the offense of aiding the enemy. If, however, a duty of
allegiance is required to complete the offense, Hamdan, a Yemeni
citizen with no ties to the United States, clearly would not be guilty
and the analogy would fail. The government therefore cites
approvingly to the executions of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, British
subjects residing in Spanish Florida during the First Seminole War,
for the proposition that their conduct was tantamount to aiding the
enemy under the Articles of War. The fact that they were British,
the government argues in its brief, is "indicative of the fact that
Aiding the Enemy was not understood to contain a 'silent element'
or breach of duty or allegiance."554 Additionally, as the government
correctly notes, neither Article 81 of the Articles of War nor Article
104 of the UCMJ includes a duty of allegiance as an express
element.555
According to Appellant's brief, absent a duty of allegiance,
which Hamdan did not possess, there can be no crime of aiding the
enemy. 556 Logic compels such an interpretation. The construct
supported by the government would have no limitations. In such a
case, all enemy combatants - privileged and unprivileged alike -
would be guilty of war crimes, merely by taking up arms against the
United Sates, regardless of whether they scrupulously complied
with the law of war.55 7 History further compels this reading. No
less an authority than Winthrop has explained that aiding the
enemy was "treasonable." 558 As such, the essence of the offense is
553. Issues for Briefing and Order for Oral Argument, United States v. Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, C.M.C.R Case No. 09-002 (Feb. 3, 2011).
554. Id. at 16.
555. Id. at 15-16. See also War Dep't, The Articles of War Approved, June 4, 1920,
at art. 81; 10 U.S.C. § 904, MCM (2008), Part IV, 28.b.
556. Appellant's Supplemental Brief, supra note 525, at 21.
557. See, e.g., Morison, supra note 505, at 132; Appellant's Supplemental Brief,
supra note 525, at 17.
558. Winthrop, supra note 64, at 629. See also Morison, supra note 505, at 135 n.40
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not the support given, but "the breach of fidelity it entails."55 9
Furthermore, the 2010 Manual for Military Commissions requires "a
breach of an allegiance or duty to the United States" 560 as the first
element for the offense. Released on April 27, 2010 - well in
advance of the CMCR's Hamdan decision, the court curiously never
refers to the Manual.
In what has now become its modus operandi, the court punts the
difficult question of whether aiding the enemy lends support to the
charge of MST as a war crime if Hamdan had no duty of allegiance
to the United States. Rather, after asking for supplemental briefs
and entertaining oral arguments on that very question, the court
dismisses the very issue it initiated. The court writes, "It is
unnecessary for this Court to determine whether aiding the enemy
under Article 104, UCMJ, applies in this case because appellant is
not charged with violating Article 104, UCMJ. We look to the law of
war for the historical underpinnings of providing material support
for terrorism."5 61  That is precisely what the court of military
commission review failed to do.
IV. Conclusions
Times of national emergency test a nation's values. Following
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and fearing another attack, the
Roosevelt Administration interned over 120,000 people of Japanese
descent living in the United States. 562 It took the United States forty-
six years to close that ignominious chapter in American history and
issue a formal apology and compensation. 563 The war on terror
similarly compromised the nation's values, particularly in the quest
for justice for the enemy and the decision to try suspected terrorists
by military commissions.
Nevertheless, after two overhauls of the entire system,
Americans can be proud of the current military commissions
(quoting Captain Jabez W. Loane, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43,
80 (1965) (referring to aiding the enemy as "the military law of treason.").
559. Morison, supra note 505, at 132.
560. 2010 MANUAL FOR COMMISSIONS, supra note 172, at IV-20, 26(a).
561. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 n.130 (2011).
562. See, e.g., TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 217 (2004).
563. See, e.g., Katherine Bishop, Day of Apology and 'Sigh of Relief,' N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1988, at Al.
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system. In addition to the federal courts, military commissions are
at long last a viable instrument in bringing to justice those who
would harm America while staying true to the values and ideals of
the world's most vibrant democracy. Total redemption, however,
remains deferred.
Military commissions continue to charge suspected terrorists
with the offense of providing material support to terrorism. This
article has argued that to truly understand that offense, one must
view it in the larger context of the nation's initial response to the
attacks of 9/11. The Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed
just days after the 9/11 attacks, provided the theoretical
underpinnings for what would become the Bush Doctrine, a
sweeping credo that those who support terrorism, in any capacity,
are as guilty as those carrying out the attacks. President Bush's
November 13, 2001, Order authorizing military commissions
provided the venue for which the charge of material support could
bring the Bush Doctrine into final fruition.
Notwithstanding a pair of highly deferential decisions recently
handed down by the Court of Military Commission Review, the
charge of material support for terrorism cannot be said to constitute
a violation of the laws of war. Consequently, military commissions
have no jurisdiction over that charge. And yet, Congressional
restrictions in the 2011 and 2012 National Defense Authorization
Acts make military commissions the only vehicle for trying many
suspected terrorists. Assuming commissions continue to charge
MST, their credibility will therefore remain compromised.
Regardless of the nation's mistakes since 9/11, the truest
strength of this country lies not in its military power but in its
comnuitment to enduring values of humanity and justice. As the
President affirmed in his Nobel lecture, "We lose ourselves when
we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we
honor ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is
hard." 564 The history of military commissions over the past decade
is testament that the nation constantly seeks to better our system
and our world and correct our mistakes. One final error must be
corrected before complete redemption is achieved.
564. See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the
Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.
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